

# **APPENDICES**

## Control over female ‘Muslim’ bodies: culture, politics and dress code laws in some Muslim and non-Muslim countries

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Control of the female body is a key component of both the formation of Muslim identities and the control of Muslim communities in European countries. I will argue that the regulation of the clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, share the same goal: the control of women’s bodies. In this respect, I will consider both the legal regulations that require women to wear the so-called ‘Muslim’ clothing and those that restrict it as a way of disciplining the population, and will focus on the control of women as a privileged form of political control.

**Keywords:** women; Muslims; dress code; regulations; intersectionality; Islamophobia

In 2010 in Madrid, a teenage girl was expelled from secondary school for wearing a hijab,<sup>1</sup> or Muslim headscarf, while laws were being debated in Europe about banning the niqab. Although they only had a direct impact on girls who wore the hijab (*muḥajabat*) and the niqab (*munaqabat*), they affected the entire community since this offensive damaged representations of Islam in general.

Almost five thousand kilometres away from Madrid, in Iran, a group of political leaders launched an initiative against vice which basically entailed stiffening the dress code for women and even cracking down on suntans. Somewhat closer, in Gaza, girls who wanted to go to university were required to wear headscarves. There appears to be a similarity here to the efforts to ban or restrict headscarves for Muslim women in Europe. Why did this compulsive urge to ban headscarves emerge in Europe when the exact opposite was taking place in many Muslim countries? On what were the two types of proscriptions based and what do the processes have in common? How do they differ?

This article investigates these questions, bringing together the results from several research projects carried out in different contexts and time periods on the Muslim diaspora in Europe, mainly France and Spain.<sup>2</sup>

I will argue that the regulation of clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, share the same goal: the control of

women's bodies. Usually, questions related to the regulation of Muslim women's clothing<sup>3</sup> have been examined in the scholarly literature either from the perspective of legislation that imposes it, as in Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, or from the perspective of legislation that restricts it, which is the situation in a growing number of European countries with strong Muslim minorities.<sup>4</sup> In general, the dominant perspectives have been legal (Motilla 2009) or have analysed the regulations with regard to human rights (McGoldrick 2006), liberalism (Joppke 2009), the formation of national identities (Bowen 2006) or political discourse in connection with Islam (Scott 2007). These analyses have remained within local or national spheres. The objective of this article, however, is more far-reaching. I will consider both the legal regulations that require women to wear the so-called 'Muslim' clothing and those that restrict it as a way of disciplining the population, and will focus on the control of women as a privileged form of political control. In Muslim contexts, they establish a strong sexual and social hierarchisation, while in non-Muslim contexts a sexual and ethnic stratification is created. The fact that these regulations appear in times of intense crisis in the system reveals their importance as tools to regulate the population in preparation for exceptional measures, with heavy impositions or reductions in rights or changes to the system directly.

The focus of my work is on the legal restrictions of Muslim women's clothing. This article will analyse the contexts of prohibition, regulation and the imposition of Muslim clothing in Muslim and non-Muslim spheres as part of a process of extending control over women and minorities, the product of the need to legitimise neoliberal policies in much of the world, associated with a high degree of authoritarianism. The first part of the paper describes the process of hijabisation that has taken place in Muslim contexts, including situations where it is not an institutional or state imposition, but the result of a series of decisions related to religiosity. This is followed by a review of the laws regulating women's clothing in some Muslim countries and European states. In the final reflection, I attempt to explain the logic behind these restrictions within the framework of reinforcing control of women and Muslims as subaltern populations.

### **Hijabisation and dress codes**

The process behind the expanded use of the hijab, or what Rema Hammami (1990) has termed *hijabisation*, has accompanied an increase in Muslim dress regulations. The imposition of this article of clothing is one reason for its more widespread use, but not the main one. Hijabisation generally obeys a logic unrelated to any imposition. Many women began to adopt it as a militant act in the 1970s when they became involved in political action through their participation in the Islamist political projects that formed part of a belated revolt, in many places, against the violent colonial project of westernisation or as a means of political resistance. As a consequence of these battles, the hijab was legitimised and many women felt more dignified and freer wearing it.

Islamism gave many women the opportunity to enter the public sphere, fighting for causes and in structures that did not denigrate their status.<sup>5</sup> As a visible sign of this political commitment, the headscarf played a fundamental role in these battles (Göle 1995). The hijab went from being a sign of submission in the eyes of colonial modernity to becoming a sign of assertiveness, and women actively appropriated it (Göle 2003). Nilüfer Göle (2003) draws on Erving Goffman's concept of stigma to argue that Islamism can be seen as a political and collective form of the 'management of spoiled identity' since, as a social movement, Islamism encourages political actors to voluntarily adopt

the religious attributes that are considered potentially discrediting from the point of view of the normative framework of a modern culture. Islamist movements turn the 'undesired differentness' of being a Muslim into a voluntary adoption of a stigma symbol that is overtly claimed and offensively communicated in public (Göle 2003, 810).

For some authors, this process corresponds to a kind of Islamisation that extends across the Muslim world, including the diaspora. The process has been called, to paraphrase the North American neocon offensive, the 'other conservative revolution', in which the role of new preachers has been key (Haenni 2005). With the support of the media, they contributed to the extension of certain models of public morality, both within and outside of Muslim countries.<sup>6</sup> This embodiment of the Islamic female has been on the increase in recent years, during which time the processes of globalisation have modified Islam, explicitly influencing the question of the headscarf, and a kind of Muslim aesthetic has become a topic of emerging importance. Scholars speak of market Islam (*Islam de marché*) (Haenni 2005), Islamic gentrification (Abaza 2004) and Islam and commodification (Hasan 2009). Market Islam has enabled Islamic consumption, marketing strategies for these products (Moors and Tarlo 2007), and the creation of a Muslim body. In a quite different vein, Mahmood (2004) argues that a fundamental key to understand hijabisation lies in the pietistic movements and their attachment to the headscarf as part of their physical representation. Indeed, Islam, as it is experienced in a substantial part of the Muslim world – including the diaspora – is a strongly embodied religion, according to the concept established by Thomas Csordas (1990). Women fill the sphere of this embodiment.

Representations of Muslim women's bodies lie at the centre of Islam's relations with the Western world where ways to control Muslim populations include the control of the bodies of a segment of the population. However, even when it is voluntary and responds to this type of process, from the Western point of view, the headscarf is always explained as a symbol of backwardness and the subordination of women. It formed part of the construction of a colonial discourse that differentiated the coloniser from the colonised, and even today continues to dominate relationships with Muslims (Ahmed 1992).

The threat of Islamic terrorism, especially after 9/11, intensified the rejection of Muslims. The prevention of new attacks has been used as a pretext for military intervention in the Muslim world and to impose regulations on the Muslim population residing in Europe.<sup>7</sup> The *liberation* of Muslim women has become a fundamental part of the arguments supporting the different forms of this domination, and the construction of these women coming out of Europe is based on a representation of the body that includes the hijab. The headscarf – followed by the niqab – concentrates the entire construction of Muslim alterity in the West, and it has become an object that structures a large part of the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in the world.<sup>8</sup> It appears in very different discourses in politics, feminisms, municipal management, discussions of human rights and the question of the presence of Muslim girls in schools. The main argument for banning its use is the liberation of women.

At times, however, the process of hijabisation is the result of state imposition, as the state passes laws that require that women – almost never men – to wear what is considered Muslim clothing. Some Muslim countries have legal regulations regarding dress codes for women. By the time these regulations are enacted, women's rights have usually been considerably reduced and the dress code is merely the culmination of a situation of serious deprivation; the clothing restrictions are just one more element of domination. In many cases, regulations that legally subordinate women in terms of their civil rights exist and women cannot always decide whom they will marry, travel alone, or pass on their nationality to their descendants.<sup>9</sup>

The following section analyses some of the most classic cases in the Muslim world where the hijab is compulsory by law and relates these regulations to larger social and political contexts.

### **Compulsory dress codes in Muslim countries**

On a number of occasions, hijabisation is directly imposed by a state that presents itself as Muslim. Usually, these visible measures form part of a larger package of what could be called 'gender politics', a type of socio-legislative system that constructs a model of society in which the woman question is central (Ramírez 2011). While many regulations and gender politics are used to socially construct the model of a woman, dress codes give state interventions immense visibility, making the state appear ubiquitous and able to exercise its control in all places.

There are two types of situations in which hijabisation occurs by imposition. The first corresponds to the contexts of intense conflict, with open battles between different groups. In this case, dress codes are applied in specific areas or cities using circulars or local media that may contradict the overarching legislative framework. Examples include Indonesia, Chechnya,<sup>10</sup> Sudan,<sup>11</sup> Nigeria and Palestine (Abdulhadi 1998; Hammami 1990). In the second situation, laws regulating clothing are decreed from the highest judicial levels, which can legislate sanctions and use security forces to make sure they are applied

effectively. Between these two positions runs an entire gamut of possibilities regarding the means of pressure and the type of clothing prescribed. The required garments include the hijab, but also usually incorporate apparel seen as traditional and indigenous, so that consideration of the post-colonial nationalist framework is fundamental. Two of the best-known cases involving the imposition of a dress code are Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.

The regulation of women's bodies as a political obsession began in Afghanistan in the camps – controlled by the CIA and Pakistani secret services – of Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the 1970s (Gul Khattak 2002), where the *mujahideen* were being trained to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Gul Khattak 2004). Fatwas were used to control the women in the camps who, in the absence of men, could not contact with anyone and were required to wear a hijab. The Taliban's successful advances against the *mujahideen*, beginning in 1994, were sanctioned by new decrees that restricted some women's rights (Dupree 1998). For instance, under the Taliban, women were forced to dress 'decently', wearing a *chadari* (called a burqa<sup>12</sup> in Arabic), and could not leave the house unless accompanied by a *mahram*.<sup>13</sup> The specific regulations on clothing were very strict and included edicts concerning the colour and thickness of the *chadari* as well as forbidden ornaments (earrings, heels, perfume), rendering the woman on the street invisible. These measures formed part of an enormous collection of laws regulating the status of women during the Taliban period in the areas under their control. In addition to the regulation of clothing, other measures prohibited working and studying, wearing make-up, speaking with non-*mahram* men, laughing or speaking loudly and being seen through the windows of their homes.<sup>14</sup> After the fall of the Taliban, Hamid Karzai's government modified only the discourse about women; the real situation did not change, due to agreements between Karzai and the local notables who promoted discrimination and continue to do so (Gul Khattak 2004; AI 2003). However, despite the importance of the repression embodied by the burqa, for many critics the representation of Afghan women as solely victims of Taliban violence as represented by the burqa only serves to emphasise racism and imperialism (Gul Khattak 2004).

Saudi Arabia offers a second case of clothing regulation. Women there must wear a niqab, and the only parts of their bodies that they can show that are not *awrah*,<sup>15</sup> are their hands and eyes. The only garment that women are seen wearing is the *abaya*, a large, loose tunic with long sleeves. Clothing regulations in Saudi Arabia, as in other places, are the culmination of a series of rules with respect to women that go beyond the simple regulation of public morals. Included among the measures that followed the harsh repression of political-religious resistance in 1979, they were designed to restrain Western influence in Saudi Arabia (Doumato 2000). From the state's point of view, it was much easier, politically speaking, to demonstrate anti-westernisation using the woman question than by targeting businesses, relations with the United States or consumption by the royal family. An institution, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue

and the Prevention of Vice (known by its first word in Arabic, HAIA) was even created and staffed by a group of volunteers or *mutawain* who act as a moral police force, ensuring that women follow the rules (Yamani 2008), which have proliferated and continually contradicted existing ones.<sup>16</sup> These regulations include the requirement to travel with the written permission of a guardian or tutor and a ban on working in most jobs, talking to strangers, browsing the internet if not in the presence of their *mahram*, wearing hijabs with prints or decoration, making commercial transactions without their *mahram*, having an identity card without their *mahram's* authorisation, allowing their face to be photographed and driving (Yamani 2008; Doumato 2000).

In Muslim countries where these types of regulations exist, the control of women is a fundamental part of their politics, and women's bodies are defined by dissidents as a site of resistance against power. Dress codes are the culmination of social policies that define a citizenship of gender based on specific legislation that draws the body; therefore, the definition of the body becomes the definition of citizenship for women. Moreover, this occurs publicly and permanently, since the application of dress codes requires public, police and parapolice control that authorises any male member of the community to enforce compliance. This means that any man can act as a moral judge of women's bodies, something that reinforces female subordination and vulnerability.

While some Muslim states require women to wear Muslim clothing, others restrict its use. This is the case with most European countries. The following section provides an overview of legislation regarding clothing in Europe and discusses how the processes leading to these restrictions took place with respect to Muslim states.

### **Citizenship of gender: regulations regarding the hijab and niqab in Europe**

The 'headscarf problem' emerged in Europe in the 1980s. Those years coincided with an increase in the role of Islam in political mobilisation both on the continent and beyond. After the definitive end of colonialism as a form of political and administrative domination, transnational migrations led to the consolidation of a subaltern population within European borders. The whole legal and media debate regarding the headscarf resulted in a re-inscribing of the Muslim population – almost always of immigrant origin – as a place of submission, and its construction as subject to regulation because of certain cultural *essences* attributed to it. The debate has arisen in France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Spain and Sweden, among other places.

In almost all European countries, the solution to the 'hijab problem' has been the drafting or re-drafting of laws or regulations limiting the use of the hijab in certain public situations or establishments. On occasion, at the request of concerned *muhajabat*, the European Court of Human Rights has intervened (Martínez Torrón 2009), almost always taking the side of the governments.<sup>17</sup> From the beginning, the entire question in Europe has been appropriated from or

infected by the structure of the French *affaire du foulard*,<sup>18</sup> which, of course, was defined by local issues, including relations with the immigrants from the old Maghreb colonies, particularly Algeria, and their descendants.

In each country, the legal framework for controlling attire varies. Prohibitions or restrictions in Europe have been established within the margins allowed by law. These laws, which regulate the spaces for religion and difference in society, vary from country to country. Each one has its own systems for regulating immigration and Islam and different incorporation models (Soysal 1994). In each country, the management of Islam is explained from this intersection, and regulating the hijab is approached within this context. The arguments on which the laws and regulations have been based are very different in nature, ranging from the idea that religion in the public sphere is incompatible with general regulations, to the construction of the headscarf as discriminatory for women or as a reflection of isolation, etc. However, they all agree that the hijab – the embodiment of negative representations about Islam – is a social threat (Table 1).

No correlation can be established between the percentage of Muslims in the total population and the existence and stiffness of the regulations. While Spain is the country with almost the lowest percentage of Muslims, it was one of the first to deliberate regulations regarding the niqab and it applies them in some municipalities. Furthermore, the municipalities that have banned the veil are not the ones with the highest percentage of immigrants. In fact, one of them Tarrés has no immigrants or Muslims,<sup>19</sup> but the ban has been discussed.

France was the pioneer, banning the hijab in schools through the enactment of Law 2004–228, the so-called ‘Law on Secularity’, which regulates the use of any symbols or attire that show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools. In 2010, Law 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010 was enacted, banning the niqab in all public French spaces. Belgium was expected to enact a similar law regarding the niqab and some cities and municipalities in Catalonia began to ban it in 2010 (Ramírez 2011). Until laws are enacted, these issues usually hang in a real legal limbo, resulting in a situation in which the rights of women who wear the hijab or niqab are endangered.

The trend in European countries is towards placing greater restrictions on the presence of Islamic garb in public spaces, including the street. Measures have been stiffened, particularly since the economic crisis of 2008, as a way to channel the social discontent felt in broad sectors of the indigenous population. The terrorist acts carried out by al-Qaeda networks in Europe have added additional arguments in support of the measures. Generally speaking, despite the diversity of relations between different religions and states, the discourses and objectives of the regulations do not vary much. The countries have been exporting their so-called ‘problem’ along with the most exclusionary solutions for the population. Up to now, countries with a strong tradition of pluralism and tolerance and those that are markedly religious have refrained from enacting regulations.

The main issue is that prohibitionist policies, with their supporting arguments, are merely manifestations of the anti-Muslim or anti-Maghreb policies of



Table 1. Summary of prohibitions regarding the hijab and niqab in Europe.

	Percentage of Muslims in the country <sup>1</sup>		Hijab <sup>2</sup>		Niqab	
	Prohibition	Type	Year	Prohibition	Type	Year
France	Yes	National. Public school.	2004	Yes	National. Public domain.	2010
Belgium	Yes	Local/school regulations/ different spheres.	1989	Yes	National. Outdoor public areas, public places.	2010
Holland	Yes	Local/school regulations.	–	Yes	National. Primary and secondary schools.	2008/2010
Italy	No				Corrective measures in other areas.	
Germany	Yes	Federal regulations for female professors in schools.	Since 2004	No.	Some municipalities, unauthorised.	
Turkey	Yes	Universities and other public bodies.	1934	Not specifically; understood as part of the hijab prohibition.		
United Kingdom	No			No		
Spain	Yes	'Informal' prohibition. School regulations, courts.	2010	Yes	Some municipalities.	2010
Switzerland	Not explicit	Female professors expelled from work.	2001	Yes	One canton.	2010
Norway	No			No		
Denmark	No			No		
Sweden	No			No		

Source: Prepared by the author using a reconstruction of the cases (see Ramírez 2011<sup>3</sup>)

Note: <sup>1</sup>Data from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2009). I use Unicode symbols, which are common both in the Latin and Anglo-Saxon world. When the percentage of the Muslim population is approximately 'the same as', I use the symbol '~'; To indicate that the percentage is lower than the number shown, I use the symbol '<~'.

<sup>2</sup>The dates reflect the first time that a prohibition is recorded.

<sup>3</sup>In Ramírez (2011), the author reconstructs the case histories using the press and interviews. There is not enough space here to reproduce all the references in the table. See the note on methodology at the beginning of the article.

European states, which are, in short, racist and are implemented with ever greater impunity. Islamophobia rules over relationships with Muslims in Europe, although according to Fred Halliday (2003), it would be more correct to speak of anti-Muslimism, since the term ‘involves not so much hostility to Islam as a religion...but hostility to *Muslims*, to communities of people whose sole or main religion is Islam and whose Islamic character, real or invented, forms one of the objects of prejudice’ (160). This distinction is very interesting, since hostility towards Muslims at times circumvents Islam, with the precise aim of fortifying anti-Muslimism.

Studies in Europe speak of a change from the old-school Islamophobia anchored in colonial relationships to a new one, linked to attacks and the identification of Islam with terrorism (Geisser 2003). What is unique about this new situation with Islam, for Pnina Werbner, is that

what we have, then, uniquely in the case of contemporary Islam, is an oppositional hegemonic bloc which includes intellectual elites and the consumerist masses, as well as ‘real’ violent racists, like members of the British National Party, who exploit anti-Muslim discourses to target Muslims in particular (as statistics show) for racial attacks (Werbner 2005, 8).

This definition is perfectly illustrated by the strange political and social alliances formed in the debates and discussions on banning the headscarf and niqab. In one of the latest studies in Europe on this issue, Fernando Bravo López (2011) argued that Islamophobia is a reaction to the emancipation of Muslims in Europe, designed to reverse its effects and legitimise inequality. In this respect, according to this author, the comparison with anti-Semitism offers quite a useful platform for analysis.

A very specific and at times contradictory construction of Muslim women forms part of anti-Muslimism. From this perspective, the concept of intersectionality as initially developed by Crenshaw (1989) is a useful one. This author holds that the subordination of Black women is not limited to the interaction of gender and race. The ‘intersectional experience’ (89) reaches far beyond the sum of racism and sexism. Thus, only an analysis that considers the intersectionality of the two contexts of domination can account for Black women’s experience of subordination. The paradigm of intersectionality is also valuable when considering the domination – using the legal regulation of clothing – of Muslim women, replacing race with Muslimness.<sup>20</sup> The subordination of Muslim women can only be understood within a framework that considers the interrelationships between sexism (inside Muslim communities as well as with respect to non-Muslims) and anti-Muslim racism or Islamophobia. In both cases, the identity politics are based on the bodies of Muslim women by means of hyper-regulation. The result is that Muslim women experience racism in different terms than Muslim men, just as they experience sexism differently than non-Muslim women.

Usually, the Islamophobic image of women is that of submission and subordination<sup>21</sup> combined with ignorance, although they sometimes become accomplices in the fundamentalist threat. Some authors have used the term 'gendered Islamophobia' (Zine 2006; Mijares and Ramírez 2008) to define this process. The condition of backwardness and subordination ascribed to these women has served to present their male companions as authoritarians and abusers. This makes it possible to justify a long series of events in the relationship between East and West, from the French occupation of Algeria to the invasion of Afghanistan. Gendered Islamophobia also forms the basis of a significant proportion of the arguments used in debates on the headscarf and niqab across Europe. The persistence of the subalternity of these women (Ramírez 2010) and the excuse of freeing them from the male-Muslim yoke (Abu-Lughod 2002) have become the most commonly used discursive bases for banning Islamic garb. This is due to the fact that the hijab or the niqab is an essential part of the construction of the exotic subalternity of Muslim women.

It is important to remember that in Europe, legal limitations and dress codes apply to only the half the population they are designed to control, that is women. Under these regulations, women wearing Islamic garb have only partial access to citizenship. The legal regulations merely serve as a *de facto* sanction of a situation, since the women are already marginalised for wearing headscarves. Thus, in the 'Europe of Rights', Muslim women are doubly discriminated against, by virtue of their sex and their Muslimness. Their reified cultural difference reinforces their gender difference, constructing a strongly gendered citizenship. In the different cases, the prohibitions against the hijab and niqab express an idea of who can be a citizen in this territory and how. They all establish a boundary between being and non-being, because the clothing is defined as the carrier of values that run contrary to those of the country and to maintaining social peace. In these definitions, women bear the burden of complying or not with these citizenship demands through the immediate, visual examination of their clothing. Their load is doubly heavy because it arises, on the one hand, from the dominant social and legislative regulations in the country where they live and, on the other, from their cultural community of reference.

There is no counter-discourse in the public sphere to balance this negative image of Muslim women against the racism of the elites, which is discursive and, according to the definition established by Teun Van Dijk (2006), is configured as an important social practice that results in specific types of inequality, is able to confirm and disseminate generalised ideologies and prejudices, and it legitimises everyday discrimination. Highly regarded male and female writers have put their pens at the service of this anti-Muslimism, sanctioning what a great number of people think. This has only been reinforced by the economic crisis that began in 2008.

In 1989, Pierre Bourdieu said in response to the first headscarf affair in France that its emergence made it possible for many intellectuals – whom he labelled gurus – to express inexcusable positions regarding the question of

immigration, hiding behind the defence of great principles like freedom, secularism and women's liberation. In his thinking, the question about whether or not to allow the headscarf in French public schools hid the real issue, which was whether immigrants of North African origin should be accepted in France. Answering 'no' to the first question resolved the second one as well. A negative response to the second question would have been indefensible, but when formulated in terms of the first, one could calmly respond 'no' (Bourdieu 1989). Almost 23 years later, Bourdieu's assessment still serves to explain the regulation of the headscarf and niqab across Europe.

### **Final remarks**

Since the sixteenth century<sup>22</sup> (López De La Plaza 1993), the question of veiling and unveiling has been a political one, both in inter- and intracultural relations: it entails the domination of women. Regulations on the headscarf add a twist to this, because both the laws that ban its use and those that require it are applied to bodies that are constructed as inferior and subaltern and can legitimately be regulated. Inscribing laws onto the body in this way expresses and reinforces the subaltern place of women in the social order. Women, as well as their bodies, are the symbolic places where societies engrave their moral order (Benhabib 2006). The key concept is the normativisation of the body, in the sense of applying rules that, as with the normativisation processes with languages, *normalise* the body.

Dress codes are designed to normativise the female body and define a classification system for women, as occurred in the Middle Ages when women's clothing was regulated (Pérez Molina 2004). They determine who is on one side or the other of the boundary of citizenship that separates 'good' women from 'bad' women. Bad women who challenge the prohibition of the headscarf are defined as non-citizens, because their bodies have values that run contrary to the citizenship inscribed onto them. The other bad women, those who challenge the requirement to wear a headscarf, are bad patriots and bad Muslims. This does not only refer to legislative regulations, but also refer to the dozens of rules and restrictions to which the bodies of Muslim women must adapt.

The regulation – both legal and social – of the headscarf and niqab occupies a central place in the exercise of male and colonial control, since it goes to the heart of the domination of Muslims by controlling women's bodies. All of this is conducted by means of discourses, rules, regulations and recommendations that construct a model of normative gender, of *how* women should be. The headscarf is becoming a fundamental instrument, firstly in the creation of a female essence that must be governed and, secondly, in the control of Muslims as a group. The first situation is seen in many Muslim countries, where the headscarf is used to control women. The second is found in relation to Muslim communities that have settled in countries of immigration, where they are subject to discursive and normative practices that make them objects of regulation by the majority society.

The tendency to create laws that sanction a social order and the pressing need to legislate as many aspects of life as possible focus, especially in the West, on immigrants and, in Muslim countries, on women. The legal system intensifies the sense of domination and control. It also establishes a broad swath of the population that is potentially outside the law, formed, in the West, by all Muslim women, even those who have never considered wearing a hijab, and in Muslim countries, by all women. Regulating the headscarf becomes a visible device that underpins the inequality between *them* and *us*. The normativisation of the body of the *other* reveals the relationship of domination, since it imposes an image that the subject must resemble or assimilate: *one must not* or *one must* wear a headscarf. Women are presented as being in a precarious situation, constantly on the border where legal meets illegal. Cases from the Muslim diaspora where the hijab is restricted also portray this *culture of the other* as backward, because the headscarf becomes the representation of the inequality between men and women.<sup>23</sup> All the stereotypes about Muslims are brought up to date here. Finally, these cases serve to show that regulation ‘liberates’ or saves women (Abu-Lughod 2002) from the men in their own culture and present the imposition of the dress code as a triumph of civilisation over barbarism. The woman in the headscarf does not look *like us*; therefore, she must be assimilated, and the scarf torn from her head.

In the Muslim world, regulations that require that women wear Muslim garb also compel their guardians to supervise them, which establishes a strong sexual hierarchisation. Thus, the dress code regulation reinforces the patriarchy of which it is a product. Regulations have brought about moments of change in the political and economic model in Muslim countries, deflecting clashes between classes to clashes between men and women. Moreover, penalising the public presence of women and bolstering a particular ideal of domestic femininity leaves poor, working women in a very vulnerable place in terms of exploitation, since they have little value as women in light of these regulations.

The regulations that restrict Muslim attire in Europe have intensified since the so-called ‘economic crisis’ of 2008. Their application has made it possible to reinforce the image of Muslims as bearers of a savage, discriminatory culture, establishing continuity with the colonial policies of the former powers, which constructed their arguments in the same way, justifying the subalternity of Muslims. This discourse works on behalf of Islamophobia, which seeks to maintain the Muslim population in a subordinate position, without rights and unemancipated (López 2011). The law regulates that which is most intimate: the body. The effect of these disciplinary measures has reverberations not only among male and female Muslims, but also throughout entire populations. The idea that there are special situations in which some boundaries can be crossed creates the conditions that allow states to impose various types of policies and restrictions, deflecting the general discontent resulting from a deterioration in living conditions brought about by the crisis to what is presented as a culture clash between Muslims and non-Muslims.

## Notes

1. Hijab is the Arabic word for the headscarf some Muslim women use to cover their heads. Niqab is the veil that covers the face and reveals only the eyes, also called a face veil.
2. This article is the result of the research project, Culture and Power: Islam in Diaspora (UAM-CAM), begun in 2011 and continued in the project Culture, Gender and Power: Islam in the Diaspora (FEM2011-27161, 2012–2014). It is strongly based on an extensive review of documentation on the political and social processes that culminated in the creation of laws regulating Muslim clothing in different countries. This documentation includes academic literature (in Social and Legal Sciences); NGO's and other organisations reports and an exhaustive work with newspaper news (see footnote 23). Everything is properly reflected in the footnotes and bibliography.
3. This article looks at the literature on clothing regulations. Another type of study focuses on the meaning of the hijab in contexts that are not legally regulated. These works are not included here because they do not deal directly with regulations. Studies of this nature include works by Tarlo (2007), who investigates the hijab in London as part of the Muslim response to transcultural urban encounters, by Moors and Tarlo (2007) on fashion, consumption and religion and by Moors (2009) on Islamic fashion.
4. A systematic review of these bibliographical frameworks is provided below.
5. Regarding Islamisms and women, see: Aldikacti Marshall (2005); Zeghal (2005); Browsers (2006); Macías Amoretti (2008).
6. See the writings of Al Qaradawi or Amr Khaled. About the former, see also Gräf (2005) and Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen (2009). About Amr Khaled, see Wise (2004) and Shapiro (2006).
7. The most recent event of this nature is former French President Nicolas Sarkozy's proposal to penalise anyone consulting Salafi websites (*Le Monde*, 22 March 2012).
8. Mernissi (1992) refers to the frequency with which women in headscarves appear on book covers.
9. On Muslim family codes, see Esposito and DeLong-Bas (2001); Charrad (2001); Ramírez (2007); Aixelà (2007); Jeppie, Moosa, and Roberts (2010) and Feliu (2012).
10. [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)
11. [www.wluml.org](http://www.wluml.org)
12. In European countries, the niqab is usually called a burqa, taking advantage of the stigma attached to the former, which is associated with Taliban repression in Afghanistan.
13. A woman's *mahram* is any male relative whom she is not allowed to marry and who serves as a guardian for women who are minors by law.
14. Cf. [www.rawa.org](http://www.rawa.org). RAWA (the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan) is the most important Afghan feminist group, self-defined as 'an independent political/social organization of Afghan women fighting for human rights and for social justice in Afghanistan'.
15. *Awrah* are the parts of the body that Muslim men and women cannot show in public.
16. Vid. [www.daralhayat.com](http://www.daralhayat.com)
17. See also Joppke (2009); Motilla (2009) and McGoldrick (2006).
18. In 1989, in Creil (France), some girls were reprimanded in the public school they attended for wearing the Muslim headscarf or 'foulard'. *L'affaire du foulard* or headscarf affair is the name used in France to describe the process that began then and culminated in a national discussion about the right or lack thereof to wear religious symbols in French public schools. See, among others, Gaspard and Khosrokhavar (1995); Lorcerie (2005).

19. *Avui*, 28 June 2010. See also *20minutos*, 7 July 2010.
20. This substitution is a process similar to the construction of Islam in the West, which tends to homogenise Muslims using a broad racial label. At times, legal instruments are used for that purpose. Authors like Gana (2008) have spoken about the process of the racialisation of Islam ('racing Islam') that results from the action of specific laws in the United States.
21. To see the impact of Islamophobia on practical decisions regarding *muhajabat* students, see Mijares [Forthcoming](#).
22. Queen Joanna the Mad enacted a law in Castile to prohibit *morisco* women from veiling their faces and wearing traditional garments.
23. In Ramírez (2010, 2011), the author analyses press images during the years of the different Spanish 'headscarf affairs' and compares them to other European cases (2011). The headscarf has largely come to be associated with backwardness, inequality and domination when it is not associated with fanaticism.

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FALGUNI A. SHETH

## The Production of Acceptable Muslim Women in the United States

### ABSTRACT

In this article, I explore some of the elements by which Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States are managed so as to produce and distinguish “unruly” from “good” Muslim female citizens within the context of American liberalism. Unlike the French state, which has regulated both the hijab and niqab through national legislation, the American liberal framework utilizes a *laissez-faire* approach, which relies on a range of public and private institutions to determine acceptable public presentations of the liberal female subject. I refer to this form of management as “neoliberalism.” Neoliberal management works in conjunction with popular political discourses and domestic events in ways that alternately contract and expand the boundaries that allow “suitable Muslim women” in the public sphere.

### I. THE CIVILIZING MISSION: CONTAINING THE UNRULY

Elsewhere, I have argued that Muslim women who don the hijab, particularly within the last decade, are construed as unruly subjects within the context of a Western liberal regime. Unruly subjects are those who are perceived to actively violate the ideal of the good (liberal) citizen. The particular infraction of women who wear the hijab is

their conspicuously heterogeneous comportment—openly subscribing to “Muslim” or “Islamic” culture. This breach is seen in explicit practices that are thought to contravene the fundamental ethos of Western liberal culture, namely that of political secularism. . . . Such practices and signs are “unruly” because they conspicuously violate a dominant neutral cultural or political norm. (Sheth 2006, 456)

Secular societies, as the concrete manifestations of liberal political ideologies, are thought to be endangered by populations or cultures that express their moral and religious beliefs in public spaces. Liberalism is thought of as the racial and religious

unmarked, and hence the hegemonic, norm that usurps a society’s political or social imaginary and becomes the invisible background against which cultural challenges are mounted (Perina 2009). By extension, such a society dominates the aesthetic norms of that society, presenting them as the cultural default. As Mickaella Perina, drawing on María Lugones’s notion of the racial state, argues,

As the “racial state” classifies people according to physical characteristics, racial and racialized aesthetics classify art and artistic conceptions according to cultural characteristics. Indeed, to believe that non-Western aesthetic thought and frameworks are radically different—so different that it is a matter of “deep translation”—or that translation is unattainable, is to mark other aesthetics as culturally different while having Western aesthetics escape the mark of culture. (Perina 2009)

The unruly figure or group, by disrupting the hegemonic aesthetic norm through their public presentation or comportment, is encountered as a threat to be addressed and contained. On a global level, this is how much of North America, Europe,

and Australia have responded to the events of September 11, 2001, namely, through a domestic and global politics of national security. In effect, national security policies are a politics of legal, social, and cultural containment through which the Western world has mounted an ever-increasing challenge to Muslims' cultural and religious commitments, understood as a necessary political defense against "Islamic terrorism" (Akbar 2015; Beydoun 2017).<sup>1</sup> As such, *to subscribe visibly to Islam is to always already be a problem*.

There may be multiple historical and political rationales behind this hostility: at some level, there may be a widespread racial-sexual assumption that Muslim women, by the dictates of a (seemingly) monolithic Islam, are subservient, oppressed, and thereby unthreatening. Certainly, we saw the expression of this belief in the rhetorical motivations expressed by First Lady Laura Bush soon after 9/11. Articulating support for her husband, then-President George W. Bush's decision to invade Afghanistan, the First Lady pointed to the need to save Afghan women and children.<sup>2</sup>

The need to save Muslim women—from themselves, from "their" men, from their "oppressive culture"—had been in existence well before Bush's declaration. The drive to save brown and black women has long been a hallmark of imperial civilizing missions (Spivak 1985; Cooke 2002). The underlying message of such missions is that these backward cultures need to be transformed if not altogether destroyed—both to "advance" the colonized society as well as to remove the threat to the colonizing culture.<sup>3</sup> The mission to save black and brown women has been well documented in former colonized societies that were predominantly Muslim, from Egypt to North Africa (Abu-Lughod 1998; Ahmed 1992; Cohn 1996; Said 1978, 1981).

As Frantz Fanon discussed in 1959, the West needed to save veiled (Algerian) woman—not necessarily for their own sake, but in order to be able to "destroy the structure of Algerian society [and] its capacity for resistance" (1965, 37). In part, the perception of threat emerged from the integral part that the haïk was thought to play in the Algerian revolution, with its instrumental ability to hide and circumvent colonial authorities. Fanon offers an illuminating, provocative discussion of the insistence on wearing the haïk and why it is a threat—a challenge—to the colonizer: even as the French empire focused on the bodies of veiled

Muslim women as vehicles that symbolized the fetishized object of oppression and potential liberation, Algerian women challenged the French's attempt to conquer them by remaining inaccessible, and unconquerable by refusing the invitation to be assimilated or "liberated" sexually, socially, culturally, or politically by refusing to unconceal their beauty for Western edification (Fanon 1965, 38).<sup>4</sup>

## II. ADDRESSING THE VEILED THREAT: GOVERNMENTALITY AND NEOLIBERALISM

As Monique Roelofs dissects the notion of aesthetic address of persons and things in María Lugones's work,

[m]odes of address connect persons and things in trajectories of address. Strings of address emerge that reach from persons to persons . . . from persons to things . . . from things to things (from spoon to oil, water, yolk), and from things to persons (from curdled mayonnaise to Lugones and onward to us). (2016, 380)

Address, for Roelofs, signifies the racial, cultural, and gendered context by which a certain object or relationship between persons or things or some variant thereof, is hailed or responded to through the lens of certain constellations. As such, the veil has multiple modalities, multiple relations to persons: the veiled Algerian woman may be read as abiding by her cultural/moral/religious commitments as well as engaging in a form of resistance. In the latter mode, the veil can be read and addressed as both a practice of resisting French liberal-imperial aesthetics of secular dress as well as a practical revolutionary resistance. As Roelofs suggests, the capacities of objects to support modes of address surpass the specific uses and conceptions human agents develop for them.

Under the colonial French administration, then, the figure of the veiled Muslim women was both in need of saving and also received in conjunction with the countervailing fear of her threatening insurgent capacities. Hence, she was addressed as a victim of cultural patriarchal oppression as well as a target to be neutralized if not altogether nullified. Fanon's incisive observations are still surprisingly astute. As global attention to potential explosive activities construed as Islamic terrorism increases, this fear appears to increase correspondingly.<sup>5</sup>

In contemporary France, Muslim women have continued to face extensive, explicit, and continuous challenges to their visible public commitments to their faith and culture. The French state has banned both the hijab and niqab through national legislation, ostensibly to demarcate and protect the state's cultural emphasis on secular public citizenship (Laborde 2005).<sup>6</sup> As Alia Al-Saji argues, "veiling was seen as *opposed* to French secular space" (2010, 883). French secular space is construed as "a specific heteronormative and heterosocial gendering of public space—constituted through particular feminine habits of dress, behaviour and mixité (coeducation)—was reinforced as the norm of French public space" (883). The aesthetic norm of French public space—proudly presented as devoid of religious symbols—was imagined to be about liberal secularism. Following Perina, we might argue that French public space is, again, the culturally unmarked default. As such, the foulard was addressed as a violation of that secular norm of *laïcité*. And yet, beneath the facial discourse of violations of secularism, the visibility of the veil is connected to the racial anxiety of French society—of the impending challenge to their unmarked racial dominance, or "cultural racism" (Al-Saji 2010, 884). As Al-Saji argues,

[T]he question why the veil comes to be seen as the marker of Islamic or Algerian cultural difference brings us to the already constituted field of vision of the French observer. This field of vision has been structured by colonialism. . . . The representational apparatus of colonialism not only constitutes the image of the 'native' but posits this image in opposition to a certain self-perception of colonial society and against an implicit normalization of gender within that society. (2010, 883)

For the French, the veil is overdetermined as a racial affront, which recalls France's sordid history of colonialism and declared attempts to "liberate" Algerian women in the name of uplifting and civilizing, as Fanon shows us all too vividly. The battle over the veil then becomes a battle over which side will dominate: will it be the secular French looking to justify and redeem their colonial past or will it be the inferior and oppressive culture of Islam, against which the West has waged a centuries-long war?

The treatment of hijabis in the French context contrasts starkly with the United States's

approach. Curiously, given the ferocity of the government's War on Terror and the broad realm of Muslim men who have been detained or incarcerated without Constitutional due process over the last two decades, Muslim women have not faced similar legal or political challenges. Nevertheless, they are still regulated and disciplined within the U.S. legal-political context in which they find themselves, but in less explicit ways than their French or other European counterparts' approach of outlawing conspicuous religious symbols.

One way to understand this might be found in the unique American mode of reconciling notions of individual freedom with certain persistent and subtle forms of social and political management of populations.<sup>7</sup> For example, there is a long history of the American state's defense of religious expression, as articulated in the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. The protection of religious expression nevertheless has a robust narrative in the United States, effectively creating a familiar and accepted legal framework in which to challenge attempts to ban religious practices or symbols. It may also be the case that, in the U.S. context, effective challenges to the hijab are better leveled by illustrating how it violates some other liberal principle, such as transparency or publicity or economic profit.

As an expression of religious commitments, the hijab appears to be compatible with Constitutional principles. Yet, depending upon how threatening or suitable a particular event is perceived, this compatibility can be modulated. Especially during times of crisis, it is selectively enforced. For example, Islamic fundamentalist sermons have served as evidence for charges of terrorism, while Christian speech is, especially under the current administration, plentiful in government quarters (Serwer 2011; Sessions 2017).

Such an approach exemplifies the general mode by which the American state manages unruly subjects. The idea of managing subjects is perhaps best articulated by Michel Foucault's discussion of governmentality, whereby governing is a strategic art deployed toward certain "suitable" ends or, as Foucault says, "the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end" (quoting Guillaume de la Perrière: 2007, 96). A suitable end should not be confused with the objective of sovereignty, which is the making of decisions for "the common good and the salvation of all" (98). Rather, suitable ends are those which

are “internal to the things [government] directs (*diriger*); it is to be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs, and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than laws” (99). In the context of the two-decade-old U.S.-led War on Terror, we might understand governmentality as operating at several levels. *Prima facie*, it operates at the discursive level of continual iterations of the promise of American freedom, democracy, and proceduralism, while selectively enforcing Constitutional law for some populations and not others. In the interest of national security, governmentality might reflect the strategic enforcement of constitutional protections for some individuals, combined with the strategic privation of the same protections for populations deemed threats to national security. For example, in the aftermath of the declaration of the War on Terror, the United States prosecuted numerous individuals who were deemed to lend support to terrorist organizations, despite questionable evidence.<sup>8</sup> Borrowing further from Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics as the separation and production of certain populations, we might understand this as part of a larger ontopolitical production of suitable or unacceptable Muslims, as such populations illustrate or reinforce or transgress that discourse of liberalism (Sheth 2011).

At another level, however, there is a dimension of governmentality that operates through a neoliberal framework, that is, by relying on *laissez-faire* market and *ad hoc* policing mechanisms that bring certain transgressive moments to light against the backdrop of a society that is seen as fair and procedural. These are seen through the mechanisms of markets and judiciaries, along with the absence of explicit regulations or laws, at least typically (Harcourt 2012). The interplay of public and private institutions, sometimes with policing institutions,<sup>9</sup> can determine whether certain practices will be accommodated within the boundaries of the liberal state or instead challenged as violations of the “tolerable” liberal subject.

Depending upon the outcome of the contestation, these events will accumulate to maintain or reinscribe a certain default vision of the good (female) liberal subject in a dialectical relationship to the particular moment/version of liberal society in which she is found. We see this in the United States’s approach to adjudicating cases that claim protection or violation of constitutional

principles: the American liberal state relies on judicial review, in which a contested claim is brought to the (higher) courts, such as a district, state, or federal Supreme Court. The higher judiciary decides whether it will consider a claim of procedural or constitutional violation. The American legal system relies heavily on judicial review to gauge whether contested actions conform to constitutional precepts. In so doing, the judiciary continually engages and revises doctrinal lawmaking and, in so doing, recycles new iterations of liberalism and the liberal subject (Stone 1990).<sup>10</sup> Thus, claims that are considered (or not) with regard to Muslim women do not address the hijab *per se*, but whether the contested action violates the rights of the liberal (female) subject not to be discriminated against,<sup>11</sup> or whether it violates public security. In this way, the American address of Muslim women is to evaluate Muslim women’s claims to religious expression—most often in the workplace, since there is an established framework designed to assist employees in the workplace who find themselves to be subject to religious, racial, or sexual discrimination. However, the U.S. judiciary also weighs in on claims of religious discrimination by prisons in U.S. correctional facilities, although decidedly in a much more negative manner.<sup>12</sup>

By reiteratively engaging with Muslim women’s ability to wear the veil in the workplace, rather than explicitly legalizing or banning the veil, the U.S. courts address Muslim women through a subtle disciplining process that has less to do with outright legal policies that ban the hijab but rather which expand and contract the boundaries of acceptable public dress against the backdrop of an unmarked secularism. The multiple reiterations—through various U.S. courts that hear discrimination cases against hijabis—serve to continually reenact different iterations of the acceptable Muslim female subject.

Muslim women who wear the hijab receive a range of market, police, judicial, and media receptions with reference to the liberal tenet that is being contested or reinscribed at various moments. Consider the following catalogue: in 2005, two young Muslim teens were arrested, strip-searched, detained, and interrogated for eight weeks on the suspicion of being potential suicide bombers or terrorists (Bernstein 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006; Sheth 2006). In 2003, a Muslim female police officer was fired for wearing the hijab on the ground that she violated the Philadelphia Police

Department's uniform policy.<sup>13</sup> Women who wear the hijab are routinely employed to work in (some of the same) businesses that require some social visibility, whether in clothing stores or nonprofit organizations (Pickoff-White 2011). By contrast, there have been multiple occasions (and a few legal cases) about Muslim women or teens who wear the hijab who were either not hired by or fired from clothing stores because they did not conform to in-house dress policies (Aziz 2011).<sup>14</sup> In one instance, the U.S. Department of Justice filed and settled a civil discrimination suit on behalf of a New Jersey corrections officer who was fired for wearing the hijab.<sup>15</sup> In other instances, imprisoned Muslim women have been forced to remove their hijabs on the grounds that they could injure someone else or themselves.<sup>16</sup> Women have been required to remove their hijabs on threat of being barred from the courtroom where they were conducting unrelated business. One order came from the governing judge on the grounds that she violated the courts' need for transparency, identity and publicness.<sup>17</sup> In 2007, the Transportation Security Association announced its intent to screen and examine anyone who wore headgear, including men who wear baseball caps, cowboy hats, and turbans.<sup>18</sup> In many cases, women were not able to obtain redress for these injustices or other forms of daily harassment or physical violence even when they were the aggrieved parties (Bhasin and Fairchild 2013). Yet, other women and Muslim teens who wear hijab, niqab, or burqas report having to deal with daily harassments or fear of physical violence.

Socially, the responses of Muslim women to their environments have been mixed as well: a significant number of Muslim women appear to have begun wearing the hijab since 9/11 in response to any number of events; still others have decided not to wear the hijab in order not to inhibit their professional lives within the context of a post-9/11 wary labor market (Alvi, Hoodfar, and McDonough 2003).

### III. THE ELASTICITY OF THE LIBERAL POLITY AND ACCOMMODATIONS OF MUSLIM WOMEN

I have pointed to a range of unsystematic treatments and receptions of Muslim women in order to illuminate the elastic boundaries of liberalism and the corresponding reinscriptions of the good

(female liberal) citizen, which oscillate between the indifferent rejection of certain Muslim women and the accommodation of certain stylized Muslim women. The spectrum of acceptable dress at work or in public more generally for women in the United States is modulated less by some transcendent standard of glamour or suitability of the outfit than by a cultural aesthetic that reflects the convergence of a range of economic and sociopolitical forces.

It seems possible to identify a few elements that enable the neoliberal collaboration between sovereignty, capital, and media. These forces work together to script repeatedly the particular—patriarchal—exemplification of liberal public comportment. The Western secular female subject is supposed to reveal herself in certain public/professional<sup>19</sup> modes: she unconceals her face, leaves her body moderately concealed, and exhibits her legs and ankles (unless she inhabits masculine clothing, such as a pantsuit). The quintessential model of “Western business attire” as described, with slight variants, on multiple blogs for Model United Nations, emphasizes professionalism. One points to suits (crediting French designer Coco Chanel for pioneering suits for women) and neutral colors and discourages headgear, although no mention is made of religious head coverings (GinnyTan 2013; Whitt 2018).<sup>20</sup> In this collaboration, the projection of how a good liberal female citizen comports is so ubiquitous as to become the invisible ether that surrounds us: the masculinist insistence on a stylized form of professional female dress is grounded in the courts' refusal to overturn professional dress codes for women.<sup>21</sup> Most media depictions of the generic acceptable Western/liberal female subject reflect a seemingly hegemonic dress code. American and global television anchors dress similarly; subjects of television news stories, print media, and films are parliamentarians, corporate executives, low-level business women, or housewives dressed in slacks and pants.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, there is a certain *laissez-faire* attitude, with the implicit nod from the state, which permits employers and businesses to regulate the professional dress best suited to their market. Depending upon the political/social/cultural milieu, these codes preclude outfits that are not expressly secular or American. That is, they are cleansed of specifically cultural or ethnic references, such as the sari or the chador, among other kinds of clothing.

In the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations concerning religious discrimination and accommodation, employers are required to accommodate particular religious needs/expressions unless they impose “an undue hardship” on the place of business (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission n.d.a). But the message is mixed, as found in the three sections concerning religious discrimination and reasonable accommodation, stated in direct sequence on the EEOC website:

*Religious Discrimination & Reasonable Accommodation*

The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer’s business. This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion.

Examples of some common religious accommodations include flexible scheduling, voluntary shift substitutions or swaps, job reassignments, and modifications to workplace policies or practices.

*Religious Accommodation/Dress & Grooming Policies*

Unless it would be an undue hardship on the employer’s operation of its business, an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or practices. This applies not only to schedule changes or leave for religious observances, but also to such things as dress or grooming practices that an employee has for religious reasons. These might include, for example, wearing particular head coverings or other religious dress (such as a Jewish yarmulke or a Muslim headscarf), or wearing certain hairstyles or facial hair (such as Rastafarian dreadlocks or Sikh uncut hair and beard). It also includes an employee’s observance of a religious prohibition against wearing certain garments (such as pants or miniskirts).

When an employee or applicant needs a dress or grooming accommodation for religious reasons, he should notify the employer that he needs such an accommodation for religious reasons. If the employer reasonably needs more information, the employer and the employee should engage in an interactive process to discuss the request. If it would not pose an undue hardship, the employer must grant the accommodation.

*Religious Discrimination & Reasonable Accommodation & Undue Hardship*

An employer does not have to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or practices if doing so would cause undue hardship to the employer. An

accommodation may cause undue hardship if it is costly, compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights of other employees, or requires other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work. (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission n.d.b)

The first two sections state clearly that employers must accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless doing so would cause more than a “minimal burden on the operations of the employer’s business.” The second and third sections then emphasize the escape clause of “an undue burden” that would allow employers to discriminate against those requiring religious accommodation.<sup>23</sup>

There are many ways in which the escape clause of “decreasing workplace efficiency, infringing on the rights of other employees,” can be invoked by employers to not hire or fire a woman who wears the hijab (for example, placing someone in the stockroom, then deciding that such a placement is inefficient or imposes a burden on their colleagues or that such accommodations cause their colleagues discomfort by explicit religious expressions and considering such expressions a form of harassment, through some leap of logic). Yet, as we have seen, various employers permit Muslim women to wear the hijab (that is to say, they are not explicitly harassed, fired, beaten, or stigmatized). Occasionally, they can be seen as the victims of discrimination. And in still other instances, they are disciplined by being fired, jailed, or reprimanded—or physically beaten, without redress.<sup>24</sup> These outcomes suggest that, despite the absence of explicit regulations concerning the hijab, *there is nevertheless a form of disciplining that continually reinscribes the ideal of the good liberal female citizen in contrast to the unruly, defiant, or difficult Muslim female subject.* This inscription, based on the contingencies of the particular political moment, can accommodate certain kinds of visibly Muslim women—those who are acceptable—who are products of modernization to some degree, that is, who appear professional: they work in a labor force, have certain skills that warrant them, if not respect, at least freedom from harassment or tolerance.

These dress codes reinforce a certain expectation for professional women that appears to mark the norm of what a mildly liberated autonomous female subject looks like—and, in turn, reinforces

the assumption that the cooperative Muslim female citizen will be tolerated or accommodated if she can conform to certain key aesthetic principles of Western *qua* secular professional dress. Thus, understood as the hallmark of the liberal feminist subject, such a Muslim woman might be someone who—despite wearing the hijab—exhibits certain key traits that confirm her liberal comportment. These traits might include sociability (especially with a non-Muslim secular public), cooperativeness, education, professional status, and engagement in secular/civil society and market activities. This accommodation requires a certain reconciliation with the ideal vision of the liberal female subject and the violation of certain revered tenets such as transparency.

The norm of transparency also implies a liberal expectation of publicity, oversight, and accountability. This norm is expressed through exchanges, contracts, and other forms of public communication, as these govern the relation between individuals. That is to say, they make clear the expectations to be met by each party in any given transaction. This version of transparency, in addition to that mode of transparency which is the conduit of relations between the state and the individual, suggests that this is the standard neutral liberal expectation of citizens in the liberal polity.<sup>25</sup> Both of these are exemplified in a Michigan small claims court judge's order that a Muslim woman remove her niqab or have her case dismissed. She refused, explaining that she could only do so in front of a female judge, at which point her case *was* dismissed. The judge's explanation for his actions were that he needed to see her face to verify whether she was telling the truth (Gandossy 2009). But, in fact, his position belied other frequent forms of communications that have no such transparency, such as audio recordings of phone conversations, which rely on intonations, pitch, and other features of meaning but—until recently—not necessarily facial expressions. As well, as the American Civil Liberties Union has commented in relation to this judge's actions, there are multiple examples of visually disabled judges or juries who must rely on audio recordings, or disabled witnesses who are not able to communicate expressively with their faces (Moss, Rodbard, and Granzotto 2009).

The inconsistency of the judge's position betrays a preference for a certain cultural comportment that ensures certain shared understandings,

views, and attitudes—revealing that communication is not a way to express uniqueness of standpoint, but rather “a shorthand by which to communicate variations of those ideas, norms, and procedures that are mostly shared” (Sheth 2009, 99). We can find similar expectations in the Georgia courts system, which prohibits the hijab in courtrooms and has gone so far as to arrest one woman who refused to remove her hijab except in front of a female judge.<sup>26</sup>

From this, we might infer that the subject who wears the hijab/niqab/chador is concealing something and, thus, has violated the expectation of a common (cultural) appearance that is supposed to be shared by liberal female subjects. But such violations can be mitigated in certain professional and cultural sub-contexts by the woman who wears the hijab if that appearance reflects a particular version of openness and a certain stylized approachability that is expressed through the public exhibition of one's self. In so doing, the Muslim woman challenges the cultural hegemony that undergirds the modern liberal environment enveloping the modern liberal woman/female professional.

Even though a refreshed politics of national security in the aftermath of 9/11 is partially responsible for a dominant wariness toward Muslim women, the political, social, and economic consequences of wearing the hijab appear to be different for Muslim women of different class backgrounds. Certain female Muslim community leaders in the public eye wear the hijab while engaging in numerous contestations over Islam and the acceptability of exhibiting their faith and commitments publicly. Yet, they also receive a certain acceptability from a significant part of the public by showing their similarities to secular women in certain visible ways. Consider, for example, Linda Sarsour, a community organizer and director of the Arab American Association of New York,<sup>27</sup> or the recently elected congresswoman from Minnesota, Rep. Ilhan Omar, both of whom are outspoken American Muslim women who wear the hijab even as they are publicly American and speak the language of liberalism, that is, civil rights, constitution, and so on. Evidence of this is marked by their sociability, education, and ability to engage in various civil society and market activities, whether as community organizers or professionals, or as people who interact with different kinds of governmental institutions—that



is, already acting with the state symbolically and figuratively. On January 6, 2019, the U.S. Congress voted to amend a nearly two-centuries-old Congressional ban on headgear to exempt religious headwear. The repeal was passed successfully.<sup>28</sup> Both women have also received ample criticisms for their outspoken advocacy of many controversial issues. Thus, while they are vilified by certain segments of the secular U.S. populace,<sup>29</sup> they have received support from other segments, in part because of their being marked as appropriate liberal feminist subjects for being able to communicate and build bridges with non-Muslim, often secular, audiences.

#### IV. THE COURTS AND MUSLIM WOMEN IN PRISON

Not all hijabis are seen as suitable female subjects in liberal societies. Hijabis who do not have the social clout that Omar and Sarsour hold—women who are prisoners and not seen as upstanding professional liberated female subjects—receive a very different treatment. When Muslim women encounter corrections officers or face time in prison, they are then relegated to the category of the unruly, difficult, Muslim woman and much more likely to be dismissed, ruled against, or discriminated against. The question of the right to religious expression is addressed dissimilarly in cases involving hijabis in prisons or as visitors in courtrooms than in professional/employment contexts. The response of the courts has been to rule against Muslim women as prisoners on the grounds that there is a larger security concern that must be attended. For example, as recently as 2018, the District Court of New Jersey ruled against prisoner Melany Chila's claim to religious discrimination for being forced to remove her headscarf in 2016. The New Jersey District Court found multiple ways to rule against Chila on a range of claims. The overall claim, that her constitutional rights were violated by the Camden County Correctional Facility, was dismissed by the Court on the grounds that the prison is not a person and, therefore, not liable to accommodate her objections.<sup>30</sup> There were also two specifically religious discrimination claims: Chila charged that her religious rights were violated because she was forced to remove her headscarf and also because she was denied access to her Qur'an and from leaving the cell to worship.

The first claim occurred in 2007, and the second occurred in 2016. The New Jersey District Court found that the 2007 claim was barred from being ruled upon due to the statute of limitations. Regarding the 2016 claim, the Court found Chila's claim not substantial because her stay in the prison was brief (ten days); thus, while her rights may have been violated on some occasions, *these were too sporadic* to be supported. In support of its judgment, the Court pointed to earlier cases whereby plaintiffs' similar claims were denied because the stay in prison was too short to affect one's religious beliefs. The Court's language here is rather remarkable:

Plaintiff's claims with respect to her *hijab*, Quran access, and hair exposure during the period "Jan 5, 2016 - 1-15-16" (*id.* at § III(B)) *may have constituted* an intrusion upon Plaintiff's prayers and practices on some occasions during this brief ten-day period of 2016 incarceration, *but these events were relatively short-term and therefore do not constitute a substantial interference.* (*Chila v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility* 2018, 17; *my emphasis*)

The Court was not convinced that Chila's rights were violated because of the short duration of her prison stay. Moreover, citing a 2007 case, the Court further insists that because of the short duration, rather than the actual violation, the violation was a minimal rather than substantial burden on Chila's actual religious beliefs (*Norwood v. Strada* 2007). Moreover, the refusal of CCCF to allow her to leave her cell to pray was due to concerns about security and orderliness and therefore outweighed her religious commitments (*Chila v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility* 2018, 18–19).

Certainly, it is legitimate for the state to have concerns about state/institutional security and safety in correctional facilities. Those interests involve a set of concerns that must be addressed, involving the balance between the prisoner's rights and the security/neutrality objectives of the government and alternative accommodations (Ammoura 2013, 679). But the link in this case appears tenuous at best. As we can see from this recent case, the state had few concerns about religious discrimination with regard to Muslim women in prison and was not part of a larger trend to combat discrimination against Muslim women. In other cases—again, mostly involving Muslim women as prisoners or as courtroom visitors—courts have dismissed charges brought by them

on technical or jurisdictional grounds (Ammoura 2013; *Khatib v. County of Orange* 2011; *Rhouni v. Wisconsin Correctional Facility* 2005; *Rhouni v. Caspersen* 2006; Ibata 2011). Often, the question of whether women have the right to wear the hijab wherever they go is evaded or sidelined in the interests of the question of principles: freedom or security, or they are preempted through settlements or other types of compromises. These cases suggest that there is not a single trajectory in the direction of greater accommodations to Muslims but rather multiple expansions and contractions of acceptability. Also, notably, these judgments are laid down in the absence of explicit anti-hijab legislations. Furthermore, they are issued *even in the face of explicit religious accommodation concerns*. The contrary way in which courts rule against Muslim women in prison raises questions about the perspective that hijabis do not face discrimination in the United States.

#### V. CONCLUSION

The widespread and varied treatment of Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States should not be understood as a more open or accepting attitude toward them. Judging by the way that the hijab becomes (or does not become) a focus of controversy in the American context, the state collaborates with markets and various local public institutions (prisons, courts, school systems) to regulate the hijab and produce both the “good” and the “unruly” Muslim female subject. It does so either by prohibiting the hijab or accommodating—on a micro level—women who wear the hijab; this appears to be the preferred method in the American liberal polity, rather than passing laws that prescribe how, when, and where the hijab shall be worn and by whom. This method of disciplining is consistent with the long history of liberalism, which intersects with the market or engages in *laissez-faire* or hands-off libertarian practices in order to manage its subjects and in turn vilifies the defiant subject or produces/rewards noteworthy liberal citizens.

At base, the question of the suitable liberal subject is formed and influenced through the prioritization of markets, employers, and profits in connection with state institutions. That relationship is shaped through a discursive relationship between the institutions within the neoliberal

(market-based, *laissez-faire*) paradigm in relation to the liberal precepts that form the American self-understanding. There is also a dialectical relationship between the neoliberal polity and Muslim women, who are not mere bodies acted upon by the state, but also engaged in decisions based on a set of contingencies, vulnerabilities, and ethical commitments, social influences, and personal obligations. As such, the intersections where a Muslim woman is marked—certainly by race, gender, and class—will also be marked by institutional forces that may not be explicitly legislative but also not limited to immediate family/community influences (Sheth 2014). Thus, the negotiation may be done even in the aftermath of a victory to wear the hijab in her workplace—after which she may decide that her options are too strictly limited by wearing the hijab—or, again, she may decide to return to the hijab in order to negotiate certain professional goals through the close cultural, patriarchal, or social strictures of one’s family.

This complex interaction and neoliberal collaboration can be understood as a reflection of the current official sentiments of the day, but always with a view to the American polity’s elastic self-understanding as a liberal society. The market, as both the mainstay of American liberalism and an important signifier of the ethically acceptable liberal subject, serves as the mechanism that interacts with a range of other institutions, including the judiciary and the police, in the service of the state’s protection of its political and cultural boundaries, all the while accommodating or disciplining the Muslim female subject in a dialectical frame, depending upon the political vagaries of the moment.

Whether or not these cases are taken up, whether they are considered, how they are ruled—and taken up at higher echelons—circumscribes the state’s ability to continually expand or contract the boundaries of liberalism in order to produce suitable Muslim women against the unmarked backdrop of the public secular aesthetic of the United States.<sup>31</sup>

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1. For a similar argument on the attribution of "queer-phobia" to Muslims, see Thobani (2017).
  2. "Radio Address by Mrs. Bush." November 17, 2001. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011117.html>.
  3. See Pitts (2006) for the notion of imperial liberalism in the context of the French empire, that is to say, the orientation of empire toward its backward children in need of civilization. In Part 3, "Liberals and the Turn to Empire in France," Pitts points to Alexis de Tocqueville and the Marquis de Condorcet—both proponents of rationality and the notion of progress during the Enlightenment, as particularly nonplussed about colonial violence applied to Algerian society in the name of uplifting the civilizing.
  4. There is much more to be said, but that remains for a different article.
  5. The civilizing mission continues even in the United States, although the geopolitical change engenders a new version of this drive in what I call "neocolonial feminism." I develop this argument at length elsewhere.
  6. Passed on March 15, 2004, the law banning the hijab is an amendment to the French Code of Education (with a view to the French constitutional requirement of laïcité, the separation of church and state. It bans the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public (state) schools, which include the yarmulke and turban. Passed as an Act of Parliament on September 14, 2010, another law bans the concealment of the face in public spaces. Like the 2004 law, it does not specifically mention the niqab or burqa, but includes all masks, helmets, and garments that conceal the face. As such, it does not prohibit the wearing of the hijab in public spaces. There is a case to be made to distinguish between the hijab, which covers a woman's head of hair, and the niqab. Here, I address events related to the hijab and niqab, since there has been little sustained distinction between the two in the American political context. See Amer (2014) for a detailed catalogue and thoughtful analysis of the range of head coverings.
  7. À la Michel Foucault's (2007) notion of governmentality. For Foucault, governmentality facilitates a certain set of mechanisms of security, that is, a certain set of techniques by which society is regulated for the purposes of maintaining security or social control over a population. More on this below.
  8. See the troubling cases of Sami Al-Arian and Amina Mohamad Esse (González and Goodman 2015; Forliti 2017). Many other Muslim men and women were subject to counterterrorism enforcement through various policies taken up in the interests of national security (Akbar 2015; Maira 2009; Beydoun 2017).
  9. Including the police and the judiciary, but not limited to these.
  10. By contrast, the French judicial approach of abstract review has been applied to the issue of donning headscarves in public. This is done through the *Conseil d'Etat*, a legislative and advisory body that explores the potential problems and fairness of a law that is brought to the attention of the state. Once the law has been considered and judged to be fair, it is nearly impossible to have its constitutionality challenged (Stone 1990).
  11. Whether in terms of employment, religion, freedom, or expression.

12. I will return to this treatment later in this article.
13. In 2013, Kimberly Webb lost her discrimination suit (*Webb v. City of Philadelphia* 2009).
14. Abercrombie and Fitch has been accused on multiple occasions for religious discrimination against women who wear the hijab (Bhasin and Fairchild 2013). Three cases were launched in distinct domains by former Abercrombie and Fitch employees. The best known was decided in 2015, in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled against Abercrombie and Fitch for religious discrimination. Two other cases were settled out of court (*EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.* 2015).
15. See U.S. Department of Justice (2010).
16. That they could injure someone else, as in the case of a female Muslim prisoner; that they could injure themselves, as in the case of young girls who are prohibited from engaging in sports such as basketball or soccer (NBC News 2011; Jessup 2011).
17. ACLU of Michigan (2009). However, since then, a number of sports have removed the prohibition against wearing the hijab (see Ahmed 2016).
18. It is difficult, in the post-September 11 era, to understand this policy to be a neutral, cautionary search directed toward all airline passengers who wear headgear. At the very least, Muslim women and Sikh men feel that such policies disproportionately target their persons (CAIR 2007).
19. Which should also be read as “employer”/market driven.
20. I develop the details of this professional look elsewhere. See Sheth (2019).
21. We have seen this in the courts’ refusal to award damages to women who are fired for “being too seductive and beautiful” (Foley 2013). Also, examples of this permission can be found in the state’s indifference to discrimination based on dress: see Netter and Goldwert (2009). This case involved a Muslim teen who was refused employment because her hijab was not part of the “Abercrombie and Fitch” look. Another woman was fired for wanting to wear a longer skirt in relation to her Pentecostal beliefs. Another case involves a Muslim female police officer who was fired for wearing the hijab (Lavagnino 2009). Finally, in a related issue, the state has long permitted the firing and regulation of Black women who wear their hair in cornrow braids (Byrd and Tharps 2002, 106–108).
22. Of course, these are in stark contrast to the ‘exotic’ subjects of stories—the poor, the dark, the unfortunate—and the backward peoples of the Middle East or South Asia or Africa.
23. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (n.d.).
24. In other instances, they are removed from the American liberal vision of democracy—quite literally. During the 2008 elections, two female supporters of Democratic candidate Barack Obama were explicitly moved away from the cameras so as not to suggest an association between representatives of the Muslim threat and the Democratic presidential contender. Here, unlike in the British (or the French) case, there were no explicit regulations or expressed preferences regarding the status of Muslim subjects. Rather, the political machinery challenged the possibility that the Muslim women could be seen as good liberal citizens by quietly removing them from the public view of the campaign. In this regard, the neoliberal regulation of the unruly subject was done quietly and behind the scenes and initially denied when the campaign was asked about it (Smith 2008).
25. I discuss this case and the idea of transparency in liberalism at length elsewhere (Sheth 2019).
26. See Belczyk 2010.
27. Sarsour in particular is an interesting example, since she—since the Trump Administration has come into office—has been targeted by the conservatives as a leader of Islamic terrorism and, on various of these occasions, has become taken up and defended by liberals as having the right to free speech, as an exemplar of an assertive (if not a feminist) liberal subject who is fighting on behalf of certain liberal principles.
28. The vote was only 55 percent in favor of the exemption, at 234 to 197 (Law 2019).
29. This is not a completely accurate term, since many of their critics are often religious fundamentalists or Zionists.
30. See *Chila v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility* (2018). This is an interesting judgment in 2018, given that recent case law has affirmed the ability to consider private corporations as persons.
31. Thanks to Amy Allen, Alia Al-Saji, Mickaella Perina, Sujata Moorti, Sudha Setty, Paul C. Taylor, and the audiences in seminars and panels at John Carroll University, Emory University, University of Nijmegen, and the American Society for Aesthetics Meetings 2017, for their feedback on various versions of this article. Thanks also to the anonymous referees and Anne Eaton and Charles Peterson for their support and encouragement in revising this article. I dedicate this article to the memory of Robert E. Prasch III.

## IDEATIONAL ANALYSIS

### M. A. K. HALLIDAY TRANSITIVITY SYSTEM

Article 1 – *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (2015)*

**Control over female ‘Muslim’ bodies: culture, politics and dress code laws in some Muslim and non-Muslim countries**

By Ángeles Ramírez

No	Conjunction	Clause	Ellipsis	Process Types
1.		Control of the female body <b>is</b> a key component of both the formation of Muslim communities in European countries		Relational Attributive
2.		I <b>will argue</b> that the regulation of the clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, share the same goal: the control of women’s bodies		Verbal
3.	that	the regulation of the clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, <b>share</b> the same goal: the control of women’s bodies		Relational Identifying
4.		In this respect, I <b>will consider</b> both the legal regulations that require women to wear the so-called ‘Muslim’ clothing and those that restrict it as a way of disciplining the population		Mental
5.	and	<b>will focus on</b> the control of women as a privileged form of political control	I	Mental
6.		In 2010 in Madrid, a teenage girl <b>was expelled</b> from secondary school for wearing a hijab, or Muslim headscarf		Material
7.	while	laws <b>were being debated</b> in Europe about banning the hijab		Verbal
8.	Although	they only <b>had</b> a direct impact on girls who wore the hijab ( <i>muhajabat</i> ) and the niqab ( <i>munaqabat</i> )		Relational Attributive
9.		they <b>affected</b> the entire community		Relational Identifying

10.	since	this offensive <b>damaged</b> representations of Islam in general		Material
11.		Almost five thousand kilometres away from Madrid, in Iran, a group of political leaders <b>launched</b> an initiative against vice which basically entailed stiffening the dress code for women and even cracking down on suntans		Material
12.		Somewhat closer, in Gaza, girls who wanted to go to university <b>were required to wear</b> headscarves		Relational Identifying
13.		There <b>appears to be</b> a similarity here to the efforts to ban or restrict headscarves for Muslim women in Europe		Existential
14.		Why <b>did</b> this compulsive urge to ban the headscarves <b>emerge</b> in Europe		Material
15.	when	the exact opposite <b>was taking place</b> in many Muslim countries		Material
16.		<b>On</b> what <b>were</b> the two types of proscriptions <b>based</b>		Relational Attributive
17.	and	what <b>do</b> the processes <b>have</b> in common		Relational Attributive
18.		This article <b>investigates</b> these questions		Material
19.		<b>bringing together</b> the results from several research projects carried out in different contexts and time periods on the Muslim diaspora in Europe, mainly France and Spain	This article	Material
20.		I <b>will argue</b> that the regulation of clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, share the same goal: the control of women's bodies		Verbal
21.	that	the regulation of clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, <b>share</b> the same goal: the control of women's bodies		Relational Identifying
22.		Usually, the questions related to the regulation of Muslim women's clothing <b>have been examined</b> in the scholarly literature either from the perspective of legislation that imposes it, as in Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, or from the perspective of legislation that		Material

		restricts it, which is the situation in a growing number of European countries with strong Muslim minorities		
23.		In general, the dominant perspectives <b>have been</b> legal		Relational Identifying
24.	or	<b>have analysed</b> the regulations with regard to human rights, liberalism, the formation of national identities or political discourse in connection with Islam	the dominant perspectives	Material
25.		These analyses <b>have remained</b> within local or national spheres		Relational Attributive
26.	however	The objective of this article [...] <b>is</b> more far-reaching		Relational Attributive
27.		I <b>will consider</b> both the legal regulations that require women to wear the so-called ‘Muslim’ clothing and those that restrict it as a way of disciplining the population		Mental
28.	and	<b>will focus on</b> the control of women as a privileged form of political control	I	Mental
29.		In Muslim contexts, they <b>establish</b> a strong sexual and social hierarchisation		Material
30.	while	in non-Muslim contexts a sexual and ethnic stratification <b>is created</b>		Material
31.		The fact that these regulations appear in times of intense crisis in the system <b>reveals</b> their importance as tools to regulate the population in preparation for exceptional measures, with heavy impositions or reductions in rights or changes to the system directly		Material
32.		The focus of my work <b>is</b> on the legal restrictions of Muslim women’s clothing		Relational Attributive
33.		This article <b>will analyse</b> the contexts of prohibition, regulation and the imposition of Muslim clothing in Muslim and non-Muslim spheres as part of a process of extending control over women and minorities, the product of the need to legitimise neoliberal policies in much of the world, associated with a high degree of authoritarianism		Material
34.		The first part of the paper <b>describes</b> the process of hijabisation that has taken place in Muslim contexts, including situations where it is		Material



		not an institutional or state imposition, but the result of a series of decisions related to religiosity		
35.		This <b>is followed</b> by a review of the laws regulating women's clothing in some Muslim countries and European states		Material
36.		In the final reflection, I <b>attempt to explain</b> the logic behind these restrictions within the framework of reinforcing control of women and Muslims as subaltern populations		Material
37.		The process behind the expanded use of the hijab [...] <b>has accompanied</b> an increase in Muslim dress regulations		Relational Identifying
38.	or	what Rema Hammami <b>has termed</b> <i>hijabisation</i>		Material
39.		The imposition of this article of clothing <b>is</b> one reason for its more widespread use, but not the main one		Relational Identifying
40.		Hijabisation generally <b>obeys</b> a logic unrelated to any imposition		Material
41.		Many women <b>began to adopt</b> it as a militant act in the 1970s		Material
42.	when	they <b>became involved</b> in political action through their participation in the Islamist political projects that formed part of a belated revolt, in many places, against the violent colonial project of westernisation or as a means of political resistance		Material
43.		As a consequence of these battles, the hijab <b>was legitimised</b>		Material
44.	and	many women <b>felt</b> more dignified and freer wearing it		Mental
45.		Islamism <b>gave</b> many women the opportunity to enter the public sphere		Material
46.		<b>fighting</b> for causes and in structures that did not denigrate their status	many women	Material
47.		As a visible sign of this political commitment, the headscarf <b>played</b> a fundamental role in these battles		Material
48.		The hijab <b>went</b> from being a sign of submission in the eyes of colonial modernity to becoming a sign of assertiveness		Material
49.	and	women actively <b>appropriated</b> it		Material
50.		Nilüfer Göle <b>draws on</b> Erving Goffman's concept of stigma to argue that Islamism can be seen as a political and collective form of the 'management of spoiled identity		Material

51.	since	as a social movement, Islamism <b>encourages</b> political actors to voluntarily adopt the religious attributes that are considered potentially discrediting from the point of view of the normative framework of a modern culture		Mental
52.		Islamist movements <b>turn</b> the ‘undesired differentness’ of being a Muslim <b>into</b> a voluntary adoption of a stigma symbol that is overtly claimed and offensively communicated in public		Material
53.		For some authors, this process <b>corresponds to</b> a kind of Islamisation that extends across the Muslim world, including the diaspora		Relational Identifying
54.		The process <b>has been called</b> , to paraphrase the North American neocon offensive, the ‘other conservative revolution’, in which the role of new preachers has been key		Relational Attributive
55.		With the support of the media, they <b>contributed to</b> the extension of certain models of public morality, both within and outside of Muslim countries		Material
56.		This embodiment of the Islamic female <b>has been</b> on the increase in recent years, during which time the processes of globalisation have modified Islam, explicitly influencing the question of the headscarf, and a kind of Muslim aesthetic has become a topic of emerging importance		Relational Attributive
57.		Scholars <b>speak of</b> market Islam ( <i>Islam de marché</i> ), Islamic gentrification and Islam and commodification		Verbal
58.		Market Islam <b>has enabled</b> Islamic consumption, marketing strategies for these products, and the creation of a Muslim body		Material
59.		In a quite different vein, Mahmood <b>argues</b> that a fundamental key to understand hijabisation lies in the pietistic movements and their attachment to the headscarf as part of their physical representation		Verbal
60.	that	a fundamental key to understand hijabisation <b>lies</b> in the pietistic movements and their attachment to the headscarf as part of their physical representation		Existential

61.		Indeed, Islam , [...] <b>is</b> a strongly embodied religion, according to the concept established by Thomas Csordas		Relational Attributive
62.	as	it <b>is experienced</b> in a substantial part of the Muslim world – including the diaspora		Material
63.		Women <b>fill</b> the sphere of this embodiment		Relational Identifying
64.		Representations of Muslim women’s bodies <b>lie</b> at the centre of Islam’s relations with the Western world where ways to control Muslim populations include the control of the bodies of a segment of the population		Existential
65.	However	even when it is voluntary and responds to this type of process, from the Western point of view, the headscarf <b>is</b> always <b>explained</b> as a symbol of backwardness and the subordination of women		Material
66.		It <b>formed</b> part of the construction of a colonial discourse that differentiated the coloniser from the colonised, and even today continues to dominate relationships with Muslims		Material
67.		The threat of Islamic terrorism, especially after 9/11, <b>intensified</b> the rejection of Muslims		Material
68.		The prevention of new attacks <b>has been used</b> as a pretext for military intervention in the Muslim world		Material
69.	and	<b>[has been used] to impose</b> regulations on the Muslim population residing in Europe	The prevention of new attacks	Material
70.		The liberation of Muslim women <b>has become</b> a fundamental part of the arguments supporting the different forms of this domination		Relational Attributive
71.	and	the construction of these women coming out of Europe <b>is based on</b> a representation of the body that includes the hijab		Relational Attributive
72.		The headscarf – followed by the niqab – <b>concentrates</b> the entire construction of Muslim alterity in the West		Mental
73.	and	it <b>has become</b> an object that structures a large part of the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in the world		Relational Attributive
74.		It <b>appears</b> in very different discourses in politics, feminisms, municipal management, discussions of human rights and the question of the presence of Muslim girls in schools		Material

75.		The main argument for banning its use <b>is</b> the liberation of women		Relational Identifying
76.	however	At times [...] the process of hijabisation <b>is</b> the result of state imposition		Relational Attributive
77.	as	the state <b>passes</b> laws that require that women – almost never men – to wear what is considered Muslim clothing		Material
78.		Some Muslim countries <b>have</b> legal regulations regarding dress codes for women		Relational Attributive
79.		By the time these regulations are enacted, women’s rights <b>have</b> usually <b>been</b> considerably <b>reduced</b>		Material
80.	and	the dress code <b>is</b> merely the culmination of a situation of serious deprivation		Relational Attributive
81.		the clothing restrictions <b>are</b> just one more element of domination		Relational Attributive
82.		In many cases, regulations that legally subordinate women in terms of their civil rights <b>exist</b>		Existential
83.	and	women <b>cannot</b> always <b>decide</b> whom they will marry, travel alone, or pass on their nationality to their descendants		Material
84.		The following section <b>analyses</b> some of the most classic cases in the Muslim world where the hijab is compulsory by law		Material
85.	and	<b>relates</b> these regulations <b>to</b> larger social and political contexts	The following section	Material
86.		On a number of occasions, hijabisation <b>is</b> directly <b>imposed</b> by a state that presents itself as Muslim		Material
87.		Usually, these visible measures <b>form</b> part of a larger package of what could be called ‘gender politics’, a type of socio-legislative system that constructs a model of society in which the woman question is central		Material
88.	While	many regulations and gender politics <b>are used to</b> socially <b>construct</b> the model of a woman		Material
89.		dress codes <b>give</b> state interventions immense visibility		Material
90.		<b>making</b> the state appear ubiquitous and able to exercise its control in all places	dress codes	Material

91.		There <b>are</b> two types of situations in which hijabisation occurs by imposition		Existential
92.		The first <b>corresponds to</b> the contexts of intense conflict, with open battles between different groups		Relational Identifying
93.		In this case, dress codes <b>are applied</b> in specific areas or cities <b>using</b> circulars or local media that may contradict the overarching legislative framework		Material
94.		Examples <b>include</b> Indonesia, Chechnya, Sudan, Nigeria and Palestine		Relational Identifying
95.		In the second situation, laws regulating clothing <b>are decreed</b> from the highest judicial levels, which can legislate sanctions and use security forces to make sure they are applied effectively		Verbal
96.		Between these two positions <b>runs</b> an entire gamut of possibilities regarding the means of pressure and the type of clothing prescribed		Material
97.		The required garments <b>include</b> the hijab		Relational Identifying
98.	but also	usually <b>incorporate</b> apparel seen as traditional and indigenous	The required garments	Relational Identifying
99.	so that	consideration of the post-colonial nationalist framework <b>is</b> fundamental		Relational Attributive
100.		Two of the best-known cases involving the imposition of a dress code <b>are</b> Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia		Relational Identifying
101.		The regulation of women's bodies as a political obsession <b>began</b> in Afghanistan in the camps – controlled by the CIA and Pakistani secret services – of Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the 1970s, where the <i>mujahideen</i> were being trained to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan		Material
102.		Fatwas <b>were used to control</b> the women in the camps who, in the absence of men, could not contact with anyone and were required to wear a hijab		Material
103.		The Taliban's successful advances against the <i>mujahideen</i> , beginning in 1994, <b>were sanctioned</b> by new decrees that restricted some women's rights		Material

104.		For instance, under the Taliban, women <b>were forced to dress</b> ‘decently’		Material
105.		<b>wearing</b> a <i>chadari</i>	women	Material
106.	and	<b>could not leave</b> the house unless accompanied by a <i>mahram</i>	women	Material
107.		The specific regulations on clothing <b>were</b> very strict		Relational Attributive
108.	and	<b>included</b> edicts concerning the colour and thickness of the <i>chadari</i> as well as forbidden ornaments (earrings, heels, perfume)	The specific regulations on clothing	Relational Identifying
109.		<b>rendering</b> the woman on the street invisible	The specific regulations on clothing	Material
110.		These measures <b>formed</b> part of an enormous collection of laws regulating the status of women during the Taliban period in the areas under their control		Material
111.		In addition to the regulation of clothing, other measures <b>prohibited</b> working and studying, wearing make-up, speaking with non- <i>mahram</i> men, laughing or speaking loudly and being seen through the windows of their homes		Material
112.		After the fall of the Taliban, Hamid Karzai’s government <b>modified</b> only the discourse about women		Material
113.		the real situation <b>did not change</b> , due to agreements between Karzai and the local notables who promoted discrimination and continue to do so		Material
114.	However	despite the importance of the repression embodied by the burqa, for many critics the representation of Afghan women as solely victims of Taliban violence as represented by the burqa only <b>serves to emphasise</b> racism and imperialism		Relational Identifying
115.		Saudi Arabia <b>offers</b> a second case of clothing regulation		Material
116.		Women there <b>must wear</b> a niqab		Material
117.	and	the only parts of their bodies that they can show that are not <i>awrah</i> <b>are</b> their hands and eyes		Relational Identifying

118.		The only garment that women are seen wearing <b>is</b> the <i>abaya</i> , a large, loose tunic with long sleeves		Relational Identifying
119.		Clothing regulations in Saudi Arabia, as in other places, <b>are</b> the culmination of a series of rules with respect to women that go beyond the simple regulation of public morals		Relational Attributive
120.		<b>Included</b> among the measures that followed the harsh repression of political–religious resistance in 1979	they	Material
121.		they <b>were designed to restrain</b> Western influence in Saudi Arabia		Material
122.		From the state’s point of view, it <b>was</b> much easier, politically speaking, to demonstrate anti-westernisation using the woman question than by targeting businesses, relations with the United States or consumption by the royal family		Relational Attributive
123.		An institution, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (known by its first word in Arabic, HAIA) <b>was</b> even <b>created</b>		Material
124.	and	<b>staffed</b> by a group of volunteers or <i>mutawain</i> who act as a moral police force	An institution, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (known by its first word in Arabic, HAIA)	Material
125.		<b>ensuring</b> that women follow the rules, which have proliferated and continually contradicted existing ones	An institution, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (known by its first word in Arabic, HAIA)	Material
126.		These regulations <b>include</b> the requirement to travel with the written permission of a guardian or tutor and a ban on working in most		Relational Identifying

		jobs, talking to strangers, browsing the internet if not in the presence of their <i>mahram</i> , wearing hijabs with prints or decoration, making commercial transactions without their <i>mahram</i> , having an identity card without their <i>mahram</i> 's authorisation, allowing their face to be photographed and driving		
127.		In Muslim countries where these types of regulations exist, the control of women <b>is</b> a fundamental part of their politics		Relational Attributive
128.	and	women's bodies <b>are defined</b> by dissidents as a site of resistance against power		Material
129.		Dress codes <b>are</b> the culmination of social policies that define a citizenship of gender based on specific legislation that draws the body		Relational Attributive
130.	therefore	the definition of the body <b>becomes</b> the definition of citizenship for women		Relational Attributive
131.	Moreover	this <b>occurs</b> publicly and permanently, since the application of dress codes requires public, police and parapolice control that authorises any male member of the community to enforce compliance		Material
132.		This <b>means</b> that any man can act as a moral judge of women's bodies, something that reinforces female subordination and vulnerability		Relational Identifying
133.	While	some Muslim states <b>require</b> women to wear Muslim clothing		Verbal
134.		others <b>restrict</b> its use		Relational Identifying
135.		This <b>is</b> the case with most European countries		Relational Identifying
136.		The following section <b>provides</b> an overview of legislation regarding clothing in Europe		Material
137.	and	<b>discusses</b> how the processes leading to these restrictions took place with respect to Muslim states	The following section	Material
138.		The 'headscarf problem' <b>emerged</b> in Europe in the 1980s		Material
139.		Those years <b>coincided with</b> an increase in the role of Islam in political mobilisation both on the continent and beyond		Material



140.		After the definitive end of colonialism as a form of political and administrative domination, transnational migrations <b>led to</b> the consolidation of a subaltern population within European borders		Relational Identifying
141.		The whole legal and media debate regarding the headscarf <b>resulted in</b> a re-inscribing of the Muslim population – almost always of immigrant origin – as a place of submission		Relational Identifying
142.	and	its construction as subject to regulation because of certain cultural <i>essences</i> <b>attributed to it</b>		Relational Identifying
143.		The debate <b>has arisen</b> in France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Spain and Sweden, among other places		Material
144.		In almost all European countries, the solution to the ‘hijab problem’ <b>has been</b> the drafting or re-drafting of laws or regulations limiting the use of the hijab in certain public situations or establishments		Relational Identifying
145.		On occasion, at the request of concerned <i>muhajabat</i> , the European Court of Human Rights <b>has intervened</b>		Material
146.		almost always <b>taking</b> the side of the governments	the European Court of Human Rights	Material
147.		From the beginning, the entire question in Europe <b>has been appropriated from</b> [...] <b>infected</b> by the structure of the French <i>affaire du foulard</i> , which, of course, was defined by local issues, including relations with the immigrants from the old Maghreb colonies, particularly Algeria, and their descendants		Material
148.		In each country, the legal framework for controlling attire <b>varies</b>		Relational Attributive
149.		Prohibitions or restrictions in Europe <b>have been established</b> within the margins allowed by law		Material
150.		These laws, which regulate the spaces for religion and difference in society, <b>vary</b> from country to country		Relational Attributive
151.		Each one <b>has</b> its own systems for regulating immigration and Islam and different incorporation models		Relational Attributive
152.		In each country, the management of Islam <b>is explained</b> from this intersection		Material

153.	and	regulating the hijab <b>is approached</b> within this context		Material
154.		The arguments on which the laws and regulations have been based <b>are</b> very different in nature		Relational Attributive
155.		<b>ranging</b> from the idea that religion in the public sphere is incompatible with general regulations, to the construction of the headscarf as discriminatory for women or as a reflection of isolation, etc.	The arguments on which the laws and regulations have been based	Material
156.	However	they all <b>agree</b> that the hijab – the embodiment of negative representations about Islam – is a social threat		Mental
157.	that	the hijab – the embodiment of negative representations about Islam – <b>is</b> a social threat		Relational Identifying
158.		No correlation <b>can be established</b> between the percentage of Muslims in the total population and the existence and stiffness of the regulations		Material
159.	While	Spain <b>is</b> the country with almost the lowest percentage of Muslims		Relational Identifying
160.		it <b>was</b> one of the first to deliberate regulations regarding the niqab		Relational Identifying
161.	and	it <b>applies</b> them in some municipal		Material
162.	Furthermore	the municipalities that have banned the veil <b>are not</b> the ones with the highest percentage of immigrants		Relational Identifying
163.		In fact, one of them Tarrés <b>has</b> no immigrants or Muslims		Relational Attributive
164.	but	the ban <b>has been discussed</b>		Verbal
165.		France <b>was</b> the pioneer		Relational Identifying
166.		<b>banning</b> the hijab in schools through the enactment of Law 2004–228, the so-called ‘Law on Secularity’, which regulates the use of any symbols or attire that show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools	France	Material
167.		In 2010, Law 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010 <b>was enacted</b>		Material
168.		<b>banning</b> the niqab in all public French spaces	Law 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010	Material

169.		Belgium <b>was expected to enact</b> a similar law regarding the niqab		Mental
170.	and	some cities and municipalities in Catalonia <b>began to ban</b> it in 2010		Material
171.	Until	laws <b>are enacted</b>		Material
172.		these issues usually <b>hang</b> in a real legal limbo		Material
173.		<b>resulting in</b> a situation in which the rights of women who wear the hijab or niqab are endangered	these issues	Material
174.		The trend in European countries <b>is</b> towards placing greater restrictions on the presence of Islamic garb in public spaces, including the street		Relational Attributive
175.		Measures <b>have been stiffened</b> , particularly since the economic crisis of 2008, as a way to channel the social discontent felt in broad sectors of the indigenous population		Material
176.		The terrorist acts carried out by al-Qaeda networks in Europe <b>have added</b> additional arguments in support of the measures		Material
177.		Generally speaking, despite the diversity of relations between different religions and states, the discourses and objectives of the regulations <b>do not vary</b> much		Relational Attributive
178.		The countries <b>have been exporting</b> their so-called ‘problem’ along with the most exclusionary solutions for the population		Material
179.		Up to now, countries with a strong tradition of pluralism and tolerance and those that are markedly religious <b>have refrained from enacting</b> regulations		Material
180.		The main issue <b>is</b> that prohibitionist policies, with their supporting arguments, are merely manifestations of the anti-Muslim or anti-Maghreb policies of European states, which are, in short, racist and are implemented		Relational Identifying
181.	that	prohibitionist policies, with their supporting arguments, <b>are</b> merely manifestations of the anti-Muslim or anti-Maghreb policies of European states, which are, in short, racist and are implemented		Relational Attributive
182.		Islamophobia <b>rules over</b> relationships with Muslims in Europe		Material
183.	although	according to Fred Halliday, it <b>would be</b> more correct to speak of anti-Muslimism		Relational Attributive

184.	since	the term ' <b>involves not</b> so much hostility to Islam as a religion...but hostility to Muslims, to communities of people whose sole or main religion is Islam and whose Islamic character, real or invented, forms one of the objects of prejudice'		Material
185.		This distinction <b>is</b> very interesting		Relational Attributive
186.	since	hostility towards Muslims at times <b>circumvents</b> Islam, with the precise aim of fortifying anti-Muslimism		Material
187.		Studies in Europe <b>speak of</b> a change from the old-school Islamophobia anchored in colonial relationships to a new one, linked to attacks and the identification of Islam with terrorism		Verbal
188.		What <b>is</b> unique about this new situation with Islam, for Prina Werbner, is that what we have, then, uniquely in the case of contemporary Islam, is an oppositional hegemonic bloc which includes intellectual elites and the consumerist masses, as well as 'real' violent racists, like members of the British National Party, who exploit anti-Muslim discourses to target Muslims in particular (as statistics show) for racial attacks		Relational Attributive
189.		This definition <b>is</b> perfectly <b>illustrated</b> by the strange political and social alliances formed in the debates and discussions on banning the headscarf and niqab		Material
190.		In one of the latest studies in Europe on this issue, Fernando Bravo López <b>argued</b> that Islamophobia is a reaction to the emancipation of Muslims in Europe, designed to reverse its effects and legitimise inequality		Verbal
191.	that	Islamophobia <b>is</b> a reaction to the emancipation of Muslims in Europe		Relational Attributive
192.		<b>designed to reverse</b> its effects [...] <b>legitimise</b> inequality	Islamophobia	Material
193.		In this respect, according to this author, the comparison with anti-Semitism <b>offers</b> quite a useful platform for analysis.		Material
194.		A very specific and at times contradictory construction of Muslim women <b>forms</b> part of anti-Muslimism		Material

195.		From this perspective, the concept of intersectionality as initially developed by Crenshaw <b>is</b> a useful one		Relational Attributive
196.		This author <b>holds</b> that the subordination of Black women is not limited to the interaction of gender and race		Mental
197.	that	the subordination of Black women <b>is not limited to</b> the interaction of gender and race		Relational Attributive
198.		The ‘intersectional experience’ <b>reaches</b> far beyond the sum of racism and sexism		Relational Attributive
199.		Thus, only an analysis that considers the intersectionality of the two contexts of domination <b>can account for</b> Black women’s experience of subordination		Material
200.		The paradigm of intersectionality <b>is</b> also valuable when considering the domination [...] of Muslim women		Relational Attributive
201.		<b>using</b> the legal regulation of clothing	The paradigm of intersectionality	Material
202.		<b>replacing</b> race with Muslimness	The paradigm of intersectionality	Material
203.		The subordination of Muslim women <b>can only be understood</b> within a framework that considers the interrelationships between sexism (inside Muslim communities as well as with respect to non-Muslims) and anti-Muslim racism or Islamophobia		Mental
204.		In both cases, the identity politics <b>are based on</b> the bodies of Muslim women by means of hyper-regulation		Relational Attributive
205.		The result <b>is</b> that Muslim women experience racism in different terms than Muslim men, just as they experience sexism differently than non-Muslim women		Relational Identifying
206.		Usually, the Islamophobic image of women <b>is</b> that of submission and subordination combined with ignorance		Relational Identifying
207.	although	they sometimes <b>become</b> accomplices in the fundamentalist threat		Relational Attributive
208.		Some authors <b>have used</b> the term ‘gendered Islamophobia’ to define this process		Material

209.		The condition of backwardness and subordination ascribed to these women <b>has served to present</b> their male companions as authoritarians and abusers		Material
210.		This <b>makes it possible to justify</b> a long series of events in the relationship between East and West, from the French occupation of Algeria to the invasion of Afghanistan		Material
211.		Gendered Islamophobia also <b>forms</b> the basis of a significant proportion of the arguments used in debates on the headscarf and niqab across Europe		Material
212.		The persistence of the subalternity of these women and the excuse of freeing them from the male-Muslim yoke <b>have become</b> the most commonly used discursive bases for banning Islamic garb		Relational Attributive
213.		This <b>is</b> due to the fact that the hijab or the niqab is an essential part of the construction of the exotic subalternity of Muslim women		Relational Attributive
214.	that	the hijab or the niqab <b>is</b> an essential part of the construction of the exotic subalternity of Muslim women		Relational Attributive
215.		It <b>is</b> important to remember that in Europe, legal limitations and dress codes apply to only the half the population they are designed to control, that is women		Relational Attributive
216.		Under these regulations, women wearing Islamic garb <b>have</b> only partial access to citizenship		Relational Attributive
217.		The legal regulations merely <b>serve as</b> a <i>de facto</i> sanction of a situation		Relational Identifying
218.	since	the women <b>are</b> already <b>marginalised</b> for wearing headscarves		Material
219.	Thus	in the 'Europe of Rights', Muslim women <b>are</b> doubly <b>discriminated against</b> , by virtue of their sex and their Muslimness		Material
220.		Their reified cultural difference <b>reinforces</b> their gender difference		Material
221.		<b>constructing</b> a strongly gendered citizenship	Their reified cultural difference	Material
222.		In the different cases, the prohibitions against the hijab and niqab <b>express</b> an idea of who can be a citizen in this territory and how		Relational Identifying
223.		They all <b>establish</b> a boundary between being and non-being		Material

224.	because	the clothing <b>is defined</b> as the carrier of values that run contrary to those of the country and to maintaining social peace		Material
225.		In these definitions, women <b>bear</b> the burden of complying or not with these citizenship demands through the immediate, visual examination of their clothing		Relational Identifying
226.		Their load <b>is</b> doubly heavy [...] on the one hand, from the dominant social and legislative regulations in the country where they live and, on the other, from their cultural community of reference		Relational Attributive
227.	because	<b>it is arises</b>		Material
228.		There <b>is</b> no counter-discourse in the public sphere to balance this negative image of Muslim women against the racism of the elites, which is discursive and, according to the definition established by Teun Van Dijk, is configured as an important social practice that results in specific types of inequality, is able to confirm and disseminate generalised ideologies and prejudices, and it legitimises everyday discrimination		Existential
229.		Highly regarded male and female writers <b>have put</b> their pens at the service of this anti-Muslimism		Material
230.		<b>sanctioning</b> what a great number of people think	Highly regarded male and female writers	Material
231.		This <b>has</b> only <b>been reinforced</b> by the economic crisis that began in 2008		Material
232.		In 1989, Pierre Bourdieu <b>said</b> in response to the first headscarf affair in France that its emergence made it possible for many intellectuals – whom he labelled gurus – to express inexcusable positions regarding the question of immigration		Verbal
233.	that	its emergence <b>made it possible</b> for many intellectuals – whom he labelled gurus – to express inexcusable positions regarding the question of immigration		Material
234.		<b>hiding</b> behind the defence of great principles like freedom, secularism and women’s liberation	many intellectuals	Material

235.		In his thinking, the question about whether or not to allow the headscarf in French public schools <b>hid</b> the real issue, which was whether immigrants of North African origin should be accepted in France		Material
236.		Answering ‘no’ to the first question <b>resolved</b> the second one as well		Material
237.		A negative response to the second question <b>would have been</b> indefensible		Relational Attributive
238.	but	when formulated in terms of the first, one <b>could</b> calmly <b>respond</b> ‘no’		Verbal
239.		Almost 23 years later, Bourdieu’s assessment still <b>serves to explain</b> the regulation of the headscarf and niqab across Europe		Relational Identifying
240.		Since the sixteenth century, the question of veiling and unveiling <b>has been</b> a political one, both in inter- and intracultural relations		Relational Attributive
241.		it <b>entails</b> the domination of women		Relational Identifying
242.		Regulations on the headscarf <b>add</b> a twist to this		Material
243.	because	both the laws that ban its use and those that require it <b>are applied to</b> bodies that are constructed as inferior and subaltern and can legitimately be regulated		Material
244.		Inscribing laws onto the body in this way <b>expresses</b> [...] the subaltern place of women in the social order		Relational Identifying
245.	and	<b>reinforces</b> the subaltern place of women in the social order	Inscribing laws onto the body in this way	Material
246.		Women, as well as their bodies, <b>are</b> the symbolic places where societies engrave their moral order		Relational Attributive
247.		The key concept <b>is</b> the normativisation of the body, in the sense of applying rules that, as with the normativisation processes with languages, <i>normalise</i> the body		Relational Identifying
248.		Dress codes <b>are designed to normativise</b> the female body		Material
249.	and	<b>[are designed to] define</b> a classification system for women, as occurred in the Middle Ages when women’s clothing was regulated	Dress codes	Material



250.		They <b>determine</b> who is on one side or the other of the boundary of citizenship that separates ‘good’ women from ‘bad’ women		Mental
251.		Bad women who challenge the prohibition of the headscarf <b>are defined</b> as non-citizens		Material
252.	because	their bodies <b>have</b> values that run contrary to the citizenship inscribed onto them		Relational Attributive
253.		The other bad women, those who challenge the requirement to wear a headscarf, <b>are</b> bad patriots and bad Muslims		Relational Attributive
254.		This <b>does not</b> only <b>refer to</b> legislative regulations		Relational Identifying
255.	but also	<b>refer to</b> the dozens of rules and restrictions to which the bodies of Muslim women must adapt	This	Relational Identifying
256.		The regulation – both legal and social – of the headscarf and niqab <b>occupies</b> a central place in the exercise of male and colonial control		Material
257.	since	it <b>goes to</b> the heart of the domination of Muslims by controlling women’s bodies		Material
258.		All of this <b>is conducted</b> by means of discourses, rules, regulations and recommendations that construct a model of normative gender, of <i>how</i> women should be		Material
259.		The headscarf <b>is becoming</b> a fundamental instrument, firstly in the creation of a female essence that must be governed and, secondly, in the control of Muslims as a group		Relational Attributive
260.		The first situation <b>is seen</b> in many Muslim countries, where the headscarf is used to control women		Mental
261.		The second <b>is found</b> in relation to Muslim communities that have settled in countries of immigration, where they are subject to discursive and normative practices that make them objects of regulation by the majority society		Material
262.		The tendency to create laws that sanction a social order and the pressing need to legislate as many aspects of life as possible <b>focus</b> , especially in the West, <b>on</b> immigrants and, in Muslim countries, on women		Mental
263.		The legal system <b>intensifies</b> the sense of domination and control		Material

264.		It also <b>establishes</b> a broad swath of the population that is potentially outside the law, formed, in the West, by all Muslim women, even those who have never considered wearing a hijab, and in Muslim countries, by all women		Material
265.		Regulating the headscarf <b>becomes</b> a visible device that underpins the inequality between <i>them</i> and <i>us</i>		Relational Attributive
266.		The normativisation of the body of the <i>other</i> <b>reveals</b> the relationship of domination		Material
267.	since	it <b>imposes</b> an image that the subject must resemble or assimilate		Material
268.		<i>one must not</i> [...] <b>wear</b> a headscarf		Material
269.	or	<i>one must wear</i> a headscarf		Material
270.		Women <b>are presented</b> as being in a precarious situation, constantly on the border where legal meets illegal		Material
271.		Cases from the Muslim diaspora where the hijab is restricted also <b>portray</b> this <i>culture of the other</i> as backward		Material
272.	because	the headscarf <b>becomes</b> the representation of the inequality between men and women		Relational Attributive
273.		All the stereotypes about Muslims <b>are brought up</b> to date here		Material
274.		Finally, these cases <b>serve to show</b> that regulation ‘liberates’ or saves women from the men in their own culture		Relational Identifying
275.	and	[ <b>serve to</b> ] <b>present</b> the imposition of the dress code as a triumph of civilisation over barbarism	these cases	Relational Identifying
276.		The woman in the headscarf <b>does not look like</b> <i>us</i>		Mental
277.	therefore	she <b>must be assimilated</b>		Material
278.	and	the scarf <b>torn</b> from her head		Material
279.		In the Muslim world, regulations that require that women wear Muslim garb also <b>compel</b> their guardians to supervise them, which establishes a strong sexual hierarchisation		Material
280.		Thus, the dress code regulation <b>reinforces</b> the patriarchy of which it is a product		Material
281.		Regulations <b>have brought about</b> moments of change in the political and economic model in Muslim countries		Material

282.		<b>deflecting</b> clashes between classes to clashes between men and women	Regulations	Material
283.	Moreover	penalising the public presence of women and bolstering a particular ideal of domestic femininity <b>leaves</b> poor, working women in a very vulnerable place in terms of exploitation		Material
284.	since	they <b>have</b> little value as women in light of these regulations		Relational Attributive
285.		The regulations that restrict Muslim attire in Europe <b>have intensified</b> since the so-called ‘economic crisis’ of 2008		Material
286.		Their application <b>has made it possible to reinforce</b> the image of Muslims as bearers of a savage, discriminatory culture, establishing continuity with the colonial policies of the former powers, which constructed their arguments in the same way, justifying the subalternity of Muslims		Material
287.		This discourse <b>works</b> on behalf of Islamophobia, which seeks to maintain the Muslim population in a subordinate position, without rights and unemancipated		Material
288.		The law <b>regulates</b> that which is most intimate: the body		Material
289.		The idea that there are special situations in which some boundaries can be crossed <b>creates</b> the conditions that allow states to impose various types of policies and restrictions		Material
290.		<b>deflecting</b> the general discontent resulting from a deterioration in living conditions brought about by the crisis to what is presented as a culture clash between Muslims and non-Muslims	The idea that there are special situations in which some boundaries can be crossed	Material

Material Process								
No	Conjunction	Actor	Process	Goal	Initiator	Recipient	Scope	Circumstances
6.			<b>was expelled</b>		a teenage girl			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In 2010</li> <li>- in Madrid</li> <li>- from secondary school</li> <li>- for wearing a hijab, or Muslim headscarf</li> </ul>
10.	since	this offensive	<b>damaged</b>	representations of Islam in general				
11.		a group of political leaders	<b>launched</b>	an initiative against vice which basically entailed stiffening the dress code for women and even cracking down on suntans				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Almost five thousand kilometres away from Madrid</li> <li>- in Iran</li> </ul>
14.			<b>did emerge</b>	this compulsive urge to ban the headscarves				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in Europe</li> </ul>

15.	when		<b>was taking place</b>	the exact opposite				- in many Muslim countries
18.		This article	<b>investigates</b>	these questions				
19.		This article	<b>bringing together</b>				the results from several research projects carried out in different contexts and time periods on the Muslim diaspora in Europe, mainly France and Spain	
22.			<b>have been examined</b>	the questions related to the regulation of Muslim women's clothing				- Usually - in the scholarly literature either from the perspective of legislation that imposes it, as in Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, or from the

								perspective of legislation that restricts it, which is the situation in a growing number of European countries with strong Muslim minorities
24.		the dominant perspectives	<b>have analysed</b>	the regulations				- with regard to human rights, liberalism, the formation of national identities or political discourse in connection with Islam
29.		they	<b>establish</b>	a strong sexual and social hierarchisation				- In Muslim contexts
30.	while		<b>is created</b>	a sexual and ethnic stratification				- in non-Muslim contexts
31.		The fact that these regulations appear in times of	<b>reveals</b>	their importance as tools to regulate the				

		intense crisis in the system		population in preparation for exceptional measures, with heavy impositions or reductions in rights or changes to the system directly				
33.		This article	<b>will analyse</b>	the contexts of prohibition, regulation and the imposition of Muslim clothing in Muslim and non-Muslim spheres as part of a process of extending control over women and minorities, the product of the need to legitimise neoliberal				

				policies in much of the world, associated with a high degree of authoritarianism				
34.		The first part of the paper	<b>describes</b>	the process of hijabisation that has taken place in Muslim contexts, including situations where it is not an institutional or state imposition, but the result of a series of decisions related to religiosity				
35.		a review of the laws regulating women's clothing in some Muslim countries and European states	<b>is followed</b>	This				



36.		I	<b>attempt to explain</b>	the logic behind these restrictions within the framework of reinforcing control of women and Muslims as subaltern populations				- In the final reflection
38.	or	Rema Hammami	<b>has termed</b>	<i>hijabisation</i>				
40.		Hijabisation	<b>obeys</b>				a logic unrelated to any imposition	- generally
41.		Many women	<b>began to adopt</b>	it				- as a militant act - in the 1970s
42.	when	they	<b>became involved</b>	in political action				- through their participation in the Islamist political projects that formed part of a belated revolt, in many places, against the violent colonial project of westernisation or as a means

								of political resistance
43.			<b>was legitimised</b>	the hijab				- As a consequence of these battles
45.		Islamism	<b>gave</b>	many women			the opportunity to enter the public sphere	
46.		many women	<b>fighting</b>					- for causes and in structures that did not denigrate their status
47.		the headscarf	<b>played</b>	a fundamental role				- As a visible sign of this political commitment - in these battles
48.		The hijab	<b>went</b>					- from being a sign of submission in the eyes of colonial modernity to becoming a sign of assertiveness
49.	and	women	<b>appropriated</b>	it				- actively
50.		Nilüfer Göle	<b>draws on</b>	Erving Goffman's				- to argue that Islamism can

				concept of stigma				be seen as a political and collective form of the 'management of spoiled identity
51.	since	Islamism	<b>encourages</b>	political actors				- as a social movement - to voluntarily adopt the religious attributes that are considered potentially discrediting from the point of view of the normative framework of a modern culture
52.		Islamist movements	<b>turn into</b>	the 'undesired differentness' of being a Muslim			a voluntary adoption of a stigma symbol that is overtly claimed and offensively communicated in public	

55.		they	<b>contributed to</b>	the extension of certain models of public morality				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- With the support of the media</li> <li>- both within and outside of Muslim countries</li> </ul>
58.		Market Islam	<b>has enabled</b>	Islamic consumption, marketing strategies for these products, and the creation of a Muslim body				
62.	as		<b>is experienced</b>	it				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in a substantial part of the Muslim world – including the diaspora</li> </ul>
65.	However		<b>is explained</b>	the headscarf				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- even when it is voluntary and responds to this type of process</li> <li>- from the Western point of view</li> <li>- always</li> <li>- as a symbol of backwardness and the</li> </ul>

								subordination of women
66.		It	<b>formed</b>	part of the construction of a colonial discourse that differentiated the coloniser from the colonised, and even today continues to dominate relationships with Muslims				
67.		The threat of Islamic terrorism, especially after 9/11	<b>intensified</b>	the rejection of Muslims				
68.			<b>has been used</b>	The prevention of new attacks				- as a pretext for military intervention in the Muslim world
69.	and		<b>has been used to impose</b>	The prevention of new attacks			regulations	- on the Muslim population residing in Europe
74.		It	<b>appears</b>					- in very different

								discourses in politics, feminisms, municipal management, discussions of human rights and the question of the presence of Muslim girls in schools
77.	as	the state	<b>passes</b>	laws that require that women – almost never men – to wear what is considered Muslim clothing				
79.			<b>have been reduced</b>	women's rights				- By the time these regulations are enacted - usually - considerably
83.	and	women	<b>cannot decide</b>	whom they will marry, travel alone, or pass on their nationality to				- always

				their descendants				
84.		The following section	<b>analyses</b>	some of the most classic cases in the Muslim world where the hijab is compulsory by law				
85.	and	The following section	<b>relates to</b>	these regulations			larger social and political contexts	
86.		a state that presents itself as Muslim	<b>is imposed</b>	hijabisation				- On a number of occasions - directly
87.		these visible measures	<b>form</b>	part of a larger package of what could be called 'gender politics', a type of socio-legislative system that constructs a model of society in which the woman question is central				- Usually

88.	While		<b>are used to construct</b>	the model of a woman			many regulations and gender politics	- socially
89.		dress codes	<b>give</b>	state interventions			immense visibility	
90.		dress codes	<b>making</b>	the state				- appear ubiquitous and able to exercise its control in all places
93.		dress codes	<b>are applied using</b>	circulars or local media that may contradict the overarching legislative framework				- In this case - in specific areas or cities
96.		an entire gamut of possibilities regarding the means of pressure and the type of clothing prescribed	<b>runs</b>					- Between these two positions
101.		The regulation of women's bodies as a political obsession	<b>began</b>					- in Afghanistan in the camps – controlled by the CIA and Pakistani secret services – of Afghan



								refugees in Pakistan in the 1970s, where the <i>mujahideen</i> were being trained to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
102.		Fatwas	<b>were used to control</b>	the women in the camps who, in the absence of men, could not contact with anyone and were required to wear a hijab				
103.		new decrees that restricted some women's rights	<b>were sanctioned</b>	The Taliban's successful advances against the <i>mujahideen</i> , beginning in 1994				
104.		women	<b>were forced to dress</b>					- For instance - under the Taliban - 'decently'
105.		women	<b>wearing</b>	<i>a chadari</i>				

106.	and	women	<b>could not leave</b>	the house				- unless accompanied by a <i>mahram</i>
109.		The specific regulations on clothing	<b>rendering</b>	the woman				- on the street invisible
110.		These measures	<b>formed</b>	part of an enormous collection of laws regulating the status of women during the Taliban period				- in the areas under their control
111.		other measures	<b>prohibited</b>	working and studying, wearing make-up, speaking with non- <i>mahram</i> men, laughing or speaking loudly and being seen through the windows of their homes				- In addition to the regulation of clothing

112.		Hamid Karzai's government	<b>modified</b>	only the discourse about women					- After the fall of the Taliban
113.			<b>did not change</b>	the real situation					- due to agreements between Karzai and the local notables who promoted discrimination and continue to do so
115.		Saudi Arabia	<b>offers</b>	a second case of clothing regulation					
116.		Women	<b>must wear</b>	a niqab					- there
120.		they	<b>included</b>						- among the measures that followed the harsh repression of political–religious resistance in 1979
121.		they	<b>were designed to restrain</b>	Western influence in Saudi Arabia					
123.			<b>was created</b>	An institution, the Committee for the					- even

				Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (known by its first word in Arabic, HAIA)				
124.	and	a group of volunteers or <i>mutawain</i> who act as a moral police force	<b>staffed</b>	An institution, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (known by its first word in Arabic, HAIA)				
125.		An institution, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (known by its first word in Arabic, HAIA)	<b>ensuring</b>	that women follow the rules, which have proliferated and continually contradicted existing ones				

128.	and	dissidents	<b>are defined</b>	women's bodies					- as a site of resistance against power
131.	Moreover	this	<b>occurs</b>						- publicly and permanently - since the application of dress codes requires public, police and parapolice control that authorises any male member of the community to enforce compliance
136.		The following section	<b>provides</b>	an overview of legislation regarding clothing in Europe					
137.	and	The following section	<b>discusses</b>	how the processes leading to these restrictions took place with respect to Muslim states					

138.			<b>emerged</b>	The 'headscarf problem'				- in Europe - in the 1980s
139.		Those years	<b>coincided with</b>	an increase in the role of Islam in political mobilisation both on the continent and beyond				
143.		The debate	<b>has arisen</b>					- in France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Spain and Sweden, among other places
145.		the European Court of Human Rights	<b>has intervened</b>					- On occasion - at the request of concerned <i>muhajabat</i>
146.		the European Court of Human Rights	<b>taking</b>	the side of the governments				- almost always
147.		the structure of the French <i>affaire du foulard</i> , which, of course, was defined by	<b>has been appropriated from [...] infected</b>	the entire question				- From the beginning - in Europe

		local issues, including relations with the immigrants from the old Maghreb colonies, particularly Algeria, and their descendants						
149.		Prohibitions or restrictions	<b>have been established</b>					- in Europe - within the margins allowed by law
152.			<b>is explained</b>	the management of Islam				- In each country - from this intersection
153.	and		<b>is approached</b>	regulating the hijab				- within this context
155.		The arguments on which the laws and regulations have been based	<b>ranging</b>					- from the idea that religion in the public sphere is incompatible with general regulations, to the construction of the headscarf as discriminatory for women or as a reflection

								of isolation, etc.
158.		No correlation	<b>can be established</b>					- between the percentage of Muslims in the total population and the existence and stiffness of the regulations
161.	and	it	<b>applies</b>	them				- in some municipal
166.		France	<b>banning</b>	the hijab				- in schools - through the enactment of Law 2004–228, the so-called ‘Law on Secularity’, which regulates the use of any symbols or attire that show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools
167.			<b>was enacted</b>	Law 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010				- In 2010



168.		Law 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010	<b>banning</b>	the niqab				- in all public French spaces
170.	and	some cities and municipalities	<b>began to ban</b>	it				- in Catalonia - in 2010
171.	Until		<b>are enacted</b>	laws				
172.		these issues	<b>hang</b>					- usually - in a real legal limbo
173.		these issues	<b>resulting in</b>	a situation in which the rights of women who wear the hijab or niqab are endangered				
175.			<b>have been stiffened</b>	Measures				- particularly since the economic crisis of 2008 - as a way to channel the social discontent felt in broad sectors of the indigenous population
176.		The terrorist acts carried out by al-Qaeda networks in Europe	<b>have added</b>	additional arguments in support of the measures				

178.		The countries	<b>have been exporting</b>	their so-called 'problem' along with the most exclusionary solutions for the population				
179.		countries with a strong tradition of pluralism and tolerance and those that are markedly religious	<b>have refrained from enacting</b>	regulations				- Up to now
182.		Islamophobia	<b>rules over</b>	relationships with Muslims				- in Europe
184.	since	the term	<b>involves not</b>	so much hostility to Islam as a religion...but hostility to Muslims, to communities of people whose sole or main religion is Islam and whose Islamic character,				

				real or invented, forms one of the objects of prejudice				
186.	since	hostility towards Muslims at times	<b>circumvents</b>	Islam				- with the precise aim of fortifying anti- Muslimism
189.		the strange political and social alliances formed in the debates and discussions on banning the headscarf and niqab	<b>is illustrated</b>	This definition				- perfectly
192.		Islamophobia	<b>designed to reverse [...] legitimize</b>	its effects and [...] inequality				
193.		the comparison with anti- Semitism	<b>offers</b>	quite a useful platform for analysis				- In this respect - according to this author
194.		A very specific and at times contradictory construction of Muslim women	<b>forms</b>	part of anti- Muslimism				
199.		an analysis that considers the intersectionality of the two	<b>can account for</b>	Black women's experience of subordination				- Thus - only

		contexts of domination						
201.		The paradigm of intersectionality	<b>using</b>	the legal regulation of clothing				
202.		The paradigm of intersectionality	<b>replacing</b>	race with Muslimness				
208.		Some authors	<b>have used</b>	the term 'gendered Islamophobia'				- to define this process
209.		The condition of backwardness and subordination ascribed to these women	<b>has served to present</b>	their male companions as authoritarians and abusers				
210.		This	<b>makes possible to justify</b>	a long series of events in the relationship between East and West, from the French occupation of Algeria to the invasion of Afghanistan				
211.		Gendered Islamophobia	<b>forms</b>	the basis of a significant proportion of the arguments				- also

				used in debates on the headscarf and niqab across Europe				
218.	since		<b>are marginalised</b>	the women				- for wearing headscarves
219.	Thus		<b>are discriminated against</b>	Muslim women				- in the 'Europe of Rights' - doubly - by virtue of their sex and their Muslimness
220.		Their reified cultural difference	<b>reinforces</b>	their gender difference				
221.		Their reified cultural difference	<b>constructing</b>	a strongly gendered citizenship				
223.		They all	<b>establish</b>	a boundary between being and non-being				
224.	because		<b>is defined</b>	the clothing				- as the carrier of values that run contrary to those of the country and to maintaining social peace

227.	because		<b>is arises</b>	it				-
229.		Highly regarded male and female writers	<b>have put</b>	their pens				- at the service of this anti-Muslimism
230.		Highly regarded male and female writers	<b>sanctioning</b>	what a great number of people think				
231.		the economic crisis that began in 2008	<b>has been reinforced</b>	This				- only
233.	that	its emergence	<b>made possible</b>	for many intellectuals – whom he labelled gurus – to express inexcusable positions regarding the question of immigration				
234.		many intellectuals	<b>hiding</b>					- behind the defence of great principles like freedom, secularism and women’s liberation
235.		the question about whether or not to allow the headscarf in	<b>hid</b>	the real issue, which was whether immigrants				- In his thinking

		French public schools		of North African origin should be accepted in France				
236.		Answering 'no' to the first question	<b>resolved</b>	the second one				- as well
242.		Regulations on the headscarf	<b>add</b>	a twist				- to this
243.	because	both the laws that ban its use and those that require it	<b>are applied to</b>	bodies that are constructed as inferior and subaltern and can legitimately be regulated				
245.	and	Inscribing laws onto the body	<b>reinforces</b>					- in this way
248.		Dress codes	<b>are designed to normativise</b>	the female body				
249.	and	Dress codes	<b>[are designed to] define</b>	a classification system for women				- as occurred in the Middle Ages when women's clothing was regulated
251.			<b>are defined</b>	Bad women who challenge the prohibition				- as non-citizens

				of the headscarf				
256.		The regulation – both legal and social – of the headscarf and niqab	<b>occupies</b>	a central place				- in the exercise of male and colonial control
257.	since	it	<b>goes to</b>	heart of the domination of Muslims				- by controlling women’s bodies
258.		means of discourses, rules, regulations and recommendations that construct a model of normative gender, of <i>how</i> women should be	<b>is conducted</b>	All of this				
261.			<b>is found</b>	The second				- in relation to Muslim communities that have settled in countries of immigration, where they are subject to discursive and normative practices that make them objects of



								regulation by the majority society
263.		The legal system	<b>intensifies</b>	the sense of domination and control				
264.		It	<b>establishes</b>	a broad swath of the population that is potentially outside the law, formed, in the West, by all Muslim women, even those who have never considered wearing a hijab, and in Muslim countries, by all women				- also
266.		The normativisation of the body of the <i>other</i>	<b>reveals</b>	the relationship of domination				
267.	since	it	<b>imposes</b>	an image that the subject must				

				resemble or assimilate				
268.		one	<b>must not [...]</b> wear	a headscarf				
269.	or	one	<b>must wear</b>	a headscarf				
270.			<b>are presented</b>	Women				- as being in a precarious situation, constantly on the border where legal meets illegal
271.		Cases from the Muslim diaspora where the hijab is restricted	<b>portray</b>	<i>this culture of the other</i>				- also - as backward
273.		All the stereotypes about Muslims	<b>are brought up</b>					- to date here
277.	therefore		<b>must be assimilated</b>	she				
278.	and		<b>torn</b>	the scarf				- from her head
279.		regulations that require that women wear Muslim garb	<b>compel</b>	their guardians				- In the Muslim world - also - to supervise them, which establishes a strong hierarchisation
280.		the dress code regulation	<b>reinforces</b>	the patriarchy of				- Thus

				which it is a product				
281.		Regulations	<b>have brought about</b>	moments of change				- in the political and economic model - in Muslim countries
282.		Regulations	<b>deflecting</b>	clashes				- between classes to clashes between men and women
283.	Moreover	penalising the public presence of women and bolstering a particular ideal of domestic femininity	<b>leaves</b>	poor, working women				- in a very vulnerable place in terms of exploitation
285.			<b>have intensified</b>	The regulations that restrict Muslim attire				- in Europe - since the so-called 'economic crisis' of 2008
286.		Their application	<b>has made possible to reinforce</b>	the image of Muslims as bearers of a savage, discriminatory culture, establishing continuity with the				

				colonial policies of the former powers, which constructed their arguments in the same way, justifying the subalternity of Muslims				
287.		This discourse	<b>works</b>					- on behalf of Islamophobia, which seeks to maintain the Muslim population in a subordinate position, without rights and unemancipated
288.		The law	<b>regulates</b>	that which is most intimate: the body				
289.		The idea that there are special situations in which some	<b>creates</b>	the conditions that allow states to impose				

		boundaries can be crossed		various types of policies and restrictions				
290.		The idea that there are special situations in which some boundaries can be crossed	<b>deflecting</b>	the general discontent resulting from a deterioration in living conditions brought about by the crisis to what is presented as a culture clash between Muslims and non-Muslims				

<b>Mental Process</b>					
<b>No</b>	<b>Conjunction</b>	<b>Senser</b>	<b>Process</b>	<b>Phenomenon</b>	<b>Circumstances</b>
4.		I	<b>will consider</b>	both the legal regulations that require women to wear the so-called 'Muslim' clothing and those that restrict it as a way of disciplining the population	- In this respect
5.	and	I	<b>will focus on</b>	the control of women as a privileged form of political control	
27.		I	<b>will consider</b>	both the legal regulations that require women to wear the so-called 'Muslim' clothing and those that restrict it as a way of disciplining the population	
28.	and	I	<b>will focus on</b>	the control of women as a privileged form of political control	
44.	and	many women	<b>felt</b>	more dignified and freer wearing it	
51.	since	Islamism	<b>encourages</b>	political actors to voluntarily adopt the religious attributes that are considered potentially discrediting from the point of view of the normative framework of a modern culture	- as a social movement
72.		The headscarf – followed by the niqab –	<b>concentrates</b>	the entire construction of Muslim alterity in the West	
156.	However	they all	<b>agree</b>	that the hijab – the embodiment of negative representations about Islam – is a social threat	
169.		Belgium	<b>was expected to enact</b>	a similar law regarding the niqab	
196.		This author	<b>holds</b>	that the subordination of Black women is not limited to the interaction of gender and race	
203.			<b>can be understood</b>	The subordination of Muslim women	- only

					- within a framework that considers the interrelationships between sexism (inside Muslim communities as well as with respect to non-Muslims) and anti-Muslim racism or Islamophobia
250.		They	<b>determine</b>	who is on one side or the other of the boundary of citizenship that separates 'good' women from 'bad' women	
260.			<b>is seen</b>	The first situation	- in many Muslim countries, where the headscarf is used to control women
262.		The tendency to create laws that sanction a social order and the pressing need to legislate as many aspects of life as possible	<b>focus on</b>	immigrants and [...] women	- especially in the West - in Muslim countries
276.		<i>us</i>	<b>does not look like</b>	The woman in the headscarf	

Relational Attributive Process					
No	Conjunction	Carrier	Process	Attribute	Circumstances
1.		Control of the female body	is	a key component of both the formation of Muslim communities in European countries	
8.	Although	they	had	a direct impact on girls who wore the hijab ( <i>muhajabat</i> ) and the niqab ( <i>munaqabat</i> )	- only
16.		the two types of proscriptions	were based on	what	
17.	and	what the processes	do have	in common	
25.		These analyses	have remained	within local or national spheres	
26.	however	The objective of this article	is	more far-reaching	
32.		The focus of my work	is	on the legal restrictions of Muslim women's clothing	
54.		The process	has been called	the 'other conservative revolution', in which the role of new preachers has been key	- to paraphrase the North American neocon offensive
56.		This embodiment of the Islamic female	has been	on the increase	- in recent years, during which time the processes of globalisation have modified Islam, explicitly influencing the question of the headscarf, and a kind of Muslim aesthetic has become a topic of emerging importance
61.		Islam	is	a strongly embodied religion	- Indeed



					- according to the concept established by Thomas Csordas
70.		The liberation of Muslim women	<b>has become</b>	a fundamental part of the arguments supporting the different forms of this domination	
71.	and	the construction of these women coming out of Europe	<b>is based on</b>	a representation of the body that includes the hijab	
73.	and	it	<b>has become</b>	an object that structures a large part of the relationship	- between Muslims and non-Muslims in the world
76.	however	the process of hijabisation	<b>is</b>	the result of state imposition	- At times
78.		Some Muslim countries	<b>have</b>	legal regulations regarding dress codes for women	
80.	and	the dress code	<b>is</b>	merely the culmination of a situation of serious deprivation	
81.		the clothing restrictions	<b>are</b>	just one more element of domination	
99.	so that	consideration of the post-colonial nationalist framework	<b>is</b>	fundamental	
107.		The specific regulations on clothing	<b>were</b>	very strict	
119.		Clothing regulations in Saudi Arabia	<b>are</b>	the culmination of a series of rules with respect to women that go beyond the simple regulation of public morals	- as in other places

122.		it	<b>was</b>	much easier [...] to demonstrate anti-westernisation using the woman question than by targeting businesses, relations with the United States or consumption by the royal family	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- From the state's point of view</li> <li>- politically speaking</li> </ul>
127.		the control of women	<b>is</b>	a fundamental part of their politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In Muslim countries where these types of regulations exist</li> </ul>
129.		Dress codes	<b>are</b>	the culmination of social policies that define a citizenship of gender based on specific legislation that draws the body	
130.	therefore	the definition of the body	<b>becomes</b>	the definition of citizenship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- for women</li> </ul>
148.		the legal framework for controlling attire	<b>varies</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In each country</li> </ul>
150.		These laws, which regulate the spaces for religion and difference in society	<b>vary</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- from country to country</li> </ul>
151.		Each on	<b>has</b>	its own systems for regulating immigration and Islam and different incorporation models	
154.		The arguments on which the laws and regulations have been based	<b>are</b>	very different	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in nature</li> </ul>
163.		one of them Tarrés	<b>has</b>	no immigrants or Muslims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In fact</li> </ul>
174.		The trend	<b>is</b>	towards placing greater restrictions on the presence of Islamic garb in public spaces, including the street	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in European countries</li> </ul>

177.		the discourses and objectives of the regulations	<b>do not vary</b>	much	- Generally speaking - despite the diversity of relations between different religions and states
181.	that				-
183.	although	it	<b>would be</b>	more correct to speak of anti-Muslimism	- according to Fred Halliday
185.		This distinction	<b>is</b>	very interesting	
188.		What	<b>is</b>	unique	- about this new situation with Islam, for Pnina Werbner, is that what we have, then, uniquely in the case of contemporary Islam, is an oppositional hegemonic bloc which includes intellectual elites and the consumerist masses, as well as 'real' violent racists, like members of the British National Party, who exploit anti-Muslim discourses to target Muslims in particular (as statistics show) for racial attacks
191.	that	Islamophobia	<b>is</b>	a reaction to the emancipation of Muslims	- in Europe
195.		The concept of intersectionality as	<b>is</b>	a useful one	- From this perspective

		initially developed by Crenshaw			
197.	that	the subordination of Black women	<b>is not limited to</b>	the interaction of gender and race	
198.		The ‘intersectional experience’	<b>reaches</b>	far beyond the sum of racism and sexism	
200.		The paradigm of intersectionality	<b>is</b>	also valuable	- when considering the domination [...] of Muslim women
204.		the identity politics	<b>are based on</b>	the bodies of Muslim women	- In both cases - by means of hyper-regulation
207.	although	they	<b>become</b>	accomplices	- sometimes - in the fundamentalist threat
212.		The persistence of the subalternity of these women and the excuse of freeing them from the male-Muslim yoke	<b>have become</b>	the most commonly used discursive bases	- for banning Islamic garb
213.		This	<b>is</b>		- due to the fact that the hijab or the niqab is an essential part of the construction of the exotic subalternity of Muslim women
214.	that	the hijab or the niqab	<b>is</b>	an essential part of the construction of the exotic subalternity of Muslim women	
215.		It	<b>is</b>	important to remember that in Europe, legal limitations and dress codes apply to only the half	

				the population they are designed to control, that is women	
216.		women wearing Islamic garb	<b>have</b>	only partial access to citizenship	- Under these regulations
226.		Their load	<b>is</b>	doubly heavy	- on the one hand, from the dominant social and legislative regulations in the country where they live and, on the other, from their cultural community of reference
237.		A negative response to the second question	<b>would have been</b>	indefensible	
240.		the question of veiling and unveiling	<b>has been</b>	a political one, both in inter- and intracultural relations	- Since the sixteenth century
246.		Women, as well as their bodies	<b>are</b>	the symbolic places where societies engrave their moral order	
252.	because	their bodies	<b>have</b>	values that run contrary to the citizenship inscribed onto them	
253.		The other bad women, those who challenge the requirement to wear a headscarf	<b>are</b>	bad patriots and bad Muslims	
259.		The headscarf	<b>is becoming</b>	a fundamental instrument	- firstly in the creation of a female essence that must be governed and, secondly, in the control of Muslims as a group

265.		Regulating the headscarf	<b>becomes</b>	a visible device that underpins the inequality between <i>them</i> and <i>us</i>	
272.	because	the headscarf	<b>becomes</b>	the representation of the inequality between men and women	
284.	since	they	<b>have</b>	little value	- as women in the light of these regulations

Relational Identifying Process					
No	Conjunction	Token	Process	Value	Circumstances
3.	that	the regulation of the clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item	<b>share</b>	the same goal: the control of women's bodies	
9.		they	<b>affected</b>	the entire community	
12.		girls who wanted to go to university	<b>were required to wear</b>	headscarves	- Somewhat closer - in Gaza
21.	that	the regulation of clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item	<b>share</b>	the same goal: the control of women's bodies	
23.		the dominant perspectives	<b>have been</b>	legal	- In general
37.		The process behind the expanded use of the hijab	<b>has accompanied</b>	an increase	- in Muslim dress regulations
39.		The imposition of this article	<b>is</b>	one reason for its more widespread use, but not the main one	

53.		this process	<b>corresponds to</b>	a kind of Islamisation that extends across the Muslim world, including the diaspora	- For some authors
63.		Women	<b>fill</b>	the sphere of this embodiment	
75.		The main argument for banning its use	<b>is</b>	the liberation of women	
92.		The first	<b>corresponds to</b>	the contexts of intense conflict, with open battles between different groups	
94.		Examples	<b>include</b>	Indonesia, Chechnya, Sudan, Nigeria and Palestine	
97.		The required garments	<b>include</b>	the hijab	
98.	but also	The required garments	<b>incorporate</b>	apparel seen as traditional and indigenous	- usually
100.		Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia	<b>are</b>	Two of the best-known cases involving the imposition of a dress code	
108.	and	The specific regulations on clothing	<b>included</b>	edicts concerning the colour and thickness of the <i>chadari</i> as well as forbidden ornaments (earrings, heels, perfume)	
114.	However	the representation of Afghan women as solely victims of Taliban violence as represented by the burqa	<b>serves to emphasise</b>	racism and imperialism	- despite the importance of the repression embodied by the burqa - for many critics - only
117.	and	their hands and eyes	<b>are</b>	the only parts of their bodies that they can show that are not <i>awrah</i>	
118.		the <i>abaya</i> , a large, loose tunic with long sleeves	<b>is</b>	The only garment that women are seen wearing	



126.		These regulations	<b>include</b>	the requirement to travel with the written permission of a guardian or tutor and a ban on working in most jobs, talking to strangers, browsing the internet if not in the presence of their <i>mahram</i> , wearing hijabs with prints or decoration, making commercial transactions without their <i>mahram</i> , having an identity card without their <i>mahram's</i> authorisation, allowing their face to be photographed and driving	
132.		This	<b>means</b>	that any man can act as a moral judge of women's bodies, something that reinforces female subordination and vulnerability	
134.		others	<b>restrict</b>	its use	
135.		This	<b>is</b>	the case with most European countries	
140.		transnational migrations	<b>led to</b>	the consolidation of a subaltern population within European borders	- After the definitive end of colonialism as a form of political and administrative domination
141.		The whole legal and media debate regarding the headscarf	<b>resulted in</b>	a re-inscribing of the Muslim population – almost always of immigrant origin – as a place of submission	
142.	and	its construction as subject to regulation because of certain cultural <i>essences</i>	<b>attributed to</b>	it	

144.		the drafting or re-drafting of laws or regulations limiting the use of the hijab in certain public situations or establishments	<b>has been</b>	the solution to the ‘hijab problem’	- In almost all European countries
157.	that	the hijab – the embodiment of negative representations about Islam –	<b>is</b>	a social threat	
159.	While	Spain	<b>is</b>	the country with almost the lowest percentage of Muslims	
160.		it	<b>was</b>	one of the first to deliberate regulations regarding the niqab	
162.	Furthermore	the municipalities that have banned the veil	<b>are not</b>	the ones with the highest percentage of immigrants	
165.		France	<b>was</b>	the pioneer	
180.		The main issue	<b>is</b>	that prohibitionist policies, with their supporting arguments, are merely manifestations of the anti-Muslim or anti-Maghreb policies of European states, which are, in short, racist and are implemented	
205.		The result	<b>is</b>	that Muslim women experience racism in different terms than Muslim men, just as they experience sexism differently than non-Muslim women	

206.		the Islamophobic image of women	<b>is</b>	that of submission and subordination combined with ignorance	- Usually
217.		The legal regulations	<b>serve as</b>	a <i>de facto</i> sanction of a situation	- merely
222.		the prohibitions against the hijab and niqab	<b>express</b>	an idea of who can be a citizen I this territory and how	- In different cases
225.		women	<b>bear</b>	the burden of complying or not with these citizenship demands through the immediate, visual examination of their clothing	- In these definitions
239.		Bourdieu's assessment	<b>serves to explain</b>	the regulation of the headscarf and niqab across Europe	- Almost 23 years later - still
241.		it	<b>entails</b>	the domination of women	
244.		Inscribing laws onto the body in this way	<b>expresses</b>	the subaltern place of women in the social order	
247.		The key concept	<b>is</b>	the normativisation of the body, in the sense of applying rules that, as with the normativisation processes with languages, <i>normalise</i> the body	
254.		This	<b>does not refer to</b>	legislative regulations	- only
255.	but also	This	<b>refer to</b>	the dozens of rules and restrictions to which the bodies of Muslim women must adapt	
274.		these cases	<b>serve to show</b>	that regulation 'liberates' or saves women from the men in their own culture	- Finally
275.	and	these cases	<b>[serve to] present</b>	the imposition of the dress code as a triumph of civilisation over barbarism	

**Verbal Process**

No	Conjunction	Sayer	Process	Receiver	Quoted	Reported	Verbiage	Circumstances
2.		I	<b>will argue</b>				that the regulation of the clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, share the same goal: the control of women's bodies	
7.	while		<b>were being debated</b>				laws about banning the hijab	- in Europe
20.		I	<b>will argue</b>				that the regulation of clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement	

							to wear a particular item, share the same goal: the control of women's bodies	
57.		Scholars	<b>speak of</b>				market Islam ( <i>Islam de marché</i> ), Islamic gentrification and Islam and commodification	
59.		Mahmood	<b>argues</b>				that a fundamental key to understand hijabisation lies in the pietistic movements and their attachment to the headscarf as part of their physical representation	- In a quiet different vein
95.			<b>are decreed</b>				laws regulating clothing	- In a second situation - from the highest judicial levels, which can legislate sanctions and use security forces to

								make sure they are applied effectively
133.	While	some Muslim states	<b>require</b>	women			to wear Muslim clothing	
164.	but		<b>has been discussed</b>				the ban	
187.		Studies in Europe	<b>speak of</b>					- a change from the old-school Islamophobia anchored in colonial relationships to a new one, linked to attacks and the identification of Islam with terrorism
190.		Fernando Bravo López	<b>argued</b>				that Islamophobia is a reaction to the emancipation of Muslims in Europe, designed to reverse its effects and	- In one of the latest studies in Europe on this issue

							legitimise inequality	
232.		Pierre Bourdieu	<b>said</b>				that its emergence made it possible for many intellectuals – whom he labelled gurus – to express inexcusable positions regarding the question of immigration	- In 1989 - in response to the first headscarf affair in France
238.	but	one	<b>could respond</b>				‘no’	- when formulated in terms of the first - calmly

<b>Existential Process</b>				
<b>No</b>	<b>Conjunction</b>	<b>Existent</b>	<b>Process</b>	<b>Circumstances</b>
13.		a similarity [...] to the efforts to ban or restrict headscarves for Muslim women in Europe	<b>appears to be</b>	- here
60.	that	a fundamental key to understand hijabisation	<b>lies</b>	- in the pietistic movements and their attachment to the headscarf as part of their physical representation
64.		Representations of Muslim women's bodies	<b>lie</b>	- at the centre of Islam's relations with the Western world where ways to control Muslim populations include the control of the bodies of a segment of the population
82.		regulations that legally subordinate women in terms of their civil rights	<b>exist</b>	- In many cases
91.		two types of situations in which hijabisation occurs by imposition	<b>are</b>	
228.		no counter-discourse in the public sphere to balance this negative image of Muslim women against the racism of the elites, which is discursive and, according to the definition established by Teun Van Dijk, is configured as an important social practice that results in specific types of inequality, is able to confirm and disseminate generalised ideologies and prejudices, and it legitimises everyday discrimination	<b>is</b>	



**The Production of Acceptable Muslim Women in the United States**

By Falguni A. Sheth

No	Conjunction	Clause	Ellipsis	Process Types
1.		In this article, I <b>explore</b> some of the elements by which Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States are managed so as to produce and distinguish “unruly” from “good” Muslim female citizens within the context of American liberalism		Material
2.		Unlike the French state, which has regulated both the hijab and niqab through national legislation, the American liberal framework <b>utilizes</b> a laissez-faire approach, which relies on a range of public and private institutions to determine acceptable public presentations of the liberal female subject		Material
3.		I <b>refer to</b> this form of management as “neoliberalism”		Relational Identifying
4.		Neoliberal management <b>works</b> in conjunction with popular political discourses and domestic events in ways that alternately contract and expand the boundaries that allow “suitable Muslim women” in the public sphere		Material
5.		Elsewhere, I <b>have argued</b> that Muslim women who don the hijab, particularly within the last decade, are construed as unruly subjects within the context of a Western liberal regime		Verbal
6.	that	Muslim women who don the hijab, particularly within the last decade, <b>are construed</b> as unruly subjects within the context of a Western liberal regime		Mental
7.		Unruly subjects <b>are</b> those who are perceived to actively violate the ideal of the good (liberal) citizen		Relational Identifying

8.		The particular infraction of women who wear the hijab <b>is</b> their conspicuously heterogeneous comportment—openly subscribing to “Muslim” or “Islamic” culture		Relational Identifying
9.		This breach <b>is seen</b> in explicit practices that are thought to contravene the fundamental ethos of Western liberal culture, namely that of political secularism		Mental
10.		Such practices and signs <b>are</b> “unruly”		Relational Attributive
11.	because	they conspicuously <b>violate</b> a dominant neutral cultural or political norm		Material
12.		Secular societies, as the concrete manifestations of liberal political ideologies, <b>are thought to be</b> endangered by populations or cultures that express their moral and religious beliefs in public spaces		Mental
13.		Liberalism <b>is thought of</b> as the racial and religious unmarked		Mental
14.	and	hence the hegemonic, norm that usurps a society’s political or social imaginary and becomes the invisible background against which cultural challenges <b>are mounted</b>		Material
15.		By extension, such a society <b>dominates</b> the aesthetic norms of that society		Material
16.		<b>presenting</b> them as the cultural default	such a society	Material
17.	As	Mickaella Perina, drawing on María Lugones’s notion of the racial state, <b>argues</b> , As the “racial state” classifies people according to physical characteristics, racial and racialized aesthetics classify art and artistic conceptions according to cultural characteristics. Indeed, to believe that non-Western aesthetic thought and frameworks are radically different—so different that it is a matter of “deep translation”—or that translation is unattainable, is to mark other aesthetics as culturally different while having Western aesthetics escape the mark of culture		Verbal
18.		<b>drawing on</b> María Lugones’s notion of the racial state	Mickaella Perina	Material

19.	As	the “racial state” <b>classifies</b> people according to physical characteristics		Material
20.		racial and racialized aesthetics <b>classify</b> art and artistic conceptions according to cultural characteristics		Material
21.		Indeed, to believe that non-Western aesthetic thought and frameworks are radically different—so different that it is a matter of “deep translation”—or that translation is unattainable, <b>is</b> to mark other aesthetics as culturally different while having Western aesthetics escape the mark of culture		Relational Identifying
22.		The unruly figure or group, by disrupting the hegemonic aesthetic norm through their public presentation or comportment, <b>is encountered</b> as a threat to be addressed and contained		Material
23.		On a global level, this <b>is</b> how much of North America, Europe, and Australia have responded to the events of September 11, 2001, namely, through a domestic and global politics of national security		Relational Attributive
24.		In effect, national security policies <b>are</b> a politics of legal, social, and cultural containment through which the Western world has mounted an ever-increasing challenge to Muslims’ cultural and religious commitments, understood as a necessary political defense against “Islamic terrorism”		Relational Identifying
25.		As such, to subscribe visibly to Islam <b>is</b> to always already be a problem		Relational Identifying
26.		There <b>may be</b> multiple historical and political rationales behind this hostility		Existential
27.		at some level, there <b>may be</b> a widespread racial–sexual assumption that Muslim women, by the dictates of a (seemingly) monolithic Islam, are subservient, oppressed, and thereby unthreatening		Existential
28.		Certainly, we <b>saw</b> the expression of this belief in the rhetorical motivations expressed by First Lady Laura Bush soon after 9/11		Mental

29.		<b>Articulating</b> support for her husband, then-President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Afghanistan	the First Lady	Material
30.		the First Lady <b>pointed to</b> the need to save Afghan women and children		Material
31.		The need to save Muslim women—from themselves, from “their” men, from their “oppressive culture”— <b>had been</b> in existence well before Bush’s declaration		Relational Attributive
32.		The drive to save brown and black women <b>has long been</b> a hallmark of imperial civilizing mission		Relational Attributive
33.		The underlying message of such missions <b>is</b> that these backward cultures need to be transformed if not altogether destroyed—both to “advance” the colonized society as well as to remove the threat to the colonizing culture		Relational Identifying
34.	that	these backward cultures <b>need to be transformed</b> [...]—both to “advance” the colonized society as well as to remove the threat to the colonizing culture		Relational Identifying
35.	if	not altogether <b>destroyed</b> —both to “advance” the colonized society as well as to remove the threat to the colonizing culture	these backward cultures	Material
36.		The mission to save black and brown women <b>has been</b> well <b>documented</b> in former colonized societies that were predominantly Muslim, from Egypt to North Africa		Material
37.	As	Frantz Fanon <b>discussed</b> in 1959, the West needed to save veiled (Algerian) woman—not necessarily for their own sake, but in order to be able to “destroy the structure of Algerian society [and] its capacity for resistance”		Verbal
38.		the West <b>needed to save</b> veiled (Algerian) woman—not necessarily for their own sake, but in order to be able to “destroy the structure of Algerian society [and] its capacity for resistance”		Relational Identifying
39.		In part, the perception of threat emerged from the integral part that the haïk <b>was thought to play</b> in the Algerian revolution,		Mental

		with its instrumental ability to hide and circumvent colonial authorities		
40.		Fanon <b>offers</b> an illuminating, provocative discussion of the insistence on wearing the haïk and why it is a threat—a challenge—to the colonizer		Material
41.	even as	the French empire <b>focused on</b> the bodies of veiled Muslim women as vehicles that symbolized the fetishized object of oppression and potential liberation		Mental
42.		Algerian women <b>challenged</b> the French’s attempt to conquer them by remaining inaccessible, and unconquerable by refusing the invitation to be assimilated or “liberated” sexually, socially, culturally, or politically by refusing to unconceal their beauty for Western edification		Material
43.	As	Monique Roelofs <b>dissects</b> the notion of aesthetic address of persons and things in María Lugones’s work		Material
44.		[m]odes of address <b>connect</b> persons and things in trajectories of address		Material
45.		Strings of address <b>emerge</b> that reach from persons to persons . . . from persons to things . . . from things to things (from spoon to oil, water, yolk), and from things to persons (from curdled mayonnaise to Lugones and onward to us)		Material
46.		Address, for Roelofs, <b>signifies</b> the racial, cultural, and gendered context by which a certain object or relationship between persons or things or some variant thereof, is hailed or responded to through the lens of certain constellations		Relational Identifying
47.		As such, the veil <b>has</b> multiple modalities, multiple relations to persons		Relational Attributive
48.		the veiled Algerian woman <b>may be read</b> as abiding by her cultural/moral/religious commitments as well as engaging in a form of resistance		Material
49.		In the latter mode, the veil <b>can be read</b> and <b>addressed</b> as both a practice of resisting French liberal–imperial aesthetics of secular dress as well as a practical revolutionary resistance		Material

50.	As	Roelofs <b>suggests</b> , the capacities of objects to support modes of address surpass the specific uses and conceptions human agents develop for them		Verbal
51.		the capacities of objects to support modes of address <b>surpass</b> the specific uses and conceptions human agents develop for them		Relational Identifying
52.		the specific uses and conceptions human agents <b>develop</b> for them		Material
53.		Under the colonial French administration, then, the figure of the veiled Muslim women <b>was</b> both in need of saving and also received in conjunction with the countervailing fear of her threatening insurgent capacities		Relational Attributive
54.		Hence, she <b>was addressed</b> as a victim of cultural patriarchal oppression as well as a target to be neutralized if not altogether nullified		Material
55.		Fanon’s incisive observations <b>are</b> still surprisingly astute		Relational Attributive
56.	As	global attention to potential explosive activities <b>construed</b> as Islamic terrorism increase		Mental
57.		this fear <b>appears to increase</b> correspondingly		Material
58.		In contemporary France, Muslim women <b>have continued to face</b> extensive, explicit, and continuous challenges to their visible public commitments to their faith and culture		Material
59.		The French state <b>has banned</b> both the hijab and niqab through national legislation, ostensibly to demarcate and protect the state’s cultural emphasis on secular public citizenship		Material
60.	As	Alia Al-Saji <b>argues</b> , “veiling was seen as opposed to French secular space”		Verbal
61.		veiling <b>was seen</b> as opposed to French secular space		Mental
62.		French secular space <b>is construed</b> as “a specific heteronormative and heterosocial gendering of public space—constituted through particular feminine habits of dress,		Mental

		behaviour and mixité (coeducation)—was reinforced as the norm of French public space”		
63.		a specific heteronormative and heterosocial gendering of public space—constituted through particular feminine habits of dress, behaviour and mixité (coeducation)— <b>was reinforced</b> as the norm of French public space		Material
64.		The aesthetic norm of French public space—proudly presented as devoid of religious symbols— <b>was imagined to be</b> about liberal secularism		Mental
65.		Following Perina, we <b>might argue</b> that French public space is, again, the culturally unmarked default		Verbal
66.	that	French public space <b>is</b> , again, the culturally unmarked default		Relational Identifying
67.		As such, the foulard <b>was addressed</b> as a violation of that secular norm of laïcité		Verbal
68.	And yet	beneath the facial discourse of violations of secularism, the visibility of the veil <b>is connected</b> to the racial anxiety of French society—of the impending challenge to their unmarked racial dominance, or “cultural racism”		Material
69.	As	Al-Saji <b>argues</b> , [T]he question why the veil comes to be seen as the marker of Islamic or Algerian cultural difference brings us to the already constituted field of vision of the French observer. This field of vision has been structured by colonialism. ... The representational apparatus of colonialism not only constitutes the image of the ‘native but posits this image in opposition to a certain self-perception of colonial society and against an implicit normalization of gender within that society		Verbal
70.		[T]he question why the veil comes to be seen as the marker of Islamic or Algerian cultural difference <b>brings</b> us to the already constituted field of vision of the French observer		Material
71.		This field of vision <b>has been structured</b> by colonialism		Material

72.		The representational apparatus of colonialism <b>not</b> only <b>constitutes</b> the image of the ‘native		Material
73.	but	<b>posits</b> this image in opposition to a certain self-perception of colonial society and against an implicit normalization of gender within that society	The representational apparatus of colonialism	Material
74.		For the French, the veil <b>is overdetermined</b> as a racial affront, which recalls France’s sordid history of colonialism and declared attempts to “liberate” Algerian women in the name of uplifting and civilizing		Material
75.	as	Fanon <b>shows</b> us all too vividly		Material
76.		The battle over the veil then <b>becomes</b> a battle over which side will dominate		Relational Attributive
77.		<b>will it be</b> the secular French <b>looking to justify</b> and <b>redeem</b> their colonial past		Material
78.	or	<b>will it be</b> the inferior and oppressive culture of Islam, against which the West has waged a centuries-long war		Relational Identifying
79.		The treatment of hijabis in the French context <b>contrasts</b> starkly with the United States’s approach		Relational Attributive
80.		Curiously, given the ferocity of the government’s War on Terror and the broad realm of Muslim men who have been detained or incarcerated without Constitutional due process over the last two decades, Muslim women <b>have not faced</b> similar legal or political challenges		Material
81.	Nevertheless	they <b>are</b> still <b>regulated</b> and <b>disciplined</b> within the U.S. legal-political context in which they find themselves, but in less explicit ways than their French or other European counterparts’ approach of outlawing conspicuous religious symbols		Material
82.		One way to understand this <b>might be found</b> in the unique American mode of reconciling notions of individual freedom with certain persistent and subtle forms of social and political management of populations		Material



83.		For example, there <b>is</b> a long history of the American state’s defense of religious expression, as articulated in the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment		Existential
84.	nevertheless	The protection of religious expression <b>has</b> a robust narrative in the United States		Relational Attributive
85.		effectively <b>creating</b> a familiar and accepted legal framework in which to challenge attempts to ban religious practices or symbols	The protection of religious expression	Material
86.		It <b>may</b> also <b>be</b> the case that, in the U.S. context, effective challenges to the hijab are better leveled by illustrating how it violates some other liberal principle, such as transparency or publicity or economic profit		Relational Attributive
87.		As an expression of religious commitments, the hijab <b>appears to be</b> compatible with Constitutional principles		Relational Attributive
88.	Yet	depending upon how threatening or suitable a particular event is perceived, this compatibility <b>can be modulated</b>		Material
89.		Especially during times of crisis, it <b>is</b> selectively <b>enforced</b>		Material
90.		For example, Islamic fundamentalist sermons <b>have served as</b> evidence for charges of terrorism		Relational Identifying
91.	while	Christian speech <b>is</b> , especially under the current administration, plentiful in government quarters		Relational Attributive
92.		Such an approach <b>exemplifies</b> the general mode by which the American state manages unruly subjects		Relational Identifying
93.		The idea of managing subjects <b>is</b> perhaps best <b>articulated</b> by Michel Foucault’s discussion of governmentality, whereby governing is a strategic art deployed toward certain “suitable” ends or, as Foucault says, “the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end”		Material
94.		A suitable end <b>should not be confused with</b> the objective of sovereignty, which is the making of decisions for “the common good and the salvation of all”		Mental
95.		Rather, suitable ends <b>are</b> those which are “internal to the things [government] directs ( <i>diriger</i> )”		Relational Identifying

96.		it <b>is to be sought</b> in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs		Material
97.	and	the instruments of government <b>will become</b> diverse tactics rather than laws”		Relational Attributive
98.		In the context of the two-decade-old U.S.-led War on Terror, we <b>might understand</b> governmentality as operating at several level		Mental
99.		Prima facie, it <b>operates</b> at the discursive level of continual iterations of the promise of American freedom, democracy, and proceduralism		Material
100.	while	selectively <b>enforcing</b> Constitutional law for some populations and not others	it	Material
101.		In the interest of national security, governmentality <b>might reflect</b> the strategic enforcement of constitutional protections for some individuals, combined with the strategic privation of the same protections for populations deemed threats to national security		Relational Identifying
102.		For example, in the aftermath of the declaration of the War on Terror, the United States <b>prosecuted</b> numerous individuals who were deemed to lend support to terrorist organizations, despite questionable evidence		Material
103.		<b>Borrowing</b> further from Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics as the separation and production of certain populations	we	Material
104.		we <b>might understand</b> this as part of a larger ontopolitical production of suitable or unacceptable Muslims, as such populations illustrate or reinforce or transgress that discourse of liberalism		Mental
105.	however	At another level [...] there <b>is</b> a dimension of governmentality that operates through a neoliberal framework, that is, by relying on laissez-faire market and ad hoc policing mechanisms that bring certain transgressive moments to light		Existential

		against the backdrop of a society that is seen as fair and procedural		
106.		These <b>are seen</b> through the mechanisms of markets and judiciaries, along with the absence of explicit regulations or laws, at least typically		Mental
107.		The interplay of public and private institutions, sometimes with policing institutions, <b>can determine</b> whether certain practices will be accommodated within the boundaries of the liberal state or instead challenged as violations of the “tolerable” liberal subject		Material
108.		Depending upon the outcome of the contestation, these events <b>will accumulate to maintain</b> or <b>reinscribe</b> a certain default vision of the good (female) liberal subject in a dialectical relationship to the particular moment/version of liberal society in which she is found		Material
109.		We <b>see</b> this in the United States’s approach to adjudicating cases that claim protection or violation of constitutional principles		Mental
110.		the American liberal state <b>relies</b> on judicial review, in which a contested claim is brought to the (higher) courts, such as a district, state, or federal Supreme Court		Material
111.		The higher judiciary <b>decides</b> whether it will consider a claim of procedural or constitutional violation		Material
112.		The American legal system <b>relies</b> heavily on judicial review to gauge whether contested actions conform to constitutional precepts		Material
113.		In so doing, the judiciary continually <b>engages</b> and <b>revises</b> doctrinal lawmaking		Material
114.	and	in so doing, <b>recycles</b> new iterations of liberalism and the liberal subject	the judiciary	Material
115.		Thus, claims that are considered (or not) with regard to Muslim women <b>do not address</b> the hijab per se		Verbal

116.	but whether	the contested action <b>violates</b> the rights of the liberal (female) subject not to be discriminated against		Material
117.	or whether	it <b>violates</b> public security		Material
118.		In this way, the American address of Muslim women <b>is to evaluate</b> Muslim women’s claims to religious expression—most often in the workplace		Material
119.	since	there <b>is</b> an established framework designed to assist employees in the workplace who find themselves to be subject to religious, racial, or sexual discrimination		Existential
120.	However	the U.S. judiciary also <b>weighs in</b> on claims of religious discrimination by prisons in U.S. correctional facilities, although decidedly in a much more negative manner		Verbal
121.		By reiteratively engaging with Muslim women’s ability to wear the veil in the workplace, rather than explicitly legalizing or banning the veil, the U.S. courts <b>address</b> Muslim women through a subtle disciplining process that has less to do with outright legal policies that ban the hijab but rather which expand and contract the boundaries of acceptable public dress against the backdrop of an unmarked secularism		Verbal
122.		The multiple reiterations—through various U.S. courts that hear discrimination cases against hijabis— <b>serve to</b> continually <b>reenact</b> different iterations of the acceptable Muslim female subject		Relational Identifying
123.		Muslim women who wear the hijab <b>receive</b> a range of market, police, judicial, and media receptions with reference to the liberal tenet that is being contested or reinscribed at various moments		Material
124.		<b>Consider</b> the following catalogue		Mental
125.		in 2005, two young Muslim teens <b>were arrested, strip-searched, detained, and interrogated</b> for eight weeks on the suspicion of being potential suicide bombers or terrorists		Material

126.		In 2003, a Muslim female police officer <b>was fired</b> for wearing the hijab on the ground that she violated the Philadelphia Police Department's uniform policy		Material
127.		Women who wear the hijab <b>are routinely employed to work</b> in (some of the same) businesses that require some social visibility, whether in clothing stores or nonprofit organizations		Material
128.		By contrast, there <b>have been</b> multiple occasions (and a few legal cases) about Muslim women or teens who wear the hijab who were either not hired by or fired from clothing stores because they did not conform to in-house dress policies		Existential
129.		In one instance, the U.S. Department of Justice <b>filed</b> and <b>settled</b> a civil discrimination suit on behalf of a New Jersey corrections officer who was fired for wearing the hijab		Material
130.		In other instances, imprisoned Muslim women <b>have been forced to remove</b> their hijabs on the grounds that they could injure someone else or themselves		Material
131.		Women <b>have been required to remove</b> their hijabs on threat of being barred from the courtroom where they were conducting unrelated business		Relational Identifying
132.		One order <b>came from</b> the governing judge on the grounds that she violated the courts' need for transparency, identity and publicness		Material
133.		In 2007, the Transportation Security Association <b>announced</b> its intent to screen and examine anyone who wore headgear, including men who wear baseball caps, cowboy hats, and turbans		Verbal
134.		In many cases, women <b>were not able to obtain</b> redress for these injustices or other forms of daily harassment or physical violence even when they were the aggrieved parties		Material
135.	Yet	other women and Muslim teens who wear hijab, niqab, or burqas <b>report</b> having to deal with daily harassments or fear of physical violence		Verbal

136.		Socially, the responses of Muslim women to their environments <b>have been mixed</b> as well		Material
137.		a significant number of Muslim women <b>appear to have begun wearing</b> the hijab since 9/11 in response to any number of events		Material
138.	still	others <b>have decided not to wear</b> the hijab in order not to inhibit their professional lives within the context of a post-9/11 wary labor market		Material
139.		I <b>have pointed</b> to a range of unsystematic treatments and receptions of Muslim women in order to illuminate the elastic boundaries of liberalism and the corresponding reinscriptions of the good (female liberal) citizen, which oscillate between the indifferent rejection of certain Muslim women and the accommodation of certain stylized Muslim women		Material
140.		The spectrum of acceptable dress at work or in public more generally for women in the United States <b>is modulated</b> less by some transcendent standard of glamour or suitability of the outfit than by a cultural aesthetic that reflects the convergence of a range of economic and sociopolitical forces		Material
141.		It <b>seems</b> possible to identify a few elements that enable the neoliberal collaboration between sovereignty, capital, and media		Relational Attributive
142.		These forces <b>work</b> together to script repeatedly the particular—patriarchal—exemplification of liberal public comportment		Material
143.		The Western secular female subject <b>is supposed to reveal</b> herself in certain public/professional modes		Material
144.		she <b>unconceals</b> her face		Material
145.		<b>leaves</b> her body moderately concealed	she	Material
146.	and	<b>exhibits</b> her legs and ankles (unless she inhabits masculine clothing, such as a pantsuit)	she	Material

147.		The quintessential model of “Western business attire” as described, with slight variants, on multiple blogs for Model United Nations, <b>emphasizes</b> professionalism		Material
148.		One <b>points</b> to suits (crediting French designer Coco Chanel for pioneering suits for women) and neutral colors		Material
149.	and	<b>discourages</b> headgear	One	Material
150.	although	no mention <b>is made</b> of religious head coverings		Verbal
151.		In this collaboration, the projection of how a good liberal female citizen comports <b>is</b> so ubiquitous as to become the invisible ether that surrounds us		Relational Attributive
152.		the masculinist insistence on a stylized form of professional female dress <b>is grounded</b> in the courts’ refusal to overturn professional dress codes for women		Material
153.		Most media depictions of the generic acceptable Western/liberal female subject <b>reflect</b> a seemingly hegemonic dress code		Relational Attributive
154.		American and global television anchors <b>dress</b> similarly		Material
155.		subjects of television news stories, print media, and films <b>are</b> parliamentarians, corporate executives, low-level business women, or housewives dressed in slacks and pants		Relational Identifying
156.		parliamentarians, corporate executives, low-level business women, or housewives <b>dressed in</b> slacks and pants		Material
157.	Moreover	there <b>is</b> a certain laissez-faire attitude, with the implicit nod from the state, which permits employers and businesses to regulate the professional dress best suited to their market		Existential
158.		Depending upon the political/social/cultural milieu, these codes <b>preclude</b> outfits that are not expressly secular or American		Material
159.		That is, they <b>are cleansed</b> of specifically cultural or ethnic references, such as the sari or the chador, among other kinds of clothing		Material
160.		In the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations concerning religious discrimination and		Relational Identifying

		accommodation, employers <b>are required to accommodate</b> particular religious needs/expressions		
161.	unless	they <b>impose</b> “an undue hardship” on the place of business		Material
162.	But	the message <b>is</b> mixed, as found in the three sections concerning religious discrimination and reasonable accommodation		Relational Attributive
163.		<b>stated</b> in direct sequence on the EEOC website: The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or practices unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer’s business. This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion. Examples of some common religious accommodations include flexible scheduling, voluntary shift substitutions or swaps, job reassignments, and modifications to workplace policies or practices. Unless it would be an undue hardship on the employer’s operation of its business, an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or practices. This applies not only to schedule changes or leave for religious observances, but also to such things as dress or grooming practices that an employee has for religious reasons. These might include, for example, wearing particular head coverings or other religious dress (such as a Jewish yarmulke or a Muslim headscarf), or wearing certain hairstyles or facial hair (such as Rastafarian dreadlocks or Sikh uncut hair and beard). It also includes an employee’s observance of a religious prohibition against wearing certain garments (such as pants or miniskirts). When an employee or applicant needs a dress or grooming accommodation for religious reasons, he should notify the employer that he needs such an accommodation for religious reasons. If the employer reasonably needs more information, the employer and the	the message	Verbal



		employee should engage in an interactive process to discuss the request. If it would not pose an undue hardship, the employer must grant the accommodation. An employer does not have to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices if doing so would cause undue hardship to the employer. An accommodation may cause undue hardship if it costly, compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights of other employees, or requires other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work		
164.		The law <b>requires</b> an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices		Relational Identifying
165.	unless	doing so <b>would cause</b> more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business		Material
166.		This <b>means</b> an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion		Relational Identifying
167.		an employer <b>may be required</b> to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion		Relational Identifying
168.		Examples of some common religious accommodations <b>include</b> flexible scheduling, voluntary shift substitutions or swaps, job reassignments, and modifications to workplace policies or practices		Relational Identifying
169.	Unless	it <b>would be</b> an undue hardship on the employer's operation of its business		Relational Attributive
170.		an employer <b>must</b> reasonably <b>accommodate</b> an employee's religious beliefs or practices		Material
171.		This <b>applies</b> not only to schedule changes or leave for religious observances, but also to such things as dress or grooming practices that an employee has for religious reasons		Relational Identifying

172.		These might <b>include</b> , for example, wearing particular head coverings or other religious dress (such as a Jewish yarmulke or a Muslim headscarf), or wearing certain hairstyles or facial hair (such as Rastafarian dreadlocks or Sikh uncut hair and beard)		Relational Identifying
173.		It also <b>includes</b> an employee’s observance of a religious prohibition against wearing certain garments (such as pants or miniskirts)		Relational Identifying
174.	When	an employee or applicant <b>needs</b> a dress or grooming accommodation for religious reasons		Relational Identifying
175.		he <b>should notify</b> the employer that he needs such an accommodation for religious reasons		Material
176.	If	the employer reasonably <b>needs</b> more information		Relational Identifying
177.		the employer and the employee <b>should engage in</b> an interactive process to discuss the request		Material
178.	If	it <b>would not pose</b> an undue hardship		Material
179.		the employer <b>must grant</b> the accommodation		Material
180.		An employer <b>does not have to accommodate</b> an employee’s religious beliefs or practices		Material
181.	if	doing so <b>would cause</b> undue hardship to the employer		Material
182.		An accommodation <b>may cause</b> undue hardship		Material
183.	if	it costly, <b>compromises</b> workplace safety		Material
184.		<b>decreases</b> workplace efficiency	it	Material
185.		<b>infringes</b> on the rights of other employees	it	Material
186.	or	<b>requires</b> other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work	it	Relational Identifying
187.		The first two sections <b>state</b> clearly that employers must accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless doing so would cause more than a “minimal burden on the operations of the employer’s business”		Verbal
188.	that	employers <b>must accommodate</b> an employee’s religious practices		Material

189.	unless	doing so <b>would cause</b> more than a “minimal burden on the operations of the employer’s business”		Material
190.		The second and third sections then <b>emphasize</b> the escape clause of “an undue burden” that would allow employers to discriminate against those requiring religious accommodation		Material
191.		There <b>are</b> many ways in which the escape clause of “decreasing workplace efficiency, infringing on the rights of other employees,” can be invoked by employers to not hire or fire a woman who wears the hijab (for example, placing someone in the stockroom, then deciding that such a placement is inefficient or imposes a burden on their colleagues or that such accommodations cause their colleagues discomfort by explicit religious expressions and considering such expressions a form of harassment, through some leap of logic)		Existential
192.	Yet	various employers <b>permit</b> Muslim women to wear the hijab (that is to say, they are not explicitly harassed, fired, beaten, or stigmatized)		Material
193.	as	<b>we have seen</b>		Mental
194.		Occasionally, they <b>can be seen</b> as the victims of discrimination		Mental
195.	And	in still other instances, they <b>are disciplined</b> by being fired, jailed, or reprimanded—or physically beaten, without redress		Material
196.		These outcomes <b>suggest</b> that, despite the absence of explicit regulations concerning the hijab, there is nevertheless a form of disciplining that continually reinscribes the ideal of the good liberal female citizen in contrast to the unruly, defiant, or difficult Muslim female subject		Relational Identifying
197.	nevertheless	despite the absence of explicit regulations concerning the hijab, there <b>is</b> [...] a form of disciplining that continually reinscribes the ideal of the good liberal female citizen in contrast to the unruly, defiant, or difficult Muslim female subject		Existential

198.		This inscription [...] <b>can accommodate</b> certain kinds of visibly Muslim women—those who are acceptable—who are products of modernization to some degree, that is, who appear professional		Material
199.		<b>based on</b> the contingencies of the particular political moment	This inscription	Relational Attributive
200.		they <b>work</b> in a labor force		Material
201.		<b>have</b> certain skills that warrant them, if not respect, at least freedom from harassment or tolerance	they	Relational Attributive
202.		These dress codes <b>reinforce</b> a certain expectation for professional women that appears to mark the norm of what a mildly liberated autonomous female subject looks like		Material
203.	and	in turn, <b>reinforces</b> the assumption that the cooperative Muslim female citizen will be tolerated or accommodated	These dress codes	Material
204.	if	she <b>can conform to</b> certain key aesthetic principles of Western qua secular professional dress		Material
205.		Thus, <b>understood</b> as the hallmark of the liberal feminist subject	such a Muslim woman	Mental
206.		such a Muslim woman <b>might be</b> someone who—despite wearing the hijab—exhibits certain key traits that confirm her liberal comportment		Relational Identifying
207.		These traits <b>might include</b> sociability (especially with a non-Muslim secular public), cooperativeness, education, professional status, and engagement in secular/civil society and market activities		Relational Identifying
208.		This accommodation <b>requires</b> a certain reconciliation with the ideal vision of the liberal female subject and the violation of certain revered tenets such as transparency		Relational Identifying
209.		The norm of transparency also <b>implies</b> a liberal expectation of publicity, oversight, and accountability		Relational Identifying
210.		This norm <b>is expressed</b> through exchanges, contracts, and other forms of public communication, as these govern the relation between individuals		Verbal

211.		That is to say, they <b>make clear</b> the expectations to be met by each party in any given transaction		Material
212.		This version of transparency, in addition to that mode of transparency which is the conduit of relations between the state and the individual, <b>suggests</b> that this is the standard neutral liberal expectation of citizens in the liberal polity		Relational Identifying
213.	that	this <b>is</b> the standard neutral liberal expectation of citizens in the liberal polity		Relational Identifying
214.		Both of these <b>are exemplified</b> in a Michigan small claims court judge's order that a Muslim woman remove her niqab or have her case dismissed		Material
215.		She <b>refused</b>		Material
216.		<b>explaining</b> that she could only do so in front of a female judge, at which point her case was dismissed	She	Verbal
217.	that	she <b>could</b> only <b>do so</b> in front of a female judge, at which point her case was dismissed		Material
218.		The judge's explanation for his actions <b>were</b> that he needed to see her face to verify whether she was telling the truth		Relational Identifying
219.	that	he <b>needed to see</b> her face to verify whether she was telling the truth		Relational Identifying
220.	But	in fact, his position <b>belied</b> other frequent forms of communications that have no such transparency, such as audio recordings of phone conversations, which rely on intonations, pitch, and other features of meaning but—until recently—not necessarily facial expressions		Material
221.	as	As well [...] the American Civil Liberties Union <b>has commented</b> in relation to this judge's actions, there are multiple examples of visually disabled judges or juries who must rely on audio recordings, or disabled witnesses who are not able to communicate expressively with their faces		Verbal
222.		there <b>are</b> multiple examples of visually disabled judges or juries who must rely on audio recordings, or disabled		Existential

		witnesses who are not able to communicate expressively with their faces		
223.		The inconsistency of the judge’s position <b>betrays</b> a preference for a certain cultural comportment that ensures certain shared understandings, views, and attitudes		Material
224.		<b>revealing</b> that communication is not a way to express uniqueness of standpoint, but rather “a shorthand by which to communicate variations of those ideas, norms, and procedures that are mostly shared”	The inconsistency of the judge’s position	Material
225.		We <b>can find</b> similar expectations in the Georgia courts system, which prohibits the hijab in courtrooms and has gone so far as to arrest one woman who refused to remove her hijab except in front of a female judge		Material
226.		From this, we <b>might infer</b> that the subject who wears the hijab/niqab/chador is concealing something and, thus, has violated the expectation of a common (cultural) appearance that is supposed to be shared by liberal female subjects		Material
227.	But	such violations <b>can be mitigated</b> in certain professional and cultural sub-contexts by the woman who wears the hijab		Material
228.	if	that appearance <b>reflects</b> a particular version of openness and a certain stylized approachability that is expressed through the public exhibition of one’s self		Relational Identifying
229.		In so doing, the Muslim woman <b>challenges</b> the cultural hegemony that undergirds the modern liberal environment enveloping the modern liberal woman/female professional		Material
230.	Even though	a refreshed politics of national security in the aftermath of 9/11 <b>is</b> partially responsible for a dominant wariness toward Muslim women		Relational Attributive
231.		the political, social, and economic consequences of wearing the hijab <b>appear to be</b> different for Muslim women of different class backgrounds		Relational Attributive
232.		Certain female Muslim community leaders in the public eye <b>wear</b> the hijab		Material

233.	while	<b>engaging</b> in numerous contestations over Islam and the acceptability of exhibiting their faith and commitments publicly	Certain female Muslim community leaders	Material
234.	Yet	they also <b>receive</b> a certain acceptability from a significant part of the public by showing their similarities to secular women in certain visible ways		Material
235.		<b>Consider</b> , for example, Linda Sarsour, a community organizer and director of the Arab American Association of New York, or the recently elected congresswoman from Minnesota, Rep. Ilhan Omar, both of whom are outspoken American Muslim women who wear the hijab even as they are publicly American and speak the language of liberalism, that is, civil rights, constitution, and so on		Mental
236.		Evidence of this <b>is marked</b> by their sociability, education, and ability to engage in various civil society and market activities, whether as community organizers or professionals, or as people who interact with different kinds of governmental institutions—that is, already acting with the state symbolically and figuratively		Material
237.		On January 6, 2019, the U.S. Congress <b>voted to amend</b> a nearly two-centuries-old Congressional ban on headgear to exempt religious headwear		Material
238.		The repeal <b>was passed</b> successfully		Material
239.		Both women <b>have</b> also <b>received</b> ample criticisms for their outspoken advocacy of many controversial issues		Material
240.	while	Thus [...] they <b>are vilified</b> by certain segments of the secular U.S. populace		Material
241.		they <b>have received</b> support from other segments, in part because of their being marked as appropriate liberal feminist subjects for being able to communicate and build bridges with non-Muslim, often secular, audiences		Material
242.		Not all hijabis <b>are seen</b> as suitable female subjects in liberal societies		Mental

243.		Hijabis who do not have the social clout that Omar and Sarsour hold—women who are prisoners and not seen as up standing professional liberated female subjects— <b>receive</b> a very different treatment		Material
244.	When	Muslim women <b>encounter</b> corrections officers or face time in prison		Material
245.	then	they <b>are relegated</b> to the category of the unruly, difficult, Muslim woman and much more likely to be dismissed, ruled against, or discriminated against		Material
246.		The question of the right to religious expression <b>is addressed</b> dissimilarly in cases involving hijabis in prisons or as visitors in courtrooms than in professional/employment contexts		Material
247.		The response of the courts <b>has been</b> to rule against Muslim women as prisoners on the grounds that there is a larger security concern that must be attended		Relational Identifying
248.		For example, as recently as 2018, the District Court of New Jersey <b>ruled</b> against prisoner Melany Chila’s claim to religious discrimination for being forced to remove her headscarf in 2016		Material
249.		The New Jersey District Court <b>found</b> multiple ways to rule against Chila on a range of claims		Material
250.		The overall claim, that her constitutional rights were violated by the Camden County Correctional Facility, <b>was dismissed</b> by the Court on the grounds that the prison is not a person		Material
251.	and, therefore	[is] <b>not</b> liable to accommodate her objections	The overall claim	Relational Attributive
252.		There <b>were</b> also two specifically religious discrimination claims		Existential
253.		Chila <b>charged</b> that her religious rights were violated because she was forced to remove her headscarf and also because she was denied access to her Qur’an and from leaving the cell to worship		Material
254.		The first claim <b>occurred</b> in 2007		Material



255.	and	the second <b>occurred</b> in 2016		Material
256.		The New Jersey District Court <b>found</b> that the 2007 claim was barred from being ruled upon due to the statute of limitations		Material
257.		Regarding the 2016 claim, the Court <b>found</b> Chila's claim not substantial because her stay in the prison was brief (ten days)		Material
258.	while	thus [...] her rights <b>may have been violated</b> on some occasions		Material
259.		these <b>were</b> too sporadic to be supported		Relational Attributive
260.		In support of its judgment, the Court <b>pointed</b> to earlier cases whereby plaintiffs' similar claims were denied because the stay in prison was too short to affect one's religious beliefs		Material
261.		The Court's language here <b>is</b> rather remarkable		Relational Attributive
262.		Plaintiff's claims with respect to her hijab, Quran access, and hair exposure during the period "Jan 5, 2016 – 1-15-16" <b>may have constituted</b> an intrusion upon Plaintiff's prayers and practices on some occasions during this brief ten-day period of 2016 incarceration		Material
263.	but	these events <b>were</b> relatively short-term		Relational Attributive
264.	and therefore	<b>do not constitute</b> a substantial interference	these events	Material
265.		The Court <b>was not convinced</b> that Chila's rights were violated because of the short duration of her prison stay		Mental
266.	Moreover	<b>citing</b> a 2007 case	the Court	Material
267.		the Court further <b>insists</b> that because of the short duration, rather than the actual violation, the violation was a minimal rather than substantial burden on Chila's actual religious beliefs		Mental
268.	that	because of the short duration, rather than the actual violation, the violation <b>was</b> a minimal rather than substantial burden on Chila's actual religious beliefs		Relational Identifying

269.	Moreover	the refusal of CCCF to allow her to leave her cell to pray <b>was</b> due to concerns about security and orderliness		Relational Attributive
270.	and therefore	<b>outweighed</b> her religious commitments	the refusal of CCCF to allow her to leave her cell to pray	Material
271.		Certainly, it <b>is</b> legitimate for the state to have concerns about state/institutional security and safety in correctional facilities		Relational Attributive
272.		Those interests <b>involve</b> a set of concerns that must be addressed, involving the balance between the prisoner's rights and the security/neutrality objectives of the government and alternative accommodations		Relational Identifying
273.	But	the link in this case <b>appears</b> tenuous at best		Relational Attributive
274.	As	we <b>can see</b> from this recent case		Mental
275.		the state <b>had</b> few concerns about religious discrimination with regard to Muslim women in prison and was not part of a larger trend to combat discrimination against Muslim women		Relational Attributive
276.		In other cases—again, mostly involving Muslim women as prisoners or as courtroom visitors— courts <b>have dismissed</b> charges brought by them on technical or jurisdictional grounds		Material
277.		Often, the question of whether women have the right to wear the hijab wherever they go <b>is evaded</b> or <b>sidelined</b> in the interests of the question of principles: freedom or security		Material
278.	or	they <b>are preempted</b> through settlements or other types of compromises		Material
279.		These cases <b>suggest</b> that there is not a single trajectory in the direction of greater accommodations to Muslims but rather multiple expansions and contractions of acceptability		Relational Identifying
280.	that	there <b>is not</b> a single trajectory in the direction of greater accommodations to Muslims but rather multiple expansions and contractions of acceptability		Existential
281.	Also	notably, these judgments <b>are laid down</b> in the absence of explicit anti-hijab legislations		Material

282.	Furthermore	they <b>are issued</b> even in the face of explicit religious accommodation concerns		Material
283.		The contrary way in which courts rule against Muslim women in prison <b>raises</b> questions about the perspective that hijabis do not face discrimination in the United States		Material
284.		The widespread and varied treatment of Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States <b>should not be understood</b> as a more open or accepting attitude toward them		Mental
285.		<b>Judging</b> by the way that the hijab becomes (or does not become) a focus of controversy in the American context	the state	Mental
286.		the state <b>collaborates</b> with markets and various local public institutions (prisons, courts, school systems) to regulate the hijab and produce both the “good” and the “unruly” Muslim female subject		Material
287.		It <b>does so</b> either by prohibiting the hijab or accommodating—on a micro level—women who wear the hijab		Material
288.		this <b>appears to be</b> the preferred method in the American liberal polity, rather than passing laws that prescribe how, when, and where the hijab shall be worn and by whom		Relational Identifying
289.		This method of disciplining <b>is</b> consistent with the long history of liberalism, which intersects with the market or engages in laissez-faire or hands-off libertarian practices in order to manage its subjects and in turn vilifies the defiant subject or produces/rewards noteworthy liberal citizens		Relational Attributive
290.		At base, the question of the suitable liberal subject <b>is formed</b> and <b>influenced</b> through the prioritization of markets, employers, and profits in connection with state institutions		Material
291.		That relationship <b>is shaped</b> through a discursive relationship between the institutions within the neoliberal (market-based, laissez-faire) paradigm in relation to the liberal precepts that form the American self-understanding		Material
292.		There <b>is</b> also a dialectical relationship between the neoliberal polity and Muslim women, who are not mere bodies acted		Existential

		upon by the state, but also engaged in decisions based on a set of contingencies, vulnerabilities, and ethical commitments, social influences, and personal obligations		
293.		As such, the intersections where a Muslim woman is marked—certainly by race, gender, and class— <b>will also be marked</b> by institutional forces that may not be explicitly legislative but also not limited to immediate family/community influences		Material
294.		Thus, the negotiation <b>may be done</b> even in the aftermath of a victory to wear the hijab in her workplace—after which she may decide that her options are too strictly limited by wearing the hijab		Material
295.	or	again, she <b>may decide to return</b> to the hijab in order to negotiate certain professional goals through the close cultural, patriarchal, or social strictures of one’s family		Material
296.		This complex interaction and neoliberal collaboration <b>can be understood</b> as a reflection of the current official sentiments of the day, but always with a view to the American polity’s elastic self-understanding as a liberal society		Mental
297.		The market, as both the mainstay of American liberalism and an important signifier of the ethically acceptable liberal subject, <b>serves</b> as the mechanism that interacts with a range of other institutions, including the judiciary and the police, in the service of the state’s protection of its political and cultural boundaries, all the while accommodating or disciplining the Muslim female subject in a dialectical frame, depending upon the political vagaries of the moment		Relational Identifying
298.	Whether or not	these cases <b>are taken up</b>		Relational Identifying
299.	whether	they <b>are considered</b>		Mental
300.		how they are ruled—and taken up at higher echelons— <b>circumscribes</b> the state’s ability to continually expand or contract the boundaries of liberalism in order to produce		Material

		suitable Muslim women against the unmarked backdrop of the public secular aesthetic of the United States		
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**Material Process**

No	Conjunction	Actor	Process	Goal	Initiator	Recipient	Scope	Circumstances
1.		I	<b>explore</b>	some of the elements by which Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States are managed so as to produce and distinguish “unruly” from “good” Muslim female citizens within the context of American liberalism				- In this article
2.		the American liberal framework	<b>utilizes</b>				a laissez-faire approach, which relies on a range of public and private institutions to determine acceptable public presentations of the liberal	- Unlike the French state, which has regulated both the hijab and niqab through national legislation

							female subject	
4.		Neoliberal management	<b>works</b>					- in conjunction with popular political discourses and domestic events in ways that alternately contract and expand the boundaries that allow “suitable Muslim women” in the public sphere
11.	because	they	<b>violate</b>	a dominant neutral cultural or political norm				- conspicuously
14.	and		<b>are mounted</b>	the hegemonic, norm that usurps a society’s political or social imaginary and becomes the invisible background against which cultural challenges				- hence

15.		such a society	<b>dominates</b>	the aesthetic norms of that society					- By extension
16.		such a society	<b>presenting</b>	them					- as the cultural default
18.		Mickaella Perina	<b>drawing on</b>	María Lugones's notion of the racial state					
19.	As	the "racial state"	<b>classifies</b>	people					- according to physical characteristics
20.		racial and racialized aesthetics	<b>classify</b>	art and artistic conceptions					- according to cultural characteristics
22.			<b>is encountered</b>	The unruly figure or group					- by disrupting the hegemonic aesthetic norm through their public presentation or comportment - as a threat to be addressed and contained
29.		the First Lady	<b>Articulating</b>	support for her husband, then-President George W. Bush's decision to invade Afghanistan					



30.		the First Lady	<b>pointed to</b>	the need to save Afghan women and children				
35.	if	these backward cultures	<b>destroyed</b>					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- not altogether</li> <li>- both to “advance” the colonized society as well as to remove the threat to the colonizing culture</li> </ul>
36.			<b>has been documented</b>	The mission to save black and brown women				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- well</li> <li>- in former colonized societies that were predominantly Muslim, from Egypt to North Africa</li> </ul>
40.		Fanon	<b>offers</b>	an illuminating, provocative discussion of the insistence on wearing the haïk and why it is a threat—a challenge—to the colonizer				

42.		Algerian women	<b>challenged</b>	the French's attempt to conquer them					- by remaining inaccessible, and unconquerable by refusing the invitation to be assimilated or "liberated" sexually, socially, culturally, or politically by refusing to unconceal their beauty for Western edification
43.	As	Monique Roelofs	<b>dissects</b>	the notion of aesthetic address of persons and things					- in María Lugones's work
44.		[m]odes of address	<b>connect</b>	persons and things					- in trajectories of address
45.		Strings of address	<b>emerge</b>						- that reach from persons to persons . . . from persons to things . . . from things to things (from spoon to oil, water, yolk), and from

								things to persons (from curdled mayonnaise to Lugones and onward to us)
48.			<b>may be read</b>	the veiled Algerian woman				- as abiding [...] as well as engaging in a form of resistance - by her cultural/moral/religious commitments
49.			<b>can be read [...] addressed</b>	the veil				- In the latter mode - as both a practice of resisting French liberal–imperial aesthetics of secular dress as well as a practical revolutionary resistance
52.			<b>develop</b>	the specific uses and conceptions human agents		them		
54.			<b>was addressed</b>	she				- Hence

								- as a victim of cultural patriarchal oppression as well as a target to be neutralized if not altogether nullified
57.			<b>appears to increase</b>	this fear				- correspondingly
58.		Muslim women	<b>have continued to face</b>	extensive, explicit, and continuous challenges to their visible public commitments to their faith and culture				- In contemporary France
59.		The French state	<b>has banned</b>	both the hijab and niqab				- through national legislation, ostensibly to demarcate and protect the state's cultural emphasis on secular public citizenship
63.			<b>was reinforced</b>	a specific heteronormative and				- as the norm of French public space

				heterosocial gendering of public space— constituted through particular feminine habits of dress, behaviour and mixité (coeducation)				
68.	And yet		<b>is connected</b>	the visibility of the veil			to the racial anxiety of French society—of the impending challenge to their unmarked racial dominance, or “cultural racism”	- beneath the facial discourse of violations of secularism
70.		[T]he question why the veil comes to be seen as the marker of Islamic or Algerian	<b>brings</b>	us			to the already constituted field of vision of the French observer	

		cultural difference						
71.		colonialism	<b>has been structured</b>	This field of vision				
72.		The representational apparatus of colonialism	<b>not constitutes</b>	the image of the 'native				- only
73.	but	The representational apparatus of colonialism	<b>posits</b>	this image				- in opposition to a certain self-perception of colonial society and against an implicit normalization of gender within that society
74.			<b>is overdetermined</b>	the veil				- For the French - as a racial affront, which recalls France's sordid history of colonialism and declared attempts to "liberate" Algerian women in the name of uplifting and civilizing

75.	as	Fanon	<b>shows</b>	us					- all too vividly
77.		the secular French	<b>will be looking to justify [...] redeem</b>	their colonial past					
80.		Muslim women	<b>have not faced</b>	similar legal or political challenges					- Curiously - given the ferocity of the government's War on Terror and the broad realm of Muslim men who have been detained or incarcerated without Constitutional due process over the last two decades
81.	Nevertheless	they	<b>are regulated [...] disciplined</b>						- still - within the U.S. legal-political context in which they find themselves, but in less explicit ways than their French or other European counterparts' approach of

								outlawing conspicuous religious symbols
82.			<b>might be found</b>	One way to understand this				- in the unique American mode of reconciling notions of individual freedom with certain persistent and subtle forms of social and political management of populations
85.		The protection of religious expression	<b>creating</b>	a familiar and accepted legal framework in which to challenge attempts to ban religious practices or symbols				- effectively
88.	Yet		<b>can be modulated</b>	this compatibility				- depending upon how threatening or suitable a particular event is perceived



89.			<b>is enforced</b>	it				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Especially during times of crisis</li> <li>- selectively</li> </ul>
93.			<b>is articulated</b>	The idea of managing subjects				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- perhaps best</li> <li>- by Michel Foucault's discussion of governmentality, whereby governing is a strategic art deployed toward certain "suitable" ends or, as Foucault says, "the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end"</li> </ul>
96.			<b>is to be sought</b>	it				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs</li> </ul>
99.		it	<b>operates</b>					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Prima facie</li> <li>- at the discursive level of continual iterations of the</li> </ul>

								promise of American freedom, democracy, and proceduralism
100.	while		<b>enforcing</b>	Constitutional law		some populations and not others		- selectively
102.		the United States	<b>prosecuted</b>	numerous individuals who were deemed to lend support to terrorist organizations, despite questionable evidence				- For example - in the aftermath of the declaration of the War on Terror
103.		we	<b>Borrowing</b>					- further - from Foucault's understanding of biopolitics as the separation and production of certain populations
107.		The interplay of public and private institutions, sometimes	<b>can determine</b>	whether certain practices will be accommodated within the boundaries of				

		with policing institutions		the liberal state or instead challenged as violations of the “tolerable” liberal subject				
108.		these events	<b>will accumulate to maintain</b> [...] <b>reinscribe</b>	a certain default vision of the good (female) liberal subject in a dialectical relationship to the particular moment/version of liberal society in which she is found				- Depending upon the outcome of the contestation
110.		the American liberal state	<b>relies</b>					- on judicial review, in which a contested claim is brought to the (higher) courts, such as a district, state, or federal Supreme Court
111.		The higher judiciary	<b>decides</b>	whether it will consider a claim of procedural or				

				constitutional violation				
112.		The American legal system	<b>relies</b>					- heavily
113.		the judiciary	<b>engages [...]</b> <b>revises</b>	doctrinal lawmaking				- In doing so - continually
114.	and	the judiciary	<b>recycles</b>	new iterations of liberalism and the liberal subject				- in doing so
116.	but whether	the contested action	<b>violates</b>	the rights of the liberal (female) subject not to be discriminated against				
117.	or whether	it	<b>violates</b>	public security				
118.		the American address of Muslim women	<b>is to evaluate</b>	Muslim women's claims to religious expression				- In this way - most often in the workplace
123.			<b>receive</b>	a range of market, police, judicial, and media receptions with reference to the liberal tenet that is being contested or		Muslim women who wear the hijab		

				reinscribed at various moments				
125.			<b>were arrested, strip-searched, detained, [...] interrogated</b>	two young Muslim teens				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in 2005</li> <li>- for eight weeks</li> <li>- on the suspicion of being potential suicide bombers or terrorists</li> </ul>
126.		a Muslim female officer	<b>was fired</b>					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In 2003</li> <li>- for wearing the hijab</li> <li>- on the ground that she violated the Philadelphia Police Department's uniform policy</li> </ul>
127.			<b>are employed to work</b>	Women who wear the hijab				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- routinely</li> <li>- in (some of the same) business that require some social visibility, whether in clothing stores or nonprofit organizations</li> </ul>
129.		the U.S. Department of Justice	<b>filed [...] settled</b>	a civil discrimination suit				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In one instance</li> <li>- on behalf of a New Jersey</li> </ul>

								corrections officer who was fired for wearing the hijab
130.			<b>have been forced to remove</b>	their hijabs		imprisoned Muslim women		- In other instances - on the grounds that they could injure someone else or themselves
132.		the governing judge	<b>came from</b>	One order				- on the grounds that she violated the courts' need for transparency, identity and publicness
134.			<b>were not able to obtain</b>	redress		women		- In many cases - for these injustices or other forms of daily harassment or physical violence - even when they were the aggrieved parties
136.			<b>have been mixed</b>	the responses of Muslim				- Socially - as well

				women to their environments				
137.		a significant number of Muslim women	<b>appear to have begun wearing</b>	the hijab				- since 9/11 - in response to any number of events
138.	still	others	<b>have decided not to wear</b>	the hijab				- in order not to inhibit their professional lives within the context of a post-9/11 wary labor market
139.		I	<b>have pointed</b>	to a range of unsystematic treatments and receptions of Muslim women				- in order to illuminate the elastic boundaries of liberalism and the corresponding reinscriptions of the good (female liberal) citizen, which oscillate between the indifferent rejection of certain Muslim women and the accommodation of certain

								stylized Muslim women
140.		by some transcendent standard of glamour or suitability of the outfit than by a cultural aesthetic that reflects the convergence of a range of economic and sociopolitical forces	<b>is modulated</b>	The spectrum of acceptable dress at work or in public more generally for women in the United States				- less
142.		These forces	<b>work</b>	to script repeatedly the particular— patriarchal— exemplification of liberal public comportment				- together
143.			<b>is supposed to reveal</b>	herself		The Western secular female subject		- in certain public/professional modes
144.		she	<b>unconceals</b>	her face				



145.		she	<b>leaves</b>	her body moderately concealed				
146.	and	she	<b>exhibits</b>	her legs and ankles				- unless she inhabits masculine clothing, such as a pantsuit
147.		The quintessential model of “Western business attire” [...] with slight variants	<b>emphasizes</b>	professionalism				- as described [...] on multiple blogs for Model United Nations
148.		One	<b>points</b>	to suits [...] and neutral colors				- crediting French designer Coco Chanel for pioneering suits for women
149.	and	One	<b>discourages</b>	headgear				
152.			<b>is grounded</b>	the masculinist insistence on a stylized form of professional female dress				- in the courts’ refusal to overturn professional dress codes for women
154.		American and global television anchors	<b>dress</b>					- similarly

156.		parliamentarians, corporate executives, low-level business women, or housewives	<b>dressed in</b>	slacks and pants				
158.		these codes	<b>preclude</b>	outfits that are not expressly secular or American				- Depending upon the political/social/cultural milieu
159.			<b>are cleansed</b>	of specifically cultural or ethnic references, such as the sari or the chador, among other kinds of clothing		they		- That is
161.	unless	they	<b>impose</b>	“an undue hardship” on the place of business				
165.	unless	doing so	<b>would cause</b>	more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer’s business				

170.		an employer	<b>must accommodate</b>	an employee's religious beliefs or practices					- reasonably
175.		he	<b>should notify</b>	the employer					- that he needs such an accommodation for religious reasons
177.		the employer and employee	<b>should engage in</b>	an interactive process to discuss the request					
178.	If	it	<b>would not pose</b>	an undue hardship					
179.		the employer	<b>must grant</b>	the accommodation					
180.		An employer	<b>does not have to accommodate</b>	an employee's religious beliefs or practices					
181.	if	doing so	<b>would cause</b>	undue hardship to the employer					
182.		An accommodation	<b>may cause</b>	undue hardship					
183.	if	it	<b>compromises</b>	workplace safety					- costly
184.		it	<b>decreases</b>	workplace efficiency					

185.		it	<b>infringes</b>	on the rights of other employees				
188.	that	employers	<b>must accommodate</b>	an employee's religious practices				
189.	unless	doing so	<b>would cause</b>	more than a "minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business"				
190.		The second and third sections	<b>emphasize</b>	the escape clause of "an undue burden" that would allow employers to discriminate against those requiring religious accommodation				- then
192.	Yet	various employers	<b>permit</b>	Muslim women to wear the hijab				- that is to say, they are not explicitly harassed, fired, beaten, or stigmatized
195.	And		<b>are disciplined</b>	they				- in still other instances

								- by being fired, jailed, or reprimanded— or physically beaten, without redress
198.		This inscription	<b>can accommodate</b>	certain kinds of visibly Muslim women—those who are acceptable— who are products of modernization to some degree, that is, who appear professional				
200.		they	<b>work</b>					- in a labor force
202.		These dress codes	<b>reinforce</b>	a certain expectation				- for professional women that appears to mark the norm of what a mildly liberated autonomous female subject looks like
203.	and	These dress codes	<b>reinforces</b>	the assumption that the cooperative Muslim female citizen will be				- in turn

				tolerated or accommodated				
204.	if	she	<b>can conform to</b>	certain key aesthetic principles of Western qua secular professional dress				
211.		they	<b>make clear</b>	the expectations to be met by each party				- That is to say - in any given transaction
214.			<b>are exemplified</b>	Both of these				- in a Michigan small claims court judge's order that a Muslim woman remove her niqab or have her case dismissed
215.		She	<b>refused</b>					
217.	that	she	<b>could do so</b>					- only - in front of a female judge, at which point her case was dismissed
220.	But	his position	<b>belied</b>	other frequent forms of communication that have no				- in fact

				such transparency, such as audio recordings of phone conversations, which rely on intonations, pitch, and other features of meaning but—until recently—not necessarily facial expressions				
223.		The inconsistency of the judge’s position	<b>betrays</b>	a preference for a certain cultural comportment that ensures certain shared understandings , views, and attitudes				
224.		The inconsistency of the judge’s position	<b>revealing</b>	that communication is not a way to express uniqueness of standpoint, but rather “a shorthand by				

				which to communicate variations of those ideas, norms, and procedures that are mostly shared”				
225.		We	<b>can find</b>	similar expectations				- in the Georgia courts system, which prohibits the hijab in courtrooms and has gone so far as to arrest one woman who refused to remove her hijab except in front of a female judge
226.		we	<b>might infer</b>	that the subject who wears the hijab/niqab/cha dor is concealing something and, thus, has violated the expectation of a common (cultural) appearance				- From this



				that is supposed to be shared by liberal female subjects				
227.	But		<b>can be mitigated</b>	such violations				- in certain professional and cultural sub-contexts by the woman who wears the hijab
229.		the Muslim woman	<b>challenges</b>	the cultural hegemony that undergirds the modern liberal environment enveloping the modern liberal woman/female professional				- In doing so
232.		Certain female Muslim community leaders	<b>wear</b>	the hijab				- in the public eye
233.	while	Certain female Muslim community leaders	<b>engaging</b>					- in numerous contestations over Islam and the acceptability of exhibiting their faith and

								commitments publicly
234.	Yet	they	<b>receive</b>	a certain acceptability from a significant part of the public				- also - by showing their similarities to secular women in certain visible ways
236.		by their sociability, education, and ability to engage in various civil society and market activities, whether as community organizers or professionals, or as people who interact with different kinds of governmental institutions—that is, already acting with the state symbolically	<b>is marked</b>	Evidence of this				

		and figuratively						
237.		the U.S. Congress	<b>voted to amend</b>	a nearly two-centuries-old Congressional ban on headgear				- On January 6, 2019 - to exempt religious headwear
238.			<b>was passed</b>			The repeal		- successfully
239.			<b>have received</b>	ample criticism		Both women		- also - for their outspoken advocacy of many controversial issues
240.	while	by certain segments of the secular U.S. populace	<b>are vilified</b>			they		
241.			<b>have received</b>	support		they		- from other segments - in part because of their being marked as appropriate liberal feminist subjects for being able to communicate and build bridges with non-Muslim,

								often secular, audiences
243.		Hijabis who do not have the social clout that Omar and Sarsour hold— women who are prisoners and not seen as up standing professional liberated female subjects—	<b>receive</b>	a very different treatment				
244.	When	Muslim women	<b>encounter</b>	corrections officers or face time in prison				
245.	then		<b>are relegated</b>	to the category of the unruly, difficult, Muslim woman and much more likely to be dismissed, ruled against, or discriminated against		they		

246.			<b>is addressed</b>	The question of the right to religious expression				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- dissimilarly</li> <li>- in cases involving hijabis in prisons or as visitors in courtrooms than in professional/employment contexts</li> </ul>
248.		the District Court of New Jersey	<b>ruled</b>	against prisoner Melany Chila's claim to religious discrimination for being forced to remove her headscarf in 2016				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- For example</li> <li>- as recently as 2018</li> </ul>
249.		The New Jersey District Court	<b>found</b>	multiple ways to rule against Chila				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- on a range of claims</li> </ul>
250.		the Court	<b>were dismissed</b>	The overall claim, that her constitutional rights were violated by the Camden County				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- on the grounds that the prison is not a person</li> </ul>

				Correctional Facility				
253.		Chila	<b>charged</b>	that her religious rights were violated				- because she was forced to remove her headscarf and also because she was denied access to her Qur'an and from leaving the cell to worship
254.			<b>occurred</b>	The first claim				- in 2007
255.	and		<b>occurred</b>	the second				- in 2016
256.		The New Jersey District Court	<b>found</b>	that the 2007 claim was barred from being ruled upon due to the statute of limitations				
257.		the Court	<b>found</b>	Chila's claim not substantial				- Regarding the 2016 claim
258.	while		<b>may have been violated</b>	her rights				- on some occasions
260.		the Court	<b>pointed</b>	to earlier cases whereby plaintiffs' similar claims were denied because the				- In support of its judgment

				stay in prison was too short to affect one's religious beliefs				
262.			<b>may have constituted</b>	an intrusion upon Plaintiff's prayers and practices				- on some occasions during this brief ten-day period of 2016 incarceration
264.	and therefore	these events	<b>do not constitute</b>	a substantial interference				
266.	Moreover	the Court	<b>citing</b>	a 2007 case				
270.	and therefore	the refusal of CCCF to allow her to leave her cell to pray	<b>outweighed</b>	her religious commitments				
276.		courts	<b>have dismissed</b>	charges brought by them on technical or jurisdictional grounds				- In other cases—again, mostly involving Muslim women as prisoners or as courtroom visitors—
277.			<b>is evaded [...] sidelined</b>	the question of whether women have the right to wear the hijab wherever they go				- Often - in the interests of the question of principles: freedom or security

278.	or		<b>are preempted</b>	they				- through settlements or other types of compromises
281.	Also		<b>are laid down</b>	these judgments				- notably - in the absence of explicit anti-hijab legislations
282.	Furthermore		<b>are issued</b>	they				- even in the face of explicit religious accommodation concerns
283.		The contrary way in which courts rule against Muslim women in prison	<b>raises</b>	questions about the perspective that hijabis do not face discrimination in the United States				
286.		the state	<b>collaborates</b>	to regulate the hijab and produce both the “good” and the “unruly” Muslim female subject			with markets and various local public institutions (prisons, courts, school systems)	
287.		It	<b>does so</b>					- either by prohibiting the hijab or



								accommodating —on a micro level—women who wear the hijab
290.			<b>is formed</b> [...] <b>influenced</b>	the question of the suitable liberal subject				- At base - through the prioritization of markets, employers, and profits in connection with state institutions
291.			<b>is shaped</b>	That relationship				- through a discursive relationship between the institutions within the neoliberal (market-based, laissez-faire) paradigm - in relation to the liberal precepts that form the American self-understanding
293.		by institutional forces that may not be	<b>will be marked</b>	the intersections where a Muslim				- As such

		explicitly legislative but also not limited to immediate family/community influences		woman is marked— certainly by race, gender, and class—				
294.			<b>may be done</b>	the negotiation				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Thus</li> <li>- even in the aftermath of a victory to wear the hijab in her workplace— after which she may decide that her options are too strictly limited by wearing the hijab</li> </ul>
295.	or	she	<b>may decide to return</b>	to the hijab				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- again</li> <li>- in order to negotiate certain professional goals through the close cultural, patriarchal, or social strictures of one's family</li> </ul>

300.		how they are ruled—and taken up at higher echelons—	<b>circumscribes</b>	the state's ability to continually expand or contract the boundaries of liberalism in order to produce suitable Muslim women against the unmarked backdrop of the public secular aesthetic of the United States				
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**Mental Process**

No	Conjunction	Senser	Process	Phenomenon	Circumstances
6.	that		<b>are construed</b>	Muslim women who don the hijab	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- particularly within the last decade</li> <li>- as unruly subjects within the context of a Western liberal regime</li> </ul>
9.			<b>is seen</b>	This breach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in explicit practices that are thought to contravene the fundamental ethos of Western liberal culture, namely that of political secularism</li> </ul>
12.			<b>are thought to be</b>	Secular societies, as the concrete manifestations of liberal political ideologies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- endangered by populations or cultures that express their moral and religious beliefs in public spaces</li> </ul>
13.			<b>is thought of</b>	Liberalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- as the racial and religious unmarked</li> </ul>
28.		we	<b>saw</b>	the expression of this belief in the rhetorical motivations expressed by First Lady Laura Bush soon after 9/11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certainly</li> </ul>
39.			<b>was thought to play</b>	the perception of threat emerged from the integral part that the haïk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In part</li> <li>- in the Algerian revolution, with its instrumental ability to hide and circumvent colonial authorities</li> </ul>
41.	even as	the French empire	<b>focused on</b>	the bodies of veiled Muslim women as vehicles that symbolized the fetishized	

				object of oppression and potential liberation	
56.	As		<b>construed</b>	global attention to potential explosive activities	- as Islamic terrorism increase
61.			<b>was seen</b>	veiling	- as opposed to French secular space
62.			<b>is construed</b>	French secular space	- as “a specific heteronormative and heterosocial gendering of public space—constituted through particular feminine habits of dress, behaviour and mixité (coeducation)—was reinforced as the norm of French public space”
64.			<b>was imagined to be</b>	The aesthetic norm of French public space—proudly presented as devoid of religious symbols—	- about
94.			<b>should not be confused with</b>	A suitable end	- the objective of sovereignty, which is the making of decisions for “the common good and the salvation of all”
98.		we	<b>might understand</b>	governmentality as operating at several level	- In the context of the two-decade-old U.S.-led War on Terror
104.		we	<b>might understand</b>	this as part of a larger ontopolitical production of suitable or unacceptable Muslims, as such populations illustrate or reinforce or transgress that discourse of liberalism	

106.			<b>are seen</b>	These	- through the mechanisms of markets and judiciaries, along with the absence of explicit regulations or laws, at least typically
109.		We	<b>see</b>	this	- in the United States's approach to adjudicating cases that claim protection or violation of constitutional principles
124.			<b>Consider</b>	the following catalogue	
193.	as	we	<b>have seen</b>		
194.			<b>can be seen</b>	they	- Occasionally - as the victims of discrimination
205.			<b>understood</b>	such a Muslim woman	- Thus - as the hallmark of the liberal feminist subject
235.			<b>Consider</b>	Linda Sarsour, a community organizer and director of the Arab American Association of New York, or the recently elected congresswoman from Minnesota, Rep. Ilhan Omar, both of whom are outspoken American Muslim women who wear the hijab even as they are publicly American and speak the language of liberalism, that is, civil rights, constitution, and so on	- for example

242.			<b>are seen</b>	Not all hijabis	- as suitable female subjects in liberal societies
265.		The court	<b>was not convinced</b>	that Chila's rights were violated	- because of the short duration of her prison stay
267.		the Court	<b>insists</b>	that [...] the violation was a minimal rather than substantial burden on Chila's actual religious beliefs	- because of the short duration, rather than the actual violation
274.	As	we	<b>can see</b>		- from this recent case
284.			<b>should not be understood</b>	The widespread and varied treatment of Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States	- as a more open or accepting attitude toward them
285.		the state	<b>Judging</b>		- by the way that the hijab becomes (or does not become) a focus of controversy in the American context
296.			<b>can be understood</b>	This complex interaction and neoliberal collaboration	- as a reflection of the current official sentiments of the day, but always with a view to the American polity's elastic self-understanding as a liberal society
299.	whether		<b>are considered</b>	they	

Relational Attributive Process					
No	Conjunction	Carrier	Process	Attribute	Circumstances
10.		Such practices and signs	<b>are</b>	“unruly”	
23.		this	<b>is</b>	how much of North America, Europe, and Australia have responded to the events of September 11, 2001, namely, through a domestic and global politics of national security	- On a global level
31.		The need to save Muslim women— from themselves, from “their” men, from their “oppressive culture”—	<b>had been</b>	in existence	- well before Bush’s declaration
32.		The drive to save brown and black women	<b>has been</b>	a hallmark of imperial civilizing mission	- long
47.		the veil	<b>has</b>	multiple modalities, multiple relations to persons	- As such
53.		the figure of the veiled Muslim women	<b>was</b>	both in need of saving and also received in conjunction with the countervailing fear of her threatening insurgent capacities	- Under the colonial French administration - then
55.		Fanon’s incisive observations	<b>are</b>	surprisingly astute	- still
76.		The battle over the veil	<b>becomes</b>	a battle over which side will dominate	- then
79.		The treatment of hijabis in the French context	<b>contrasts</b>	starkly	- With the United States’s approach



84.	nevertheless	The protection of religious expression	<b>has</b>	a robust narrative	- in the United States
86.		It	<b>may be</b>	the case that, in the U.S. context, effective challenges to the hijab are better leveled by illustrating how it violates some other liberal principle, such as transparency or publicity or economic profit	- also
87.		the hijab	<b>appears to be</b>	compatible with Constitutional principles	- As an expression of religious commitments
91.	while	Christian speech	<b>is</b>	plentiful	- especially under the current administration - in government quarters
97.	and	the instruments of government	<b>will become</b>	diverse tactics rather than laws	
141.		It	<b>seems</b>	possible to identify a few elements that enable the neoliberal collaboration between sovereignty, capital, and media	
151.		the projection of how a good liberal female citizen comports	<b>is</b>	so ubiquitous	- In this collaboration - as to become the invisible ether that surrounds us
153.		Most media depictions of the generic acceptable Western/liberal female subject	<b>reflect</b>	a seemingly hegemonic dress code	
162.	But	the message	<b>is</b>	mixed	- as found in the three sections concerning religious discrimination and reasonable accommodation

169.	Unless	it	<b>would be</b>	an undue hardship on the employer's operation of its business	
199.		This inscription	<b>based on</b>	the contingencies of the particular political moment	
201.		they	<b>have</b>	certain skills that warrant them, if not respect, at least freedom from harassment or tolerance	
230.	Even though	a refreshed politics of national security in the aftermath of 9/11	<b>is</b>	partially responsible	- for a dominant wariness toward Muslim women
231.		the political, social, and economic consequences of wearing the hijab	<b>appear to be</b>	different	- for Muslim women of different class backgrounds
251.	and, therefore	The overall claim	<b>[is] not</b>	liable to accommodate her objections	
259.		these	<b>were</b>	too sporadic to be supported	
261.		The Court's language here	<b>is</b>	rather remarkable	
263.	but	these events	<b>were</b>	relatively short-term	
269.	Moreover	the refusal of CCCF to allow her to leave her cell to pray	<b>was</b>	due to concerns about security and orderliness	
271.		it	<b>is</b>	legitimate	- Certainly - for the state to have concerns about state/institutional security and safety in correctional facilities
273.	But	the link	<b>appears</b>	tenuous at best	- in this case

275.		the state	<b>had</b>	few concerns about religious discrimination with regard to Muslim women in prison and was not part of a larger trend to combat discrimination against Muslim women	
289.		This method of disciplining	<b>is</b>	consistent with the long history of liberalism, which intersects with the market or engages in laissez-faire or hands-off libertarian practices	- in order to manage its subjects and in turn vilifies the defiant subject or produces/rewards noteworthy liberal citizens

Relational Identifying Process					
No	Conjunction	Token	Process	Value	Circumstances
3.		I	refer to	this form of management as “neoliberalism”	
7.		Unruly subjects	are	those who are perceived to actively violate the ideal of the good (liberal) citizen	
8.		The particular infraction of women who wear the hijab	is	their conspicuously heterogeneous comportment—openly subscribing to “Muslim” or “Islamic” culture	
21.		to believe that non-Western aesthetic thought and frameworks are radically different—so different that it is a matter of “deep translation”—or that translation is unattainable	is	to mark other aesthetics as culturally different while having Western aesthetics escape the mark of culture	- Indeed
24.		national security policies	are	a politics of legal, social, and cultural containment through which the Western world has mounted an ever-increasing challenge to Muslims’ cultural and religious commitments, understood as a necessary political defense against “Islamic terrorism”	- In effect
25.		to subscribe visibly to Islam	is	to always already be a problem	- As such

33.		The underlying message of such missions	<b>is</b>	that these backward cultures need to be transformed if not altogether destroyed—both to “advance” the colonized society as well as to remove the threat to the colonizing culture	
34.	that	these backward cultures	<b>needed to be transformed</b>		- both to “advance” the colonized society as well as to remove the threat to the colonizing culture
38.		the West	<b>needed to save</b>	veiled (Algerian) woman	- not necessarily for their own sake, but in order to be able to “destroy the structure of Algerian society [and] its capacity for resistance”
46.		the veil	<b>has</b>	multiple modalities, multiple relations to persons	- As such
51.		the capacities of objects to support modes of address	<b>surpass</b>	the specific uses and conceptions human agents develop for them	
66.	that	French public space	<b>is</b>	the culturally unmarked default	- again
78.	or	it	<b>will be</b>	<b>be</b> the inferior and oppressive culture of Islam, against which the West has waged a centuries-long war	
90.		Islamic fundamentalist sermons	<b>have served as</b>	evidence for charges of terrorism	- For example

92.		Such an approach	<b>exemplifies</b>	the general mode by which the American state manages unruly subjects	
95		suitable ends	<b>are</b>	those which are “internal to the things [government] directs ( <i>diriger</i> )	- Rather
101.		governmentality	<b>might reflect</b>	the strategic enforcement of constitutional protections for some individuals, combined with the strategic privation of the same protections for populations deemed threats to national security	- In the interest of national security
122.		The multiple reiterations	<b>serve to reenact</b>	different iterations of the acceptable Muslim female subject	- continually - through various U.S. courts that hear discrimination cases against hijabis
131.		Women	<b>have been required to remove</b>	their hijabs	- on threat of being barred from the courtroom where they were conducting unrelated business
155.		parliamentarians, corporate executives, low-level business women, or housewives dressed in slacks and pants	<b>are</b>	subjects of television news stories, print media, and films	
160.		employers	<b>are required to accommodate</b>	particular religious needs/expressions	- In the Equal Employment Opportunity

					Commission (EEOC) regulations concerning religious discrimination and accommodation
164.		The law	<b>requires</b>	an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices	
166.		This	<b>means</b>	an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion	
167.		an employer	<b>may be required</b>	to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion	
168.		Examples of some common religious accommodations	<b>include</b>	flexible scheduling, voluntary shift substitutions or swaps, job reassignments, and modifications to workplace policies or practices	
171.		This	<b>applies</b>	not only to schedule changes or leave for religious observances, but also to such things as dress or grooming practices that an employee has for religious reasons	
172.		These might	<b>include</b>	wearing particular head coverings or other religious dress (such as a Jewish yarmulke or a Muslim	- for example

				headscarf), or wearing certain hairstyles or facial hair (such as Rastafarian dreadlocks or Sikh uncut hair and beard)	
173.		It	<b>includes</b>	an employee's observance of a religious prohibition against wearing certain garments (such as pants or miniskirts)	- also
174.	When	an employee or applicant	<b>needs</b>	a dress or grooming accommodation for religious reasons	
176.	If	the employer	<b>needs</b>	more information	- reasonably
186.	or	it	<b>requires</b>	other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work	
196.		These outcomes	<b>suggest</b>	that, despite the absence of explicit regulations concerning the hijab, there is nevertheless a form of disciplining that continually reinscribes the ideal of the good liberal female citizen in contrast to the unruly, defiant, or difficult Muslim female subject	
206.		such a Muslim woman	<b>might be</b>	someone who—despite wearing the hijab—exhibits certain key traits that confirm her liberal comportment	
207.		These traits	<b>might include</b>	sociability (especially with a non-Muslim secular public), cooperativeness, education, professional status, and	



				engagement in secular/civil society and market activities	
208.		This accommodation	<b>requires</b>	a certain reconciliation with the ideal vision of the liberal female subject and the violation of certain revered tenets such as transparency	
209.		The norm of transparency	<b>implies</b>	a liberal expectation of publicity, oversight, and accountability	- also
212.		This version of transparency	<b>suggests</b>	that this is the standard neutral liberal expectation of citizens in the liberal polity	- in addition to that mode of transparency which is the conduit of relations between the state and the individual
213.	that	this	<b>is</b>	the standard neutral liberal expectation of citizens	- in the liberal polity
218.		The judge's explanation for his actions	<b>were</b>	that he needed to see her face to verify whether she was telling the truth	
219.	that	he	<b>needed to see</b>	her face	- to verify whether she was telling the truth
228.	if	that appearance	<b>reflects</b>	a particular version of openness and a certain stylized approachability that is expressed through the public exhibition of one's self	
247.		The response of the courts	<b>has been</b>	to rule against Muslim women as prisoners	- on the grounds that there is a larger security concern that must be attended

268.	that	the violation	<b>was</b>	a minimal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- because of the short duration, rather than the actual violation</li> <li>- rather than substantial burden on Chila's actual religious beliefs</li> </ul>
272.		Those interests	<b>involve</b>	a set of concerns that must be addressed, involving the balance between the prisoner's rights and the security/neutrality objectives of the government and alternative accommodations	
279.		These cases	<b>suggest</b>	that there is not a single trajectory in the direction of greater accommodations to Muslims but rather multiple expansions and contractions of acceptability	
288.		this	<b>appears to be</b>	the preferred method in the American liberal polity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- rather than passing laws that prescribe how, when, and where the hijab shall be worn and by whom</li> </ul>
297.		The market	<b>serves</b>	as the mechanism that interacts with a range of other institutions, including the judiciary and the police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- as both the mainstay of American liberalism and an important signifier of the ethically acceptable liberal subject</li> <li>- in the service of the state's protection of its political and cultural boundaries, all the</li> </ul>

					while accommodating or disciplining the Muslim female subject in a dialectical frame, depending upon the political vagaries of the moment
298.	Whether or not	these cases	<b>are taken up</b>		

Verbal Process								
No	Conjunction	Sayer	Process	Receiver	Quoted	Reported	Verbiage	Circumstances
5.		I	<b>have argued</b>				that Muslim women who don the hijab, particularly within the last decade, are construed as unruly subjects within the context of a Western liberal regime	- Elsewhere
17.	As	Mickaella Perina	<b>argues</b>				As the “racial state” classifies people according to physical characteristics, racial and racialized aesthetics classify art and artistic conceptions according to cultural characteristics. Indeed, to believe that non-Western aesthetic thought	- drawing on María Lugones’s notion of the racial state

							and frameworks are radically different—so different that it is a matter of “deep translation”—or that translation is unattainable, is to mark other aesthetics as culturally different while having Western aesthetics escape the mark of culture	
37.	As	Frantz Fanon	<b>discussed</b>				the West needed to save veiled (Algerian) woman—not necessarily for their own sake, but in order to be able to “destroy the structure of Algerian society [and] its capacity for resistance”	- in 1959
50.	As	Roelofs	<b>suggests</b>				the capacities of objects to	

							support modes of address surpass the specific uses and conceptions human agents develop for them	
60.	As	Alia Al-Saji	<b>argues</b>		“veiling was seen as opposed to French secular space”			
65.		we	<b>might argue</b>				that French public space is, again, the culturally unmarked default	- Following Perina
67.		the foulard	<b>was addressed</b>				as a violation of that secular norm of laïcité	- As such
69.	As	Al-Saji					[T]he question why the veil comes to be seen as the marker of Islamic or Algerian cultural difference brings us to the already constituted field of vision of the	

							French observer. This field of vision has been structured by colonialism. ... The representational apparatus of colonialism not only constitutes the image of the 'native but posits this image in opposition to a certain self-perception of colonial society and against an implicit normalization of gender within that society	
115.		claims that are considered (or not) with regard to Muslim women	<b>do not address</b>				the hijab	- Thus - per se
120.	However	the U.S. judiciary	<b>weighs in</b>				on claims of religious discrimination by prisons in U.S. correctional	- also

							facilities, although decidedly in a much more negative manner	
121.		the U.S. courts	<b>address</b>				Muslim women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- By reiteratively engaging with Muslim women's ability to wear the veil in the workplace</li> <li>- rather than explicitly legalizing or banning the veil</li> <li>- through a subtle disciplining process that has less to do with outright legal policies that ban the hijab but rather which expand and contract the boundaries of acceptable public dress against the backdrop of an unmarked secularism</li> </ul>



133.		the Transportation Security Association	<b>announced</b>				its intent to screen and examine anyone who wore headgear, including men who wear baseball caps, cowboy hats, and turbans	- In 2007
135.	Yet	other women and Muslim teens who wear hijab, niqab, or burqas	<b>report</b>				having to deal with daily harassments or fear of physical violence	
150.	although		<b>is made</b>				no mention [...] of religious head coverings	
163.		the message	<b>stated</b>				The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the	- in direct sequence on the EEOC website

							<p>operations of the employer's business. This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion. Examples of some common religious accommodations include flexible scheduling, voluntary shift substitutions or swaps, job reassignments, and modifications to workplace policies or practices. Unless it would be an undue hardship on the employer's</p>	
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							<p>operation of its business, an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices. This applies not only to schedule changes or leave for religious observances, but also to such things as dress or grooming practices that an employee has for religious reasons. These might include, for example, wearing particular head coverings or other religious dress (such as a Jewish yarmulke or a Muslim headscarf), or wearing certain hairstyles or facial hair (such</p>	
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							<p>as Rastafarian dreadlocks or Sikh uncut hair and beard). It also includes an employee's observance of a religious prohibition against wearing certain garments (such as pants or miniskirts). When an employee or applicant needs a dress or grooming accommodation for religious reasons, he should notify the employer that he needs such an accommodation for religious reasons. If the employer reasonably needs more information, the employer and the employee</p>	
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							<p>should engage in an interactive process to discuss the request. If it would not pose an undue hardship, the employer must grant the accommodation. An employer does not have to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices if doing so would cause undue hardship to the employer. An accommodation may cause undue hardship if it is costly, compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights of other employees, or</p>	
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							requires other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work	
187.		The first two sections	<b>state</b>				that employers must accommodate an employee's religious practices unless doing so would cause more than a "minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business"	- clearly
210.			<b>is expressed</b>				This norm	- through exchanges, contracts, and other forms of public communication, as these govern the relation between individuals

216.		She	<b>explaining</b>				that she could only do so in front of a female judge	- at which point her case was dismissed
221.	as	the American Civil Liberties Union	<b>has commented</b>				there are multiple examples of visually disabled judges or juries who must rely on audio recordings, or disabled witnesses who are not able to communicate expressively with their faces	- As well - in relation to this judge's actions

<b>Existential Process</b>				
<b>No</b>	<b>Conjunction</b>	<b>Existent</b>	<b>Process</b>	<b>Circumstances</b>
26.		multiple historical and political rationales behind this hostility	<b>may be</b>	
27.		a widespread racial–sexual assumption that Muslim women, by the dictates of a (seemingly) monolithic Islam, are subservient, oppressed, and thereby unthreatening	<b>may be</b>	- at some level
83.		a long history of the American state’s defense of religious expression, as articulated in the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment	<b>is</b>	- For example
105.	however	a dimension of governmentality that operates through a neoliberal framework, that is, by relying on laissez-faire market and ad hoc policing mechanisms that bring certain transgressive moments to light against the backdrop of a society that is seen as fair and procedural	<b>is</b>	- At another level
119.	since	an established framework designed to assist employees in the workplace who find themselves to be subject to religious, racial, or sexual discrimination	<b>is</b>	
128.		multiple occasions (and a few legal cases) about Muslim women or teens who wear the	<b>have been</b>	- By contrast



		hijab who were either not hired by or fired from clothing stores because they did not conform to in-house dress policies		
157.	Moreover	a certain laissez-faire attitude, with the implicit nod from the state, which permits employers and businesses to regulate the professional dress best suited to their market	<b>is</b>	
191.		many ways in which the escape clause of “decreasing workplace efficiency, infringing on the rights of other employees,” can be invoked by employers to not hire or fire a woman who wears the hijab (for example, placing someone in the stockroom, then deciding that such a placement is inefficient or imposes a burden on their colleagues or that such accommodations cause their colleagues discomfort by explicit religious expressions and considering such expressions a form of harassment, through some leap of logic)	<b>are</b>	
197.	that [...] nevertheless	a form of disciplining that continually reinscribes the ideal of the good liberal female citizen in contrast to the unruly, defiant, or difficult Muslim female subject	<b>is</b>	- despite the absence of explicit regulations concerning the hijab

222.		multiple examples of visually disabled judges or juries who must rely on audio recordings, or disabled witnesses who are not able to communicate expressively with their faces	<b>are</b>	
252.		two specifically religious discrimination claims	<b>were</b>	- also
280.	that	a single trajectory in the direction of greater accommodations to Muslims but rather multiple expansions and contractions of acceptability	<b>is not</b>	
292.		a dialectical relationship between the neoliberal polity and Muslim women, who are not mere bodies acted upon by the state, but also engaged in decisions based on a set of contingencies, vulnerabilities, and ethical commitments, social influences, and personal obligations	<b>is</b>	- also

## INTERPERSONAL ANALYSIS

### J. R. MARTIN & P. R. R. WHITE APPRAISAL THEORY

Article 1 – *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (2015)*

**Control over female ‘Muslim’ bodies: culture, politics and dress code laws in some Muslim and non-Muslim countries**

By Ángeles Ramírez

No	Words, Phrases, Clauses and Sentences	Appraiser	Appraising Items	Classification of Attitude			Appraised
				Affect	Judgment	Appreciation	
1.	Control of the female body is a key component	Ángeles Ramírez	a key component			Valuation; (+) Social Significance	Control of the female body
2.	the so-called ‘Muslim’ clothing	Ángeles Ramírez	so-called		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		‘Muslim’ clothing
3.	the control of women as a privileged form of political control	Ángeles Ramírez	a privileged form		Social Esteem; (+) Normality		the control of women
4.	[...] while laws were being debated in Europe about banning the niqab. Although they only had a direct impact on the girls who wore the hijab ( <i>muhajabat</i> ) and the niqab ( <i>munaqabat</i> ) [...]	Ángeles Ramírez	a direct impact		Social Sanction; (+) Veracity		the laws about banning the niqab
5.	this compulsive urge to ban headscarves	Ángeles Ramírez	compulsive urge		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		the ban of headscarves

6.	Usually, questions related to the regulation of Muslim women's clothing have been examined	Ángeles Ramírez	Usually		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		questions related to the regulation of Muslim women's
7.	strong Muslim minorities	Ángeles Ramírez	strong		Social Esteem; (+) Capacity		Muslim minorities
8.	the dominant perspectives have been legal	Ángeles Ramírez	dominant			Composition; (+) Balance	the perspectives
9.	The objective of this article, however, is more far-reaching	Ángeles Ramírez	far-reaching			Reaction; (+) Impact	the objective of this article
10.	I [...] will focus on the control of women as a privileged form of political control. In Muslim contexts, they establish a strong sexual and social hierarchisation	Ángeles Ramírez	strong sexual and social hierarchisation				they ['Muslim' clothing]
11.	these regulations appear in times of intense crisis	Ángeles Ramírez	intense crisis			Reaction; (-) Quality	the appearance of regulations
12.	their importance as tools to regulate the population in preparation for exceptional measures	Ángeles Ramírez	exceptional			(+) Valuation	the prepared measures
13.	the framework of reinforcing control of	Ángeles Ramírez	subaltern populations		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		women and Muslims

	women and Muslims as subaltern populations						
14.	the expanded use of the hijab	Ángeles Ramírez	expanded			(+) Valuation	the use of the hijab
15.	Hijabisation generally obeys a logic unrelated to any imposition	Ángeles Ramírez	generally			(+) Valuation	Hijabisation obedience towards a logic unrelated to any imposition
16.	a belated revolt	Ángeles Ramírez	belated			(-) Valuation	a revolt
17.	against the violent colonial project of westernization	Ángeles Ramírez	violent			Reaction; (-) Impact	the project of westernisation
18.		Ángeles Ramírez	colonial			(-) Valuation	
19.	the hijab was legitimised and many women felt more dignified and freer wearing it	Ángeles Ramírez	dignified		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		women who wear the hijab
20.		Ángeles Ramírez	freer		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		
21.	As a visible sign of the political commitment	Ángeles Ramírez	visible			Composition; (+) Complexity	a sign of the political commitment
22.	the headscarf played a fundamental role in these battles	Ángeles Ramírez	fundamental role			Reaction; (+) Impact	the headscarf
23.	The hijab went from being a sign of submission in the eyes of colonial modernity to	Ángeles Ramírez	a sign of submission			Reaction; (-) Impact	The hijab
24.		Ángeles Ramírez	a sign of assertiveness			Reaction; (-) Impact	

25.	becoming a sign of assertiveness, and women actively appropriated it	Ángeles Ramírez	actively		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		women appropriating the hijab
26.	Islamism can be seen as a political and collective form of the 'management of spoiled identity'	Ángeles Ramírez	spoiled identity		Social Esteem; (-) Capacity		Islamism
27.	Islamism encourages political actors to voluntarily adopt the religious attributes that are considered	Ángeles Ramírez	voluntarily		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		the adoption of religious attributes encouraged by Islamism
28.	potentially discrediting from the point of view of the normative framework of modern culture	Ángeles Ramírez	potentially discrediting			Reaction; (-) Quality	
29.		Ángeles Ramírez	modern			(+) Valuation	the culture
30.	Islamist movements turn the 'undesired differentness' of being a Muslim into a voluntary adoption of a stigma symbol that is overtly claimed and offensively communicated in public	Ángeles Ramírez	'undesired differentness'		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		being a Muslim
31.		Ángeles Ramírez	voluntary		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		the adoption of a stigma symbol
32.		Ángeles Ramírez	overtly			Reaction; (+) Impact	the claimed stigma symbol
33.		Ángeles Ramírez	offensively			Reaction; (-) Impact	the communicated stigma symbol
34.	a kind of Islamisation that extends across the Muslim world	Ángeles Ramírez	extends			(+) Valuation	the kind of Islamisation

35.	the 'other conservative revolution'	Ángeles Ramírez	conservative			(-) Valuation	the revolution
36.	in which the role of new preachers has been key	Ángeles Ramírez	new		Social Esteem; (+) Normality		preachers
37.		Ángeles Ramírez	key			Valuation; (+) Social Significance	the role of new preachers
38.	a kind of Muslim aesthetic has become a topic of emerging importance	Ángeles Ramírez	emerging importance			(+) Valuation	a kind of Muslim aesthetics
39.	a fundamental key to understand hijabisation lies in the pietistic movements and their attachment to the headscarf as part of their physical representation	Ángeles Ramírez	fundamental			Reaction; (+) Impact	key to understand hijabisation
40.		Ángeles Ramírez	pietistic			(+) Valuation	movements as fundamental key to understand hijabisation
41.	Indeed, Islam, as it is experienced in a substantial part of the Muslim world – including the diaspora –	Ángeles Ramírez	a substantial part			(+) Valuation	Islam
42.	However, even when it is voluntary and responds to this type of process [...] the headscarf is always explained as a symbol of backwardness and	Ángeles Ramírez	voluntary		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		the donning of headscarf
43.		Ángeles Ramírez	a symbol of backwardness			(-) Valuation	the headscarf
44.		Ángeles Ramírez	the [symbol of]			(-) Valuation	

	the subordination of women		subordination of women				
45.	a colonial discourse	Ángeles Ramírez	colonial			(-) Valuation	the discourse
46.	The prevention of new attacks	Ángeles Ramírez	new			(+) Valuation	the attacks
47.	The <i>liberation</i> of Muslim women has become a fundamental part of the arguments supporting the different forms of this domination	Ángeles Ramírez	a fundamental part			Reaction; (+) Impact	The <i>liberation</i> of Muslim women
48.	the culmination of a situation of serious deprivation	Ángeles Ramírez	serious			(-) Valuation	the deprivation
49.	regulations that legally subordinate women in terms of their civil rights exist	Ángeles Ramírez	legally subordinate		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		the regulations
50.	The following section analyses some of the most classic cases in the Muslim world	Ángeles Ramírez	most classic				the cases in Muslim world where the hijab is compulsory
51.	where the hijab is compulsory by law	Ángeles Ramírez	compulsory				the hijab
52.	these visible measures	Ángeles Ramírez	visible			Composition; (+) Complexity	the measures
53.	dress codes [...] making the state appear ubiquitous	Ángeles Ramírez	ubiquitous		Social Esteem; (+) Normality		the state's appearance



54.	The first corresponds to the contexts of intense conflict, with open battles between different groups	Ángeles Ramírez	intense			Reaction; (-) Impact	the conflict
55.		Ángeles Ramírez	open			Reaction; (-) Impact	the battles
56.	the overarching legislative framework	Ángeles Ramírez	overarching			Composition; (+) Complexity	the legislative framework
57.	The required garments include the hijab, but also usually incorporate apparel seen as traditional and indigenous	Ángeles Ramírez	traditional and indigenous			(-) Valuation	the apparel included in the required garments
58.	so that consideration of the post-colonial nationalist framework is fundamental	Ángeles Ramírez	fundamental			Reaction; (+) Impact	the consideration of the post-colonial nationalist framework
59.	Two of the best-known cases	Ángeles Ramírez	best-known			(+) Valuation	cases
60.	The Taliban's successful advances against the <i>mujahideen</i> , beginning in 1994, were sanctioned by new decrees	Ángeles Ramírez	successful		Social Esteem; (+) Capacity		the advances of the Taliban
61.		Ángeles Ramírez	new			(+) Valuation	the decrees
62.	women were forced to dress 'decently'	Ángeles Ramírez	dress 'decently'		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the women

63.	The specific regulations on clothing were very strict	Ángeles Ramírez	very strict			Reaction; (-) Quality	The specific regulations on clothing
64.	forbidden ornaments (earrings, heels, perfume)	Ángeles Ramírez	forbidden			(-) Valuation	ornaments (earrings, heels, perfume)
65.	laughing or speaking loudly	Ángeles Ramírez	loudly		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the act of laughing and speaking
66.	the culmination of a series of rules with respect to women that	Ángeles Ramírez	go beyond		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the women
67.	go beyond the simple regulation of public morals	Ángeles Ramírez	simple		Social Esteem; (+) Normality		the regulation of public morals
68.	the harsh repression of political–religious resistance in 1979	Ángeles Ramírez	harsh			Reaction; (-) Quality	the repression of political–religious resistance
69.	the control of women is a fundamental part of their politics	Ángeles Ramírez	a fundamental part			Reaction; (+) Impact	the control of women
70.	the definitive end of colonialism	Ángeles Ramírez	definitive			(+) Valuation	the end of colonialism
71.	at the request of concerned <i>muhajabat</i>	Ángeles Ramírez	concerned	Insecurity; Disquiet; Surge (of behaviour)			the <i>muhajabat</i>
72.	the old Maghreb colonies	Ángeles Ramírez	old		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		the Maghreb colonies
73.		Ángeles Ramírez					

74.	the idea that religion in public sphere is incompatible with general regulations	Ángeles Ramírez	incompatible			Composition; (-) Complexity	the idea of religion in public sphere
75.	the embodiment of negative representations about Islam	Ángeles Ramírez	negative			Reaction; (-) Quality	representations about Islam
76.	the so-called 'Law on Secularity'	Ángeles Ramírez	so-called		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		'Law on Secularity'
77.	the rights of women who wear the hijab or niqab are endangered	Ángeles Ramírez	endangered		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the rights of women who wear the hijab or niqab
78.	the indigenous population	Ángeles Ramírez	indigenous		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		the population
79.	The countries have been exporting their so-called 'problem'	Ángeles Ramírez	so-called		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		the countries' problem
80.	a strong tradition of pluralism and tolerance	Ángeles Ramírez	strong			Composition; (+) Complexity	the tradition of pluralism and tolerance
81.	the anti-Muslim or anti-Maghreb policies of European states, which are, in short, racist	Ángeles Ramírez	racist		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the anti-Muslim or anti-Maghreb policies of European states
82.	This distinction is very interesting	Ángeles Ramírez	very interesting			Reaction; (+) Quality	This distinction
83.	the precise aim of fortifying anti-Muslimism	Ángeles Ramírez	precise			Composition; (+) Complexity	the aim of fortifying anti-Muslimism

84.	a change from the old-school Islamophobia anchored in colonial relationships to a new one	Ángeles Ramírez	old-school			(-) Valuation	the Islamophobia
85.		Ángeles Ramírez	new one			(+) Valuation	
86.	What is unique about this new situation	Ángeles Ramírez	unique			(+) Valuation	the situation
87.		Ángeles Ramírez	new			(+) Valuation	
88.	the case of contemporary Islam	Ángeles Ramírez	contemporary			(+) Valuation	Islam
89.	an oppositional hegemonic bloc which includes intellectual elites and the consumerist masses, as well as 'real' violent racists	Ángeles Ramírez	oppositional			Composition; (-) Balance	the hegemonic bloc
90.		Ángeles Ramírez	intellectual		Social Esteem; (+) Capacity		the elites
91.		Ángeles Ramírez	consumerist		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the masses
92.		Ángeles Ramírez	violent		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the racists
93.	the strange political and social alliances	Ángeles Ramírez	strange			Reaction; (-) Quality	the political and social alliances
94.	In one of the latest studies in Europe on this issue	Ángeles Ramírez	latest			(+) Valuation	the studies in Europe on this issue
95.	the concept of intersectionality as initially developed by Crenshaw is a useful one	Ángeles Ramírez	useful one			(+) Valuation	the concept of intersectionality

96.	The paradigm of intersectionality is also valuable	Ángeles Ramírez	valuable			(+) Valuation	The paradigm of intersectionality
97.	The result is that Muslim women experience racism in different terms than Muslim men, just as they experience sexism differently than non-Muslim women	Ángeles Ramírez	differently		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		the racism experienced by Muslim women
98.	the basis of a significant proportion of the arguments used in debates on the headscarf and niqab across Europe	Ángeles Ramírez	significant			(+) Valuation	the proportion of the arguments
99.	the most commonly used discursive bases for banning Islamic garb	Ángeles Ramírez	commonly			(+) Valuation	the discursive bases used for banning Islamic garb
100.		Ángeles Ramírez	discursive			Composition; (-) Complexity	the bases for banning Islamic garb
101.	the hijab or the niqab is an essential part of the construction of the exotic subalternity of Muslim women	Ángeles Ramírez	essential part			(+) Valuation	the hijab and niqab
102.		Ángeles Ramírez	exotic subalternity		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		the hijab and niqab as an essential part in Muslim women's construction

103.	the dominant social and legislative regulations	Ángeles Ramírez	dominant			Composition; (+) Complexity	the social and legislative regulations
104.	this negative image of Muslim women [...] which is discursive and [...] is configured as an important social practice	Ángeles Ramírez	negative			(-) Valuation	the image of Muslim women
105.		Ángeles Ramírez	discursive			Composition; (-) Complexity	the negative image of Muslim women
106.		Ángeles Ramírez	important			Valuation; (+) Social Significance	
107.	it legitimises everyday discrimination	Ángeles Ramírez	everyday			(-) Valuation	the discrimination
108.	A negative response	Ángeles Ramírez	negative			(-) Valuation	the response
109.	one could calmly respond 'no'	Ángeles Ramírez	calmly		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		how one responds
110.	Regulations on the headscarf add a twist to this, because both the laws that ban its use and those that require it are applied to bodies that are constructed as inferior and subaltern	Ángeles Ramírez	inferior and subaltern			Social Esteem; (-) Normality	the laws that ban and require headscarf
111.	the subaltern place of women in the social order	Ángeles Ramírez	subaltern			Social Esteem; (-) Normality	the place of women
112.	The key concept	Ángeles Ramírez	key			Valuation; (+) Social Significance	The concept

113.	They determine who is on one side or the other of the boundary of citizenship that separates 'good' women from 'bad' women	Ángeles Ramírez	'good'		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the women
114.		Ángeles Ramírez	'bad'		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		
115.	bad patriots and bad Muslims	Ángeles Ramírez	bad		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the patriots and Muslims
116.	The headscarf is becoming a fundamental instrument	Ángeles Ramírez	fundamental instrument			Reaction; (+) Impact	The headscarf
117.	the pressing need to legislate as many aspects of life as possible	Ángeles Ramírez	pressing			(-) Valuation	the need to legislate as many aspects of life as possible
118.	Regulating the headscarf becomes a visible device	Ángeles Ramírez	visible			Composition; (+) Complexity	the device
119.	a precarious situation	Ángeles Ramírez	precarious			Reaction; (-) Quality	the situation
120.	there are special situations	Ángeles Ramírez	special			Reaction; (+) Quality	the situations

No	Words, Phrases, Clauses and Sentences	Monogloss	Heterogloss	
			Contract	Expand
1.	Control of the female body is a key component of both the formation of Muslim identities and the control of Muslim communities in European countries.	√		
2.	I will argue that the regulation of the clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, share the same goal: the control of women's bodies.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
3.	In this respect, I will consider both the legal regulations that require women to wear the so-called 'Muslim' clothing and those that restrict it as a way of disciplining the population, and will focus on the control of women as a privileged form of political control.	√		
4.	In 2010 in Madrid a teenage girl was expelled from secondary school for wearing a hijab, or Muslim headscarf, while laws were being debated in Europe about banning the niqab.	√		
5.	Although they only had a direct impact on girls who wore the hijab ( <i>muhajabat</i> ) and the niqab ( <i>munaqabat</i> ), they affected the entire community since this offensive damaged representations of Islam in general.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
6.	Almost five thousand kilometres away from Madrid, in Iran, a group of political leaders launched an initiative against vice which basically entailed stiffening the dress code for women and even cracking down on suntans.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	



7.	Somewhat closer, in Gaza, girls who wanted to go to university were required to wear headscarves	√		
8.	There appears to be a similarity here to the efforts to ban or restrict headscarves for Muslim women in Europe	√		
9.	Why did this compulsive urge to ban headscarves emerge in Europe when the exact opposite was taking place in many Muslim countries?	√		
10.	On what were the two types of proscriptions based and what do the processes have in common	√		
11.	How do they differ?	√		
12.	This article investigates these questions, bringing together the results from several research projects carried out in different contexts and time periods on the Muslim diaspora in Europe, mainly France and Spain.	√		
13.	I will argue that the regulation of clothing worn by Muslim women, both the restriction of its use (which occurs mainly in non-Muslim countries) and the requirement to wear a particular item, share the same goal: the control of women's bodies.		√ (Proclaim – Pronounce)	
14.	Usually, questions related to the regulation of Muslim women's clothing have been examined in the scholarly literature either from the perspective of legislation that imposes it, as in Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, or from the perspective of legislation that restricts it, which is the situation in a growing number of European countries with strong Muslim minorities.	√		
15.	In general, the dominant perspectives have been legal or have analysed the regulations with regard to human rights, liberalism, the formation of national	√		

	identities or political discourse in connection with Islam.			
16.	These analyses have remained within local or national spheres.	√		
17.	The objective of this article, however, is more far-reaching.		√ (Proclaim – Concur – Concede)	
18.	I will consider both the legal regulations that require women to wear the so-called ‘Muslim’ clothing and those that restrict it as a way of disciplining the population, and will focus on the control of women as a privileged form of political control.		√ (Proclaim – Pronounce)	
19.	Muslim contexts, they establish a strong sexual and social hierarchisation,	√		
20.	while in non-Muslim contexts a sexual and ethnic stratification is created.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
21.	The fact that these regulations appear in times of intense crisis in the system reveals their importance as tools to regulate the population in preparation for exceptional measures, with heavy impositions or reductions in rights or changes to the system directly.	√		
22.	The focus of my work is on the legal restrictions of Muslim women’s clothing.	√		
23.	This article will analyse the contexts of prohibition, regulation and the imposition of Muslim clothing in Muslim and non-Muslim spheres as part of a process of extending control over women and minorities, the product of the need to legitimise neoliberal policies in much of the world, associated with a high degree of authoritarianism.	√		
24.	The first part of the paper describes the process of hijabisation that has taken place in Muslim contexts,		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	

	including situations where it is not an institutional or state imposition, but the result of a series of decisions related to religiosity.			
25.	This is followed by a review of the laws regulating women's clothing in some Muslim countries and European states.	√		
26.	In the final reflection, I attempt to explain the logic behind these restrictions within the framework of reinforcing control of women and Muslims as subaltern populations.	√		
27.	The process behind the expanded use of the hijab, or what Rema Hammami has termed hijabisation, has accompanied an increase in Muslim dress regulations.	√		
28.	The imposition of this article of clothing is one reason for its more widespread use, but not the main one.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
29.	Hijabisation generally obeys a logic unrelated to any imposition.	√		
30.	Many women began to adopt it as a militant act in the 1970s when they became involved in political action through their participation in the Islamist political projects that formed part of a belated revolt, in many places, against the violent colonial project of westernisation or as a means of political resistance.	√		
31.	As a consequence of these battles, the hijab was legitimized and many women felt more dignified and freer wearing it.	√		
32.	Islamism gave many women the opportunity to enter the public sphere, fighting for causes and in structures that did not denigrate their status.	√		

33.	As a visible sign of this political commitment, the headscarf played a fundamental role in these battles.	√		
34.	The hijab went from being a sign of submission in the eyes of colonial modernity to becoming a sign of assertiveness, and women actively appropriated it.	√		
35.	Nilüfer Göle draws on Erving Goffman's concept of stigma to argue that Islamism can be seen as a political and collective form of the 'management of spoiled identity' since, as a social movement, Islamism encourages political actors to voluntarily adopt the religious attributes that are considered potentially discrediting from the point of view of the normative framework of a modern culture. Islamist movements turn the 'undesired differentness' of being a Muslim into a voluntary adoption of a stigma symbol that is overtly claimed and offensively communicated in public.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
36.	For some authors, this process corresponds to a kind of Islamisation that extends across the Muslim world, including the diaspora.	√		
37.	The process has been called, to paraphrase the North American neocon offensive, the 'other conservative revolution', in which the role of new preachers has been key.	√		
38.	With the support of the media, they contributed to the extension of certain models of public morality, both within and outside of Muslim countries.	√		
39.	This embodiment of the Islamic female has been on the increase in recent years, during which time the processes of globalisation have modified Islam, explicitly influencing the question of the headscarf, and a kind of Muslim aesthetic has become a topic of emerging importance.	√		

40.	Scholars speak of market Islam ( <i>Islam de marché</i> ), Islamic gentrification and Islam and commodification.	√		
41.	Market Islam has enabled Islamic consumption, marketing strategies for these products, and the creation of a Muslim body.	√		
42.	In a quite different vein, Mahmood argues that a fundamental key to understand hijabisation lies in the pietistic movements and their attachment to the headscarf as part of their physical representation.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
43.	Indeed, Islam, as it is experienced in a substantial part of the Muslim world – including the diaspora – is a strongly embodied religion,		√ (Proclaim – Pronounce)	
44.	according to the concept established by Thomas Csordas.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
45.	Women fill the sphere of this embodiment.	√		
46.	Representations of Muslim women’s bodies lie at the centre of Islam’s relations with the Western world where ways to control Muslim populations include the control of the bodies of a segment of the population.	√		
47.	However, even when it is voluntary and responds to this type of process, from the Western point of view, the headscarf is always explained as a symbol of backwardness and the subordination of women.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
48.	It formed part of the construction of a colonial discourse that differentiated the coloniser from the colonised,	√		
49.	and even today [it] continues to dominate relationships with Muslims.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
50.	The threat of Islamic terrorism, especially after 9/11, intensified the rejection of Muslims.	√		

51.	The prevention of new attacks has been used as a pretext for military intervention in the Muslim world and to impose regulations on the Muslim population residing in Europe.	√		
52.	The liberation of Muslim women has become a fundamental part of the arguments supporting the different forms of this domination, and the construction of these women coming out of Europe is based on a representation of the body that includes the hijab.	√		
53.	The headscarf – followed by the niqab – concentrates the entire construction of Muslim alterity in the West, and it has become an object that structures a large part of the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in the world.	√		
54.	It appears in very different discourses in politics, feminisms, municipal management, discussions of human rights and the question of the presence of Muslim girls in schools.	√		
55.	The main argument for banning its use is the liberation of women.	√		
56.	At times, however, the process of hijabisation is the result of state imposition, as the state passes laws that require that women – almost never men – to wear what is considered Muslim clothing.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
57.	Some Muslim countries have legal regulations regarding dress codes for women.	√		
58.	By the time these regulations are enacted, women's rights have usually been considerably reduced and the dress code is merely the culmination of a situation of serious deprivation; the clothing restrictions are just one more element of domination.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	

59.	In many cases, regulations that legally subordinate women in terms of their civil rights exist and women cannot always decide whom they will marry, travel alone, or pass on their nationality to their descendants.		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
60.	The following section analyses some of the most classic cases in the Muslim world where the hijab is compulsory by law and relates these regulations to larger social and political contexts.	√		
61.	On a number of occasions, hijabisation is directly imposed by a state that presents itself as Muslim.	√		
62.	Usually, these visible measures form part of a larger package of what could be called ‘gender politics’, a type of socio-legislative system that constructs a model of society in which the woman question is central.	√		
63.	While many regulations and gender politics are used to socially construct the model of a woman,		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
64.	dress codes give state interventions immense visibility, making the state appear ubiquitous and able to exercise its control in all places.	√		
65.	There are two types of situations in which hijabisation occurs by imposition.	√		
66.	The first corresponds to the contexts of intense conflict, with open battles between different groups.	√		
67.	In this case, dress codes are applied in specific areas or cities using circulars or local media that may contradict the overarching legislative framework.	√		
68.	Examples include Indonesia, Chechnya, Sudan, Nigeria and Palestine.	√		
69.	In the second situation, laws regulating clothing are decreed from the highest judicial levels, which can	√		

	legislate sanctions and use security forces to make sure they are applied effectively.			
70.	Between these two positions runs an entire gamut of possibilities regarding the means of pressure and the type of clothing prescribed.	√		
71.	The required garments include the hijab, but also usually incorporate apparel seen as traditional and indigenous, so that consideration of the post-colonial nationalist framework is fundamental.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
72.	Two of the best-known cases involving the imposition of a dress code are Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.	√		
73.	The regulation of women’s bodies as a political obsession began in Afghanistan in the camps – controlled by the CIA and Pakistani secret services – of Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the 1970s, where the <i>mujahideen</i> were being trained to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.	√		
74.	Fatwas were used to control the women in the camps who, in the absence of men, could not contact with anyone and were required to wear a hijab.		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
75.	The Taliban’s successful advances against the mujahideen, beginning in 1994, were sanctioned by new decrees that restricted some women’s rights.	√		
76.	For instance, under the Taliban, women were forced to dress ‘decently’, wearing a <i>chadari</i> (called a burqa in Arabic), and could not leave the house unless accompanied by a <i>mahram</i> .	√		
77.	The specific regulations on clothing were very strict and included edicts concerning the colour and thickness of the <i>chadari</i> as well as forbidden ornaments (earrings, heels, perfume), rendering the woman on the street invisible.	√		



78.	These measures formed part of an enormous collection of laws regulating the status of women during the Taliban period in the areas under their control.	√		
79.	In addition to the regulation of clothing, other measures prohibited working and studying, wearing make-up, speaking with non- <i>mahram</i> men, laughing or speaking loudly and being seen through the windows of their homes.	√		
80.	After the fall of the Taliban, Hamid Karzai's government modified only the discourse about women; the real situation did not change, due to agreements between Karzai and the local notables who promoted discrimination and continue to do so.	√		
81.	However, despite the importance of the repression embodied by the burqa, for many critics the representation of Afghan women as solely victims of Taliban violence as represented by the burqa only serves to emphasise racism and imperialism.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
82.	Saudi Arabia offers a second case of clothing regulation.	√		
83.	Women there must wear a niqab, and the only parts of their bodies that they can show that are not <i>awrah</i> , are their hands and eyes.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
84.	The only garment that women are seen wearing is the abaya, a large, loose tunic with long sleeves.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
85.	Clothing regulations in Saudi Arabia, as in other places, are the culmination of a series of rules with respect to women that go beyond the simple regulation of public morals.	√		
86.	Included among the measures that followed the harsh repression of political-religious resistance in	√		

	1979, they were designed to restrain Western influence in Saudi Arabia.			
87.	From the state's point of view, it was much easier, politically speaking, to demonstrate anti-westernisation using the woman question than by targeting businesses, relations with the United States or consumption by the royal family.	√		
88.	An institution, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (known by its first word in Arabic, HAIA) was even created and staffed by a group of volunteers or <i>mutawain</i> who act as a moral police force, ensuring that women follow the rules, which have proliferated and continually contradicted existing ones.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
89.	These regulations include the requirement to travel with the written permission of a guardian or tutor and a ban on working in most jobs, talking to strangers, browsing the internet if not in the presence of their <i>mahram</i> , wearing hijabs with prints or decoration, making commercial transactions without their <i>mahram</i> , having an identity card without their <i>mahram's</i> authorisation, allowing their face to be photographed and driving.	√		
90.	In Muslim countries where these types of regulations exist, the control of women is a fundamental part of their politics, and women's bodies are defined by dissidents as a site of resistance against power.	√		
91.	Dress codes are the culmination of social policies that define a citizenship of gender based on specific legislation that draws the body; therefore, the definition of the body becomes the definition of citizenship for women.	√		

92.	Moreover, this occurs publicly and permanently, since the application of dress codes requires public, police and parapolice control that authorises any male member of the community to enforce compliance.	√		
93.	This means that any man can act as a moral judge of women's bodies, something that reinforces female subordination and vulnerability.	√		
94.	While some Muslim states require women to wear Muslim clothing, others restrict its use.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
95.	This is the case with most European countries.	√		
96.	The following section provides an overview of legislation regarding clothing in Europe and discusses how the processes leading to these restrictions took place with respect to Muslim states.	√		
97.	The 'headscarf problem' emerged in Europe in the 1980s.	√		
98.	Those years coincided with an increase in the role of Islam in political mobilisation both on the continent and beyond.	√		
99.	After the definitive end of colonialism as a form of political and administrative domination, transnational migrations led to the consolidation of a subaltern population within European borders.	√		
100.	The whole legal and media debate regarding the headscarf resulted in a re-inscribing of the Muslim population – almost always of immigrant origin – as a place of submission, and its construction as subject to regulation because of certain cultural essences attributed to it.	√		
101.	The debate has arisen in France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Spain and Sweden, among other places.	√		

102.	In almost all European countries, the solution to the ‘hijab problem’ has been the drafting or re-drafting of laws or regulations limiting the use of the hijab in certain public situations or establishments.	√		
103.	On occasion, at the request of concerned <i>muhajabat</i> , the European Court of Human Rights has intervened, almost always taking the side of the governments.	√		
104.	From the beginning, the entire question in Europe has been appropriated from or infected by the structure of the French <i>affaire du foulard</i> , which, of course, was defined by local issues, including relations with the immigrants from the old Maghreb colonies, particularly Algeria, and their descendants.		√ (Proclaim – Concur – Affirm)	
105.	In each country, the legal framework for controlling attire varies.	√		
106.	Prohibitions or restrictions in Europe have been established within the margins allowed by law.	√		
107.	These laws, which regulate the spaces for religion and difference in society, vary from country to country.	√		
108.	Each one has its own systems for regulating immigration and Islam and different incorporation models.	√		
109.	In each country, the management of Islam is explained from this intersection, and regulating the hijab is approached within this context.	√		
110.	The arguments on which the laws and regulations have been based are very different in nature, ranging from the idea that religion in the public sphere is incompatible with general regulations, to the construction of the headscarf as discriminatory for women or as a reflection of isolation, etc.	√		

111.	However, they all agree that the hijab – the embodiment of negative representations about Islam – is a social threat.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
112.	No correlation can be established between the percentage of Muslims in the total population and the existence and stiffness of the regulations.		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
113.	While Spain is the country with almost the lowest percentage of Muslims, it was one of the first to deliberate regulations regarding the niqab and it applies them in some municipalities.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
114.	Furthermore, the municipalities that have banned the veil are not the ones with the highest percentage of immigrants.	√		
115.	In fact, one of them Tarrés has no immigrants or Muslims, but the ban has been discussed.		√ (Proclaim – Pronounce)	
116.	France was the pioneer, banning the hijab in schools through the enactment of Law 2004–228, the so-called ‘Law on Secularity’, which regulates the use of any symbols or attire that show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools.	√		
117.	In 2010, Law 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010 was enacted, banning the niqab in all public French spaces.	√		
118.	Belgium was expected to enact a similar law regarding the niqab and some cities and municipalities in Catalonia began to ban it in 2010.	√		
119.	Until laws are enacted, these issues usually hang in a real legal limbo, resulting in a situation in which the rights of women who wear the hijab or niqab are endangered.	√		

120.	The trend in European countries is towards placing greater restrictions on the presence of Islamic garb in public spaces, including the street.	√		
121.	Measures have been stiffened, particularly since the economic crisis of 2008, as a way to channel the social discontent felt in broad sectors of the indigenous population.	√		
122.	The terrorist acts carried out by al-Qaeda networks in Europe have added additional arguments in support of the measures.	√		
123.	Generally speaking, despite the diversity of relations between different religions and states, the discourses and objectives of the regulations do not vary much.	√		
124.	The countries have been exporting their so-called 'problem' along with the most exclusionary solutions for the population.	√		
125.	Up to now, countries with a strong tradition of pluralism and tolerance and those that are markedly religious have refrained from enacting regulations.	√		
126.	The main issue is that prohibitionist policies, with their supporting arguments, are merely manifestations of the anti-Muslim or anti-Maghreb policies of European states, which are, in short, racist and are implemented with ever greater impunity.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
127.	Islamophobia rules over relationships with Muslims in Europe,	√		
128.	although according to Fred Halliday, it would be more correct to speak of anti-Muslimism, since the term 'involves not so much hostility to Islam as a religion...but hostility to Muslims, to communities of people whose sole or main religion is Islam and			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)

	whose Islamic character, real or invented, forms one of the objects of prejudice’.			
129.	This distinction is very interesting, since hostility towards Muslims at times circumvents Islam, with the precise aim of fortifying anti-Muslimism.	√		
130.	Studies in Europe speak of a change from the old-school Islamophobia anchored in colonial relationships to a new one, linked to attacks and the identification of Islam with terrorism.	√		
131.	What is unique about this new situation with Islam, for Pnina Werbner, is that what we have, then, uniquely in the case of contemporary Islam, is an oppositional hegemonic bloc which includes intellectual elites and the consumerist masses, as well as ‘real’ violent racists, like members of the British National Party, who exploit anti-Muslim discourses to target Muslims in particular (as statistics show) for racial attacks.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
132.	members of the British National Party, who exploit anti-Muslim discourses to target Muslims in particular (as statistics show) for racial attacks.			√ (Attribute – Endorse)
133.	This definition is perfectly illustrated by the strange political and social alliances formed in the debates and discussions on banning the headscarf and niqab.	√		
134.	In one of the latest studies in Europe on this issue, Fernando Bravo López argued that Islamophobia is a reaction to the emancipation of Muslims in Europe, designed to reverse its effects and legitimize inequality.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
135.	In this respect, according to this author, the comparison with anti-Semitism offers quite a useful platform for analysis.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)

136.	A very specific and at times contradictory construction of Muslim women forms part of anti-Muslimism.	√		
137.	From this perspective, the concept of intersectionality as initially developed by Crenshaw is a useful one.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
138.	This author holds that the subordination of Black women is not limited to the interaction of gender and race.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
139.	The ‘intersectional experience’ reaches far beyond the sum of racism and sexism.	√		
140.	Thus, only an analysis that considers the intersectionality of the two contexts of domination can account for Black women’s experience of subordination.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
141.	The paradigm of intersectionality is also valuable when considering the domination – using the legal regulation of clothing – of Muslim women, replacing race with Muslimness.	√		
142.	The subordination of Muslim women can only be understood within a framework that considers the interrelationships between sexism (inside Muslim communities as well as with respect to non-Muslims) and anti-Muslim racism or Islamophobia.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
143.	In both cases, the identity politics are based on the bodies of Muslim women by means of hyper-regulation.	√		
144.	The result is that Muslim women experience racism in different terms than Muslim men, just as they experience sexism differently than non-Muslim women.	√		
145.	Usually, the Islamophobic image of women is that of submission and subordination combined with		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	



	ignorance, although they sometimes become accomplices in the fundamentalist threat.			
146.	Some authors have used the term ‘gendered Islamophobia’ to define this process.			√ (Attribute – Distance)
147.	The condition of backwardness and subordination ascribed to these women has served to present their male companions as authoritarians and abusers.	√		
148.	This makes it possible to justify a long series of events in the relationship between East and West, from the French occupation of Algeria to the invasion of Afghanistan.	√		
149.	Gendered Islamophobia also forms the basis of a significant proportion of the arguments used in debates on the headscarf and niqab across Europe.	√		
150.	The persistence of the subalternity of these women and the excuse of freeing them from the male-Muslim yoke have become the most commonly used discursive bases for banning Islamic garb.	√		
151.	This is due to the fact that the hijab or the niqab is an essential part of the construction of the exotic subalternity of Muslim women.	√		
152.	It is important to remember that in Europe, legal limitations and dress codes apply to only the half the population they are designed to control, that is women.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
153.	Under these regulations, women wearing Islamic garb have only partial access to citizenship.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
154.	The legal regulations merely serve as a <i>de facto</i> sanction of a situation, since the women are already marginalized for wearing headscarves.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	

155.	Thus, in the ‘Europe of Rights’, Muslim women are doubly discriminated against, by virtue of their sex and their Muslimness.	√		
156.	Their reified cultural difference reinforces their gender difference, constructing a strongly gendered citizenship.	√		
157.	In the different cases, the prohibitions against the hijab and niqab express an idea of who can be a citizen in this territory and how.	√		
158.	They all establish a boundary between being and non-being, because the clothing is defined as the carrier of values that run contrary to those of the country and to maintaining social peace.	√		
159.	In these definitions, women bear the burden of complying or not with these citizenship demands through the immediate, visual examination of their clothing.	√		
160.	Their load is doubly heavy because it arises, on the one hand, from the dominant social and legislative regulations in the country where they live and, on the other, from their cultural community of reference.	√		
161.	There is no counter-discourse in the public sphere to balance this negative image of Muslim women against the racism of the elites [...] is configured as an important social practice that results in specific types of inequality, is able to confirm and disseminate generalised ideologies and prejudices, and it legitimises everyday discrimination.		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
162.	the racism of the elites, which is discursive and, according to the definition established by Teun Van Dijk, is configured as an important social practice that results in specific types of inequality,			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)

163.	Highly regarded male and female writers have put their pens at the service of this anti-Muslimism, sanctioning what a great number of people think.	√		
164.	This has only been reinforced by the economic crisis that began in 2008.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
165.	In 1989, Pierre Bourdieu said in response to the first headscarf affair in France that its emergence made it possible for many intellectuals – whom he labelled gurus – to express inexcusable positions regarding the question of immigration, hiding behind the defence of great principles like freedom, secularism and women’s liberation.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
166.	In his thinking, the question about whether or not to allow the headscarf in French public schools hid the real issue, which was whether immigrants of North African origin should be accepted in France.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
167.	Answering ‘no’ to the first question resolved the second one as well.	√		
168.	A negative response to the second question would have been indefensible, but when formulated in terms of the first, one could calmly respond ‘no’.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
169.	Almost 23 years later, Bourdieu’s assessment still serves to explain the regulation of the headscarf and niqab across Europe.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
170.	Since the sixteenth century, the question of veiling and unveiling has been a political one, both in inter and intracultural relations: it entails the domination of women.	√		
171.	Regulations on the headscarf add a twist to this, because both the laws that ban its use and those that require it are applied to bodies that are constructed as inferior and subaltern and can legitimately be regulated.	√		

172.	Inscribing laws onto the body in this way expresses and reinforces the subaltern place of women in the social order.	√		
173.	Women, as well as their bodies, are the symbolic places where societies engrave their moral order.	√		
174.	The key concept is the normativisation of the body, in the sense of applying rules that, as with the normativisation processes with languages, <i>normalise</i> the body.	√		
175.	Dress codes are designed to normativise the female body and define a classification system for women, as occurred in the Middle Ages when women's clothing was regulated.	√		
176.	They determine who is on one side or the other of the boundary of citizenship that separates 'good' women from 'bad' women.	√		
177.	Bad women who challenge the prohibition of the headscarf are defined as non-citizens, because their bodies have values that run contrary to the citizenship inscribed onto them.	√		
178.	The other bad women, those who challenge the requirement to wear a headscarf, are bad patriots and bad Muslims.	√		
179.	This does not only refer to legislative regulations, but also refer to the dozens of rules and restrictions to which the bodies of Muslim women must adapt.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
180.	The regulation – both legal and social – of the headscarf and niqab occupies a central place in the exercise of male and colonial control, since it goes to the heart of the domination of Muslims by controlling women's bodies.	√		
181.	All of this is conducted by means of discourses, rules, regulations and recommendations that	√		

	construct a model of normative gender, of <i>how</i> women should be.			
182.	The headscarf is becoming a fundamental instrument, firstly in the creation of a female essence that must be governed and, secondly, in the control of Muslims as a group.	√		
183.	The first situation is seen in many Muslim countries, where the headscarf is used to control women.	√		
184.	The second is found in relation to Muslim communities that have settled in countries of immigration, where they are subject to discursive and normative practices that make them objects of regulation by the majority society.	√		
185.	The tendency to create laws that sanction a social order and the pressing need to legislate as many aspects of life as possible focus, especially in the West, on immigrants and, in Muslim countries, on women.	√		
186.	The legal system intensifies the sense of domination and control.	√		
187.	It also establishes a broad swath of the population that is potentially outside the law, formed, in the West, by all Muslim women, even those who have never considered wearing a hijab, and in Muslim countries, by all women.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
188.	Regulating the headscarf becomes a visible device that underpins the inequality between <i>them</i> and <i>us</i> .	√		
189.	The normativisation of the body of the <i>other</i> reveals the relationship of domination, since it imposes an image that the subject must resemble or assimilate: <i>one must not</i> or <i>one must</i> wear a headscarf.			√ (Entertain)

190.	Women are presented as being in a precarious situation, constantly on the border where legal meets illegal.	√		
191.	Cases from the Muslim diaspora where the hijab is restricted also portray this <i>culture of the other</i> as backward, because the headscarf becomes the representation of the inequality between men and women.	√		
192.	All the stereotypes about Muslims are brought up to date here.	√		
193.	Finally, these cases serve to show that regulation 'liberates' or saves women from the men in their own culture and present the imposition of the dress code as a triumph of civilisation over barbarism.	√		
194.	The woman in the headscarf does not look like <i>us</i> ; therefore, she must be assimilated, and the scarf torn from her head.			√ (Entertain)
195.	In the Muslim world, regulations that require that women wear Muslim garb also compel their guardians to supervise them, which establishes a strong sexual hierarchisation.	√		
196.	Thus, the dress code regulation reinforces the patriarchy of which it is a product.	√		
197.	Regulations have brought about moments of change in the political and economic model in Muslim countries, deflecting clashes between classes to clashes between men and women.	√		
198.	Moreover, penalising the public presence of women and bolstering a particular ideal of domestic femininity leaves poor, working women in a very vulnerable place in terms of exploitation, since they have little value as women in light of these regulations.	√		

199.	The regulations that restrict Muslim attire in Europe have intensified since the so-called ‘economic crisis’ of 2008.	√		
200.	Their application has made it possible to reinforce the image of Muslims as bearers of a savage, discriminatory culture, establishing continuity with the colonial policies of the former powers, which constructed their arguments in the same way, justifying the subalternity of Muslims.	√		
201.	This discourse works on behalf of Islamophobia, which seeks to maintain the Muslim population in a subordinate position, without rights and unemancipated.	√		
202.	The law regulates that which is most intimate: the body.	√		
203.	The effect of these disciplinary measures has reverberations not only among male and female Muslims, but also throughout entire populations.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
204.	The idea that there are special situations in which some boundaries can be crossed creates the conditions that allow states to impose various types of policies and restrictions, deflecting the general discontent resulting from a deterioration in living conditions brought about by the crisis to what is presented as a culture clash between Muslims and non-Muslims.	√		

No	Words, Phrases, Clauses and Sentences	Graduation	
		Focus	Force
1.	they affected the entire community since this offensive damaged representations of Islam in general.		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
2.	Almost five thousand kilometres away from Madrid, in Iran,	√ (Sharpen)	
3.	a group of political leaders launched an initiative against vice which basically entailed stiffening the dress code for women and even cracking down on sunbathers.		√ (Quantification – Number)
4.	several research projects		√ (Quantification – Number)
5.	the situation in a growing number of European countries with strong Muslim minorities		√ (Quantification – Number)
6.	The objective of this article, however, is more far-reaching.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
7.	heavy impositions or reductions		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
8.	high degree of authoritarianism		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
9.	the result of a series of decisions related to religiosity		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
10.	This is followed by a review of the laws regulating women's clothing in some Muslim countries and European states.		√ (Quantification – Number)
11.	The imposition of this article of clothing is one reason for its more widespread use, but not the main one.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)



			√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Space)
12.	Many women began to adopt it as a militant act in the 1970s when they became involved in political action through their participation in the Islamist political projects that formed part of a belated revolt, in many places, against the violent colonial project of westernisation or as a means of political resistance.		√ (Quantification – Number)
13.	many women felt more dignified and freer wearing it.		√ (Quantification – Number)
14.	Islamism gave many women the opportunity to enter the public sphere, fighting for causes and in structures that did not denigrate their status.		√ (Quantification – Number)
15.	For some authors, this process corresponds to a kind of Islamisation that extends across the Muslim world, including the diaspora.		√ (Quantification – Number)
16.	This embodiment of the Islamic female has been on the increase in recent years		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)
17.	during which time the processes of globalisation have modified Islam, explicitly influencing the question of the headscarf, and a kind of Muslim aesthetic has become a topic of emerging importance.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexical)
18.	In a quite different vein, Mahmood argues that a fundamental key to understand hijabisation lies in the pietistic movements and their attachment to the headscarf as part of their physical representation.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
19.	Islam [...] is a strongly embodied religion,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
20.	the headscarf is always explained as a symbol of backwardness and the subordination of women.		√

			(Intensification – Maximisation)
21.	The headscarf – followed by the niqab – concentrates the entire construction of Muslim alterity in the West,		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
22.	and it has become an object that structures a large part of the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in the world.		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
23.	It appears in very different discourses in politics, feminisms, municipal management, discussions of human rights and the question of the presence of Muslim girls in schools.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
24.	as the state passes laws that require that women – almost never men – to wear what is considered Muslim clothing.	√ (Sharpen)	
25.	Some Muslim countries have legal regulations regarding dress codes for women.		√ (Quantification – Number)
26.	By the time these regulations are enacted, women’s rights have usually been considerably reduced and the dress code is merely the culmination of a situation of serious deprivation;		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
27.	In many cases, regulations that legally subordinate women in terms of their civil rights exist and women cannot always decide whom they will marry, travel alone, or pass on their nationality to their descendants.		√ (Quantification – Number) √ (Intensification – Maximisation)
28.	The following section analyses some of the most classic cases in the Muslim world where the hijab is compulsory by law		√ (Quantification – Number) √ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
29.	larger social and political contexts		√

			(Quantification – Mass/Presence)
30.	On a number of occasions, hijabisation is directly imposed by a state that presents itself as Muslim.		√ (Quantification – Number)
			√ (Intensification – Isolation Process – Grammatical)
31.	a larger package of what could be called ‘gender politics’		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
32.	While many regulations and gender politics are used to socially construct the model of a woman,		√ (Quantification – Number)
33.	dress codes give state interventions immense visibility,		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
34.	the highest judicial levels		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
35.	the highest judicial levels, which can legislate sanctions and use security forces to make sure they are applied effectively.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
36.	Between these two positions runs an entire gamut of possibilities regarding the means of pressure and the type of clothing prescribed		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
37.	The Taliban’s successful advances against the mujahideen, beginning in 1994, were sanctioned by new decrees that restricted some women’s rights.		√ (Quantification – Number)
38.	The specific regulations on clothing were very strict		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
39.	an enormous collection of laws		√

			(Quantification – Mass/Presence)
40.	the real situation did not change	√ (Sharpen)	
41.	for many critics the representation of Afghan women as solely victims of Taliban violence as represented by the burqa only serves to emphasise racism and imperialism		√ (Quantification – Number)
42.	the <i>abaya</i> , a large, loose tunic with long sleeves		√ (Intensification – Repetition – Quality)
43.	Clothing regulations in Saudi Arabia, as in other places, are the culmination of a series of rules with respect to women that go beyond the simple regulation of public morals.		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
44.	it was much easier,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
45.	a group of volunteers or <i>mutawain</i>		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
46.	a group of volunteers or <i>mutawain</i> who act as a moral police force, ensuring that women follow the rules, which have proliferated and continually contradicted existing ones.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
47.	While some Muslim states require women to wear Muslim clothing, others restrict its use.		√ (Quantification – Number)
48.	The whole legal and media debate regarding the headscarf resulted in a re-inscribing of the Muslim population – almost always of immigrant origin – as a place of submission, and its construction as subject to regulation because of certain cultural essences attributed to it.		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)  √ (Intensification – Maximisation)

49.	In almost all European countries,	√ (Sharpen)	
50.	the European Court of Human Rights has intervened, almost always taking the side of the governments.		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
51.	From the beginning, the entire question in Europe has been appropriated from or infected by the structure of the French <i>affaire du foulard</i> ,		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)  √ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
52.	The arguments on which the laws and regulations have been based are very different in nature,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
53.	However, they all agree that the hijab – the embodiment of negative representations about Islam – is a social threat.		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
54.	While Spain is the country with almost the lowest percentage of Muslims,		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
55.	it was one of the first to deliberate regulations regarding the niqab and it applies them in some municipalities.		√ (Quantification – Number)
56.	the highest percentage of immigrants		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
57.	in broad sectors of the indigenous population		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
58.	The countries have been exporting their so-called ‘problem’ along with the most exclusionary solutions for the population.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)

59.	Up to now, countries with a strong tradition of pluralism and tolerance and those that are markedly religious have refrained from enacting regulations.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)
60.	ever greater impunity		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
61.	it would be more correct to speak of anti-Muslimism, since the term ‘involves not so much hostility to Islam as a religion...but hostility to Muslims, to communities of people whose sole or main religion is Islam and whose Islamic character, real or invented, forms one of the objects of prejudice’.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
62.	This distinction is very interesting,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
63.	uniquely in the case of contemporary Islam,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Lexicalisation)
64.	‘real’ violent racist	√ (Sharpen)	
65.	This definition is perfectly illustrated by the strange political and social alliances formed in the debates and discussions on banning the headscarf and niqab.		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
66.	In this respect, according to this author, the comparison with anti-Semitism offers quite a useful platform for analysis.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Acknowledge)
67.	A very specific and at times contradictory construction of Muslim women forms part of anti-Muslimism.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)

68.	The 'intersectional experience' reaches far beyond the sum of racism and sexism.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality - Lexical – NonFiguratively)
69.	In both cases, the identity politics are based on the bodies of Muslim women by means of hyper-regulation.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
70.	although they sometimes become accomplices in the fundamentalist threat.		√ (Intensification – Infusion – Process)
71.	Some authors have used the term 'gendered Islamophobia' to define this process.		√ (Quantification – Number)
72.	This makes it possible to justify a long series of events in the relationship between East and West, from the French occupation of Algeria to the invasion of Afghanistan.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Time)
73.	the most commonly used discursive bases for banning Islamic garb.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
74.	Thus, in the 'Europe of Rights', Muslim women are doubly discriminated against, by virtue of their sex and their Muslimness.		√ (Quantification – Number)
75.	Their reified cultural difference reinforces their gender difference, constructing a strongly gendered citizenship.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
76.	They all establish a boundary between being and non-being,		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
77.	Their load is doubly heavy		√ (Quantification – Number)
78.	Highly regarded male and female writers have put their pens at the service of this anti-Muslimism,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
79.	sanctioning what a great number of people think.		√

			(Quantification – Number)
80.	many intellectuals		√ (Quantification – Number)
81.	the defence of great principles like freedom, secularism and women’s liberation.		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
82.	the real issue, which was whether immigrants of North African origin should be accepted in France.	√ (Sharpen)	
83.	Almost 23 years later,	√ (Sharpen)	
84.	Bourdieu’s assessment still serves to explain the regulation of the headscarf and niqab across Europe.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Space)
85.	the dozens of rules and restrictions to which the bodies of Muslim women must adapt.		√ (Quantification – Number)
86.	The first situation is seen in many Muslim countries,		√ (Quantification – Number)
87.	the pressing need to legislate as many aspects of life as possible		√ (Quantification – Number)
88.	It also establishes a broad swath of the population that is potentially outside the law, formed, in the West, by all Muslim women,		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
89.	Women are presented as being in a precarious situation, constantly on the border where legal meets illegal.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
90.	a very vulnerable place in terms of exploitation,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
91.	since they have little value as women in light of these regulations.		√ (Intensification – Amount)
92.	The law regulates that which is most intimate: the body.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)



93.	throughout entire populations		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
94.	The idea that there are special situations in which some boundaries can be crossed		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)

**The Production of Acceptable Muslim Women in the United States**

By Falguni A. Sheth

No	Words, Phrases, Clauses and Sentences	Appraiser	Appraising Items	Classification of Attitude			Appraised
				Affect	Judgment	Appreciation	
1.	In this article, I explore some of the elements by which Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States are managed so as to produce and distinguish “unruly” from “good” Muslim female citizens within the context of American liberalism.	Falguni A. Sheth	“unruly”		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the Muslim female citizens
2.		Falguni A. Sheth	“good”		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		
3.	a laissez-faire approach, which relies on a range of public and private institutions to determine acceptable public presentations of the liberal female subject.	Falguni A. Sheth	acceptable			(+) Valuation	the public presentations of the liberal female subjects
4.	popular political discourses and domestic events	Falguni A. Sheth	popular			(+) Valuation	the political discourses
5.		Falguni A. Sheth	domestic			Reaction; (+) Impact	the events

6.	the boundaries that allow “suitable Muslim women” in the public sphere	Falguni A. Sheth	suitable		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the Muslim women
7.	Elsewhere, I have argued that Muslim women who don the hijab, particularly within the last decade, are construed as unruly subjects within the context of a Western liberal regime.	Falguni A. Sheth	unruly subjects		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the Muslim women who don the hijab
8.	Unruly subjects are those who are perceived to actively violate the ideal of the good (liberal) citizen.	Falguni A. Sheth	actively violate		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the Unruly subjects
9.		Falguni A. Sheth	good		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the (liberal) citizen
10.	The particular infraction of women who wear the hijab is their conspicuously heterogeneous comportment—openly subscribing to “Muslim” or “Islamic” culture.	Falguni A. Sheth	heterogeneous			(-) Valuation	the comportment of women who wear the hijab
11.		Falguni A. Sheth	openly			Reaction; (+) Impact	the subscription of “Muslim” or “Islamic” culture
12.	the fundamental ethos of Western liberal culture	Falguni A. Sheth	fundamental			Reaction; (+) Impact	the ethos of Western liberal culture
13.	Such practices and signs are “unruly”	Falguni A. Sheth	“unruly”		Social Sanction;		the practices and signs

	because they				(-) Propriety		
14.	conspicuously violate a dominant neutral cultural or political norm.	Falguni A. Sheth	violate		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the “unruly” practices and signs
15.		Falguni A. Sheth	dominant			Composition; (+) Complexity	the cultural and political norm
16.		Falguni A. Sheth	neutral			(+) Valuation	
17.	Secular societies, as the concrete manifestations of liberal political ideologies, are thought to be endangered by	Falguni A. Sheth	concrete			(+) Valuation	the manifestations of liberal political ideologies
18.	populations or cultures that express their moral and religious beliefs in public spaces.	Falguni A. Sheth	endangered			(-) Valuation	the Secular societies
19.	and hence the hegemonic, norm that	Falguni A. Sheth	hegemonic			(-) Valuation	the norm
20.	usurps a society’s political or social imaginary and becomes the invisible background against which cultural challenges are mounted	Falguni A. Sheth	invisible background			(-) Valuation	the hegemonic norm
21.	the aesthetic norms of that society	Falguni A. Sheth	aesthetic			Reaction; (+) Quality	the norms of that society
22.	non-Western aesthetic thought and frameworks are radically different	Falguni A. Sheth	radically different			(-) Valuation	the non-Western aesthetic thoughts and frameworks

23.	“deep translation”	Falguni A. Sheth	deep			Composition; (+) Complexity	the translation
24.	that translation is unattainable	Falguni A. Sheth	unattainable			Composition; (-) Complexity	the translation
25.	The unruly figure or group,	Falguni A. Sheth	unruly		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the figure and group
26.	a necessary political defense against “Islamic terrorism”	Falguni A. Sheth	necessary			(+) Valuation	the political defense
27.	<i>As such, to subscribe visibly to Islam is to always already be a problem.</i>	Falguni A. Sheth	visibly		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the subscription to Islam
28.	there may be a widespread racial–sexual assumption that	Falguni A. Sheth	subservient		Social Esteem; (-) Tenacity		the Muslim women
29.	Muslim women, by the dictates of a (seemingly) monolithic Islam, are subservient, oppressed, and thereby unthreatening.	Falguni A. Sheth	oppressed		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		
30.		Falguni A. Sheth	unthreatening		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		
31.	The need to save Muslim women—from themselves, from “their” men, from their “oppressive culture”—had been in existence well before Bush’s declaration.	Falguni A. Sheth	oppressive		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the Muslim women’s culture

32.	these backward cultures need to be transformed if not altogether destroyed	Falguni A. Sheth	backward		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the cultures
33.	Fanon offers an illuminating, provocative discussion of the insistence on wearing the haïk and why it is a threat—a challenge—to the colonizer:	Falguni A. Sheth	illuminating			Reaction; (+) Impact	the discussion of the insistence on wearing the haïk and why the haïk is a threat
34.		Falguni A. Sheth	provocative			Reaction; (-) Impact	
35.	even as the French empire focused on the bodies of veiled Muslim women as vehicles that symbolized the fetishized object of oppression and potential liberation,	Falguni A. Sheth	fetishized object of oppression and potential liberation			(-) Valuation	the bodies of veiled Muslim women
36.	Algerian women challenged the French's attempt to conquer them by remaining inaccessible, and unconquerable	Falguni A. Sheth	inaccessible, and unconquerable		Social Esteem; (-) Capacity		the Algerian women
37.	the veiled Algerian woman may be read as abiding	Falguni A. Sheth	abiding		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		the veiled Algerian woman
38.	In the latter mode, the veil can be read and addressed as both a	Falguni A. Sheth	practical resistance			Composition; (+) Complexity	the veil

39.	practice of resisting French liberal– imperial aesthetics of secular dress as well as a practical revolutionary resistance.	Falguni A. Sheth	revolutionary resistance			(+) Valuation	
40.	the figure of the veiled Muslim women was both in need of saving and also received in conjunction with the countervailing fear of her threatening insurgent capacities	Falguni A. Sheth	countervailing		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the veiled Muslim women’s fear
41.		Falguni A. Sheth	threatening insurgent		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		
42.	Fanon’s incisive observations are still surprisingly astute.	Falguni A. Sheth	incisive		Social Esteem; (+) Capacity		Fanon’s observations
43.		Falguni A. Sheth	astute		Social Esteem; (+) Capacity		
44.	In contemporary France, Muslim women have continued to face extensive, explicit, and continuous challenges to their visible public commitments to their faith and culture.	Falguni A. Sheth	contemporary			(+) Valuation	France
45.		Falguni A. Sheth	extensive, explicit, and continuous			(-) Valuation	the challenges faced by Muslim women in France
46.		Falguni A. Sheth	visible			Composition; (+) Complexity	the Muslim women’s public commitments to their faith and culture

47.	“veiling was seen as <i>opposed</i> to French secular space”	Falguni A. Sheth	opposed			Reaction; (-) Quality	the veiling
48.	the visibility of the veil is connected to the racial anxiety of French society—of the impending challenge to their unmarked racial dominance, or “cultural racism”	Falguni A. Sheth	impending				the challenge to French society
49.	The representational apparatus of colonialism not only constitutes the image of the ‘native’	Falguni A. Sheth	‘native’				The image constituted by the representational apparatus of colonialism
50.	France’s sordid history of colonialism	Falguni A. Sheth	sordid				the history of France’s colonialism
51.	The treatment of hijabis in the French context contrasts starkly with the United States’s approach.	Falguni A. Sheth	contrasts starkly		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		The treatment of hijabis in the French context
52.	conspicuous religious symbols	Falguni A. Sheth	conspicuous			Reaction; (+) Impact	the religious symbols
53.	One way to understand this might be found in the unique American mode of reconciling notions of individual freedom with certain	Falguni A. Sheth	unique			(+) Valuation	the American mode of reconciling notions of individual freedom



54.	persistent and subtle forms of social and political management of populations.	Falguni A. Sheth	persistent			(+) Valuation	the forms of social and political management of populations
55.		Falguni A. Sheth	subtle			Reaction; (+) Impact	
56.	The protection of religious expression nevertheless has a robust narrative in the United States, effectively creating a familiar and accepted legal framework in which to challenge attempts to ban religious practices or symbols.	Falguni A. Sheth	robust narrative			Composition; (+) Complexity	The protection of religious expression
57.		Falguni A. Sheth	familiar			Reaction; (+) Impact	
58.		Falguni A. Sheth	accepted			(+) Valuation	the legal framework
59.	It may also be the case that, in the U.S. context, effective challenges to the hijab are better leveled by illustrating how it violates some other liberal principle,	Falguni A. Sheth	effective			(+) Valuation	the challenges to the hijab
60.		Falguni A. Sheth	violates		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the hijab
61.	the hijab appears to be compatible with Constitutional principles.	Falguni A. Sheth	compatible			Composition; (+) Balance	the hijab
62.	Yet, depending upon how threatening or suitable a particular event is perceived, this	Falguni A. Sheth	threatening			Reaction; (-) Impact	the particular event
63.		Falguni A. Sheth	suitable			(+) Valuation	

	compatibility can be modulated.						
64.	The idea of managing subjects is perhaps best articulated by Michel Foucault's discussion of governmentality, whereby governing is a strategic art deployed toward certain "suitable" ends or, as Foucault says, "the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end".	Falguni A. Sheth	strategic art			(+) Valuation	the idea of governing
65.		Falguni A. Sheth	"suitable"			(+) Valuation	the certain ends
66.		Falguni A. Sheth	right			Reaction; (-) Quality	the disposition of things arranged
67.		Falguni A. Sheth	suitable			(+) Valuation	the end
68.		diverse tactics	Falguni A. Sheth	diverse			(+) Valuation
69.	it operates at the discursive level of continual iterations of the promise of American freedom, democracy, and proceduralism,	Falguni A. Sheth	discursive			Composition; (-) Complexity	the level of continual iterations
70.		Falguni A. Sheth	continual			(+) Valuation	the iterations of the promise of American freedom, democracy, and proceduralism
71.	In the interest of national security, governmentality might reflect the strategic enforcement of constitutional protections for some	Falguni A. Sheth	strategic				the enforcement of constitutional protections for some individual and populations deemed threats

	individuals, combined with the strategic privation of the same protections for populations deemed threats to national security.						to national security
72.	the United States prosecuted numerous individuals who were deemed to lend support to terrorist organizations, despite questionable evidence.	Falguni A. Sheth	questionable			Composition; (-) Complexity	the evidence of United States' prosecution towards numerous individuals who were deemed to lend support to terrorist organizations
73.	we might understand this as part of a larger ontopolitical production of suitable or unacceptable Muslims,	Falguni A. Sheth	suitable		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the ontopolitical production of Muslims
74.		Falguni A. Sheth	unacceptable		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		
75.	At another level, however, there is a dimension of governmentality that operates through a neoliberal framework, that is, by relying on laissez-faire market and ad hoc policing mechanisms that bring	Falguni A. Sheth	ad hoc			(+) Valuation	the policing mechanisms
76.		Falguni A. Sheth	transgressive			(-) Valuation	the moments of policing mechanisms
77.		Falguni A. Sheth	fair and procedural		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the society

	certain transgressive moments to light against the backdrop of a society that is seen as fair and procedural.						
78.	the “tolerable” liberal subject	Falguni A. Sheth	“tolerable”		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the liberal subject
79.	the good (female) liberal subject	Falguni A. Sheth	good		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the (female) liberal subject
80.	since there is an established framework designed to assist employees in the workplace who find themselves to be subject to religious, racial, or sexual discrimination.	Falguni A. Sheth	established			Reaction; (+) Impact	the framework to assist employees in the workplace
81.	However, the U.S. judiciary also weighs in on claims of religious discrimination by prisons in U.S. correctional facilities, although decidedly in a much more negative manner.	Falguni A. Sheth	negative		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the manner of the U.S. judiciary
82.	a subtle disciplining process	Falguni A. Sheth	subtle			Reaction; (+) Impact	the disciplining process
83.	the boundaries of acceptable public dress	Falguni A. Sheth	acceptable		Social Sanction;		the public dress

					(+) Propriety		
84.	the acceptable Muslim female subject	Falguni A. Sheth	acceptable		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the Muslim female subject
85.	I have pointed to a range of unsystematic treatments and receptions of Muslim women in order to illuminate the elastic boundaries of liberalism and the corresponding reinscriptions of the good (female liberal) citizen, which oscillate between the indifferent rejection of certain Muslim women and the accommodation of certain stylized Muslim women.	Falguni A. Sheth	unsystematic		Social Esteem; (-) Normality		the treatments and receptions of Muslim women
86.		Falguni A. Sheth	elastic			(+) Valuation	the boundaries of liberalism
87.		Falguni A. Sheth	good		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the (female liberal) citizen
88.		Falguni A. Sheth	indifferent		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the rejection of certain Muslim women
89.	The spectrum of acceptable dress at work or in public more generally for women in the United States	Falguni A. Sheth	acceptable		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the dress for women at work or in public in the United States
90.	In this collaboration, the projection of how a good liberal female citizen comports is so ubiquitous as to	Falguni A. Sheth	ubiquitous		Social Esteem; (+) Normality		the projection of how a good liberal female citizen comports

	become the invisible ether that surrounds us:						
91.	Most media depictions of the generic acceptable	Falguni A. Sheth	generic		Social Esteem; (+) Normality		the acceptable Western/liberal female subject
92.	Western/liberal female subject reflect a seemingly hegemonic dress code.	Falguni A. Sheth	acceptable		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the Western/liberal female subject
93.	low-level business women	Falguni A. Sheth	low-level			(-) Valuation	the business women
94.	Moreover, there is a certain laissez-faire attitude, with the implicit nod from the state, which permits employers and businesses to regulate the professional dress best suited to their market.	Falguni A. Sheth	best suited			(+) Valuation	the dressing of the professional
95.	“an undue hardship”	Falguni A. Sheth	undue		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the hardship
96.	This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion.	Falguni A. Sheth	reasonable		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the adjustments that is required for an employer

97.	Examples of some common religious accommodations include flexible scheduling, voluntary shift substitutions or swaps, job reassignments, and modifications to workplace policies or practices.	Falguni A. Sheth	common			(-) Valuation	the religious accommodations
98.	if it is costly, compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights of other employees, or requires other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work.	Falguni A. Sheth	hazardous			Reaction; (-) Impact	the work of other employees
99.		Falguni A. Sheth	burdensome			Reaction; (-) Quality	
100.	“an undue burden”	Falguni A. Sheth	undue		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the burden
101.	for example, placing someone in the stockroom, then deciding that such a placement is inefficient	Falguni A. Sheth	inefficient			(-) Valuation	the placement of someone in the stockroom
102.	<i>the unruly, defiant, or difficult Muslim female subject</i>	Falguni A. Sheth	unruly		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the Muslim female subject

103.		Falguni A. Sheth	defiant, or difficult		Social Esteem; (-) Tenacity		
104.	This inscription, based on the contingencies of the particular political moment, can accommodate certain kinds of visibly Muslim women—those who are acceptable—who are products of modernization to some degree, that is, who appear professional:	Falguni A. Sheth	visibly		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the Muslim women
105.		Falguni A. Sheth	acceptable		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		
106.	a mildly liberated autonomous female subject	Falguni A. Sheth	liberated		Social Esteem; (+) Capacity		the female subject
107.		Falguni A. Sheth	autonomous		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		
108.	the cooperative Muslim female citizen will be tolerated or accommodated	Falguni A. Sheth	cooperative		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		the Muslim female citizen
109.	if she can conform to certain key aesthetic principles of Western qua secular professional dress.	Falguni A. Sheth	key			Valuation; (+) Social Significance	the aesthetic principles of Western qua secular professional dress



110.	such a Muslim woman might be someone who—despite wearing the hijab—exhibits certain key traits that confirm her liberal comportment.	Falguni A. Sheth	key			Valuation; (+) Social Significance	the traits exhibited by a Muslim woman
111.	this is the standard neutral liberal expectation of citizens in the liberal polity.	Falguni A. Sheth	standard neutral			Social Esteem; (+) Normality	the liberal expectation of citizens in the liberal polity
112.	there are multiple examples of visually disabled judges or juries who must rely on audio recordings, or disabled witnesses who are not able to communicate expressively with their faces.	Falguni A. Sheth	disabled			Social Esteem; (-) Capacity	the judges, juries, and witnesses
113.	In so doing, the Muslim woman challenges the cultural hegemony that undergirds the modern liberal environment enveloping the modern liberal woman/female professional.	Falguni A. Sheth	modern			Social Esteem; (+) Normality	the liberal environment and woman/female professional
114.	Even though a refreshed politics of	Falguni A. Sheth	refreshed			(+) Valuation	the politics of national security

115.	national security in the aftermath of 9/11 is partially responsible for a dominant wariness toward Muslim women,	Falguni A. Sheth	dominant		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		the wariness toward Muslim women
116.	Yet, they also receive a certain acceptability from a significant part of the public by showing their similarities to secular women in certain visible ways.	Falguni A. Sheth	visible			Composition; (+) Complexity	the certain ways of showing the similarities between female Muslim community leaders and secular women
117.	both of whom are outspoken American Muslim women	Falguni A. Sheth	outspoken American Muslim women		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		
118.	Both women have also received ample criticisms for their outspoken advocacy of many controversial issues.	Falguni A. Sheth	outspoken		Social Esteem; (+) Tenacity		the advocacy of both women
119.	appropriate liberal feminist subjects	Falguni A. Sheth	appropriate			(+) Valuation	the liberal feminist subjects
120.	Not all hijabis are seen as suitable female subjects in liberal societies.	Falguni A. Sheth	suitable female subjects		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the hijabis
121.	Hijabis who do not have the social clout that Omar and Sarsour hold—women who are	Falguni A. Sheth	upstanding professional liberated		Social Esteem; (+) Normality		the Hijabis

	prisoners and not seen as upstanding professional liberated female subjects—		female subjects				
122.	they are then relegated to the category of the unruly, difficult, Muslim woman	Falguni A. Sheth	unruly		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the Muslim women
123.		Falguni A. Sheth	difficult		Social Esteem; (-) Tenacity		
124.	The Court's language here is rather remarkable:	Falguni A. Sheth	remarkable			Reaction; (+) Impact	The Court's language
125.	The widespread and varied treatment of Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States	Falguni A. Sheth	widespread and varied		Social Esteem; (+) Normality		the treatment of Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States
126.	This method of disciplining is consistent with the long history of liberalism,	Falguni A. Sheth	consistent			(+) Valuation	The method of disciplining
127.	and in turn vilifies the defiant subject or produces/rewards noteworthy liberal citizens.	Falguni A. Sheth	defiant		Social Sanction; (-) Propriety		the subject
128.		Falguni A. Sheth	noteworthy		Social Sanction; (+) Propriety		the liberal citizens
129.	the question of the suitable liberal subject	Falguni A. Sheth	suitable			(+) Valuation	the liberal subject
130.	a discursive relationship	Falguni A. Sheth	discursive			Composition; (-) Complexity	the relationship

131.	This complex interaction and neoliberal collaboration	Falguni A. Sheth	complex			Composition; (-) Complexity	the interaction and neoliberal collaboration
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No	Words, Phrases, Clauses and Sentences	Monogloss	Heterogloss	
			Contract	Expand
1.	In this article, I explore some of the elements by which Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States are managed so as to produce and distinguish “unruly” from “good” Muslim female citizens within the context of American liberalism.	√		
2.	Unlike the French state, which has regulated both the hijab and niqab through national legislation, the American liberal framework utilizes a laissez-faire approach, which relies on a range of public and private institutions to determine acceptable public presentations of the liberal female subject.	√		
3.	I refer to this form of management as “neoliberalism.”	√		
4.	Neoliberal management works in conjunction with popular political discourses and domestic events in ways that alternately contract and expand the boundaries that allow “suitable Muslim women” in the public sphere.	√		
5.	Elsewhere, I have argued that Muslim women who don the hijab, particularly within the last decade, are construed as unruly subjects within the context of a Western liberal regime.		√ (Proclaim – Pronounce)	
6.	Unruly subjects are those who are perceived to actively violate the ideal of the good (liberal) citizen.	√		
7.	The particular infraction of women who wear the hijab is their conspicuously	√		

	heterogeneous comportment—openly subscribing to “Muslim” or “Islamic” culture.			
8.	This breach is seen in explicit practices that are thought to contravene the fundamental ethos of Western liberal culture, namely that of political secularism.	√		
9.	. . . Such practices and signs are “unruly” because they conspicuously violate a dominant neutral cultural or political norm.	√		
10.	Secular societies, as the concrete manifestations of liberal political ideologies, are thought to be endangered by populations or cultures that express their moral and religious beliefs in public spaces.	√		
11.	Liberalism is thought as of the racial and religious unmarked, and hence the hegemonic, norm that usurps a society’s political or social imaginary and becomes the invisible background against which cultural challenges are mounted.	√		
12.	By extension, such a society dominates the aesthetic norms of that society, presenting them as the cultural default.	√		
13.	As Mickaella Perina, drawing on María Lugones’s notion of the racial state, argues, As the “racial state” classifies people according to physical characteristics, racial and racialized aesthetics classify art and artistic conceptions according to cultural characteristics.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
14.	Indeed, to believe that non-Western aesthetic thought and frameworks are radically		√ (Proclaim – Pronounce)	

	different—so different that it is a matter of “deep translation”—or that translation is unattainable, is to mark other aesthetics as culturally different while having Western aesthetics escape the mark of culture.			
15.	The unruly figure or group, by disrupting the hegemonic aesthetic norm through their public presentation or comportment, is encountered as a threat to be addressed and contained.	√		
16.	On a global level, this is how much of North America, Europe, and Australia have responded to the events of September 11, 2001, namely, through a domestic and global politics of national security.	√		
17.	In effect, national security policies are a politics of legal, social, and cultural containment through which the Western world has mounted an ever-increasing challenge to Muslims’ cultural and religious commitments, understood as a necessary political defense against “Islamic terrorism”.	√		
18.	As such, <i>to subscribe visibly to Islam is to always already be a problem.</i>	√		
19.	There may be multiple historical and political rationales behind this hostility: at some level, there may be a widespread racial–sexual assumption that Muslim women, by the dictates of a (seemingly) monolithic Islam, are subservient, oppressed, and thereby unthreatening.			√ (Entertain)
20.	Certainly, we saw the expression of this belief		√	

			(Proclaim – Concur – Affirm)	
21.	in the rhetorical motivations expressed by First Lady Laura Bush soon after 9/11.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
22.	Articulating support for her husband, then-President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Afghanistan, the First Lady pointed to the need to save Afghan women and children.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
23.	The need to save Muslim women—from themselves, from “their” men, from their “oppressive culture”—had been in existence well before Bush’s declaration.	√		
24.	The drive to save brown and black women has long been a hallmark of imperial civilizing missions.	√		
25.	The underlying message of such missions is that these backward cultures need to be transformed if not altogether destroyed—both to “advance” the colonized society as well as to remove the threat to the colonizing culture.	√		
26.	The mission to save black and brown women has been well documented in former colonized societies that were predominantly Muslim, from Egypt to North Africa.	√		
27.	As Frantz Fanon discussed in 1959, the West needed to save veiled (Algerian) woman—			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
28.	not necessarily for their own sake,		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	



29.	but in order to be able to “destroy the structure of Algerian society [and] its capacity for resistance”.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
30.	In part, the perception of threat emerged from the integral part that the haïk was thought to play in the Algerian revolution, with its instrumental ability to hide and circumvent colonial authorities.	√		
31.	Fanon offers an illuminating, provocative discussion of the insistence on wearing the haïk and why it is a threat—a challenge—to the colonizer: even as the French empire focused on the bodies of veiled Muslim women as vehicles that symbolized the fetishized object of oppression and potential liberation, Algerian women challenged the French’s attempt to conquer them by remaining inaccessible, and unconquerable by refusing the invitation to be assimilated or “liberated” sexually, socially, culturally, or politically by refusing to unconceal their beauty for Western edification.			√ (Attribute – Distance)
32.	As Monique Roelofs dissects the notion of aesthetic address of persons and things in María Lugones’s work, [m]odes of address connect persons and things in trajectories of address. Strings of address emerge that reach from persons to persons . . . from persons to things . . . from things to things (from spoon to oil, water, yolk), and from things to persons (from curdled mayonnaise to Lugones and onward to us).			√ (Attribute – Distance)

33.	Address, for Roelofs, signifies the racial, cultural, and gendered context by which a certain object or relationship between persons or things or some variant thereof, is hailed or responded to through the lens of certain constellations.			√ (Attribute – Distance)
34.	As such, the veil has multiple modalities, multiple relations to persons: the veiled Algerian woman may be read as abiding by her cultural/moral/religious commitments as well as engaging in a form of resistance.			√ (Entertain)
35.	In the latter mode, the veil can be read and addressed as both a practice of resisting French liberal–imperial aesthetics of secular dress as well as a practical revolutionary resistance.	√		
36.	As Roelofs suggests, the capacities of objects to support modes of address surpass the specific uses and conceptions human agents develop for them.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
37.	Under the colonial French administration, then, the figure of the veiled Muslim women was both in need of saving and also received in conjunction with the countervailing fear of her threatening insurgent capacities.	√		
38.	Hence, she was addressed as a victim of cultural patriarchal oppression as well as a target to be neutralized if not altogether nullified.	√		
39.	Fanon’s incisive observations are still surprisingly astute.			√ (Attribute – Distance)
40.	As global attention to potential explosive activities construed as Islamic terrorism	√		

	increases, this fear appears to increase correspondingly.			
41.	In contemporary France, Muslim women have continued to face extensive, explicit, and continuous challenges to their visible public commitments to their faith and culture.	√		
42.	The French state has banned both the hijab and niqab through national legislation, ostensibly to demarcate and protect the state's cultural emphasis on secular public citizenship.	√		
43.	As Alia Al-Saji argues, “veiling was seen as <i>opposed</i> to French secular space”.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
44.	French secular space is construed as “a specific heteronormative and heterosocial gendering of public space—constituted through particular feminine habits of dress, behaviour and <i>mixité</i> (coeducation)—was reinforced as the norm of French public space”.	√		
45.	The aesthetic norm of French public space—proudly presented as devoid of religious symbols—was imagined to be about liberal secularism.	√		
46.	Following Perina, we might argue that French public space is, again, the culturally unmarked default. As such, the foulard was addressed as a violation of that secular norm of <i>laïcité</i> .			√ (Entertain)
47.	And yet, beneath the facial discourse of violations of secularism, the visibility of the		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	

	veil is connected to the racial anxiety of French society—of the impending challenge to their unmarked racial dominance, or “cultural racism”.			
48.	As Al-Saji argues, [T]he question why the veil comes to be seen as the marker of Islamic or Algerian cultural difference brings us to the already constituted field of vision of the French observer.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
49.	This field of vision has been structured by colonialism.	√		
50.	. . . The representational apparatus of colonialism not only constitutes the image of the ‘native’		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
51.	but posits this image in opposition to a certain self-perception of colonial society and against an implicit normalization of gender within that society.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
52.	For the French, the veil is overdetermined as a racial affront, which recalls France’s sordid history of colonialism and declared attempts to “liberate” Algerian women in the name of uplifting and civilizing, as Fanon shows us all too vividly.			√ (Attribute – Distance)
53.	The battle over the veil then becomes a battle over which side will dominate: will it be the secular French looking to justify and redeem their colonial past or will it be the inferior and oppressive culture of Islam, against which the West has waged a centuries-long war?			√ (Entertain)

54.	The treatment of hijabis in the French context contrasts starkly with the United States's approach.	√		
55.	Curiously, given the ferocity of the government's War on Terror and the broad realm of Muslim men who have been detained or incarcerated without Constitutional due process over the last two decades, Muslim women have not faced similar legal or political challenges.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
56.	Nevertheless, they are still regulated and disciplined within the U.S. legal-political context in which they find themselves, but in less explicit ways than their French or other European counterparts' approach of outlawing conspicuous religious symbols.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
57.	One way to understand this might be found in the unique American mode of reconciling notions of individual freedom with certain persistent and subtle forms of social and political management of populations.			√ (Entertain)
58.	For example, there is a long history of the American state's defense of religious expression, as articulated in the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.	√		
59.	The protection of religious expression nevertheless has a robust narrative in the United States, effectively creating a familiar and accepted legal framework in which to challenge attempts to ban religious practices or symbols.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
60.	It may also be the case that, in the U.S. context, effective challenges to the hijab are			√ (Entertain)

	better leveled by illustrating how it violates some other liberal principle, such as transparency or publicity or economic profit.			
61.	As an expression of religious commitments, the hijab appears to be compatible with Constitutional principles.	√		
62.	Yet, depending upon how threatening or suitable a particular event is perceived, this compatibility can be modulated.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
63.	Especially during times of crisis, it is selectively enforced.	√		
64.	For example, Islamic fundamentalist sermons have served as evidence for charges of terrorism,	√		
65.	while Christian speech is, especially under the current administration, plentiful in government quarters.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
66.	Such an approach exemplifies the general mode by which the American state manages unruly subjects.	√		
67.	The idea of managing subjects is perhaps best articulated by Michel Foucault’s discussion of governmentality, whereby governing is a strategic art deployed toward certain “suitable” ends			√ (Attribute – Distance)
68.	or, as Foucault says, “the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end”.			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
69.	A suitable end should not be confused with the objective of sovereignty, which is the making of decisions for “the common good and the salvation of all”.	√		

70.	Rather, suitable ends are those which are “internal to the things [government] directs ( <i>diriger</i> ); it is to be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs, and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than laws”.	√		
71.	The higher judiciary decides whether it will consider a claim of procedural or constitutional violation.	√		
72.	The American legal system relies heavily on judicial review to gauge whether contested actions conform to constitutional precepts.	√		
73.	In so doing, the judiciary continually engages and revises doctrinal lawmaking and, in so doing, recycles new iterations of liberalism and the liberal subject.	√		
74.	Thus, claims that are considered (or not) with regard to Muslim women do not address the hijab per se,		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
75.	but whether the contested action violates the rights of the liberal (female) subject not to be discriminated against, or whether it violates public security.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
76.	In this way, the American address of Muslim women is to evaluate Muslim women’s claims to religious expression—most often in the workplace, since there is an established framework designed to assist employees in the workplace who find themselves to be subject to religious, racial, or sexual discrimination.	√		

77.	However, the U.S. judiciary also weighs in on claims of religious discrimination by prisons in U.S. correctional facilities, although decidedly in a much more negative manner.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
78.	By reiteratively engaging with Muslim women’s ability to wear the veil in the workplace, rather than explicitly legalizing or banning the veil, the U.S. courts address Muslim women through a subtle disciplining process that has less to do with outright legal policies that ban the hijab but rather which expand and contract the boundaries of acceptable public dress against the backdrop of an unmarked secularism.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
79.	The multiple reiterations—through various U.S. courts that hear discrimination cases against hijabis—serve to continually reenact different iterations of the acceptable Muslim female subject.	√		
80.	Muslim women who wear the hijab receive a range of market, police, judicial, and media receptions with reference to the liberal tenet that is being contested or reinscribed at various moments.	√		
81.	Consider the following catalogue: in 2005, two young Muslim teens were arrested, strip-searched, detained, and interrogated for eight weeks on the suspicion of being potential suicide bombers or terrorists.	√		
82.	In 2003, a Muslim female police officer was fired for wearing the hijab on the ground that	√		



	she violated the Philadelphia Police Department's uniform policy.			
83.	Women who wear the hijab are routinely employed to work in (some of the same) businesses that require some social visibility, whether in clothing stores or nonprofit organizations.	√		
84.	By contrast, there have been multiple occasions (and a few legal cases) about Muslim women or teens who wear the hijab who were either not hired by or fired from clothing stores because they did not conform to in-house dress policies.	√		
85.	In one instance, the U.S. Department of Justice filed and settled a civil discrimination suit on behalf of a New Jersey corrections officer who was fired for wearing the hijab.	√		
86.	In other instances, imprisoned Muslim women have been forced to remove their hijabs on the grounds that they could injure someone else or themselves.	√		
87.	Women have been required to remove their hijabs on threat of being barred from the courtroom where they were conducting unrelated business.	√		
88.	One order came from the governing judge on the grounds that she violated the courts' need for transparency, identity and publicness.	√		
89.	In 2007, the Transportation Security Association announced its intent to screen and examine anyone who wore headgear,			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)

	including men who wear baseball caps, cowboy hats, and turbans.			
90.	In many cases, women were not able to obtain redress for these injustices or other forms of daily harassment or physical violence even when they were the aggrieved parties.	√		
91.	Yet, other women and Muslim teens who wear hijab, niqab, or burqas report having to deal with daily harassments or fear of physical violence.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
92.	Socially, the responses of Muslim women to their environments have been mixed as well: a significant number of Muslim women appear to have begun wearing the hijab since 9/11 in response to any number of events;	√		
93.	still others have decided not to wear the hijab in order not to inhibit their professional lives within the context of a post-9/11 wary labor market.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
94.	I have pointed to a range of unsystematic treatments and receptions of Muslim women in order to illuminate the elastic boundaries of liberalism and the corresponding reinscriptions of the good (female liberal) citizen, which oscillate between the indifferent rejection of certain Muslim women and the accommodation of certain stylized Muslim women.		√ (Proclaim – Pronounce)	
95.	The spectrum of acceptable dress at work or in public more generally for women in the United States is modulated less by some transcendent standard of glamour or	√		

	suitability of the outfit than by a cultural aesthetic that reflects the convergence of a range of economic and sociopolitical forces.			
96.	It seems possible to identify a few elements that enable the neoliberal collaboration between sovereignty, capital, and media.			√ (Entertain)
97.	These forces work together to script repeatedly the particular—patriarchal—exemplification of liberal public comportment.	√		
98.	The Western secular female subject is supposed to reveal herself in certain public/professional modes: she unconceals her face, leaves her body moderately concealed, and exhibits her legs and ankles (unless she inhabits masculine clothing, such as a pantsuit).	√		
99.	The quintessential model of “Western business attire” as described, with slight variants, on multiple blogs for Model United Nations, emphasizes professionalism.	√		
100.	One points to suits (crediting French designer Coco Chanel for pioneering suits for women) and neutral colors and discourages headgear, although no mention is made of religious head coverings.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
101.	In this collaboration, the projection of how a good liberal female citizen comports is so ubiquitous as to become the invisible ether that surrounds us: the masculinist insistence on a stylized form of professional female dress is grounded in the courts’ refusal to	√		

	overturn professional dress codes for women.			
102.	Most media depictions of the generic acceptable Western/liberal female subject reflect a seemingly hegemonic dress code.			√ (Entertain)
103.	American and global television anchors dress similarly; subjects of television news stories, print media, and films are parliamentarians, corporate executives, low-level business women, or housewives dressed in slacks and pants.	√		
104.	Moreover, there is a certain laissez-faire attitude, with the implicit nod from the state, which permits employers and businesses to regulate the professional dress best suited to their market.	√		
105.	Depending upon the political/social/cultural milieu, these codes preclude outfits that are not expressly secular or American.	√		
106.	That is, they are cleansed of specifically cultural or ethnic references, such as the sari or the chador, among other kinds of clothing.	√		
107.	In the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations concerning religious discrimination and accommodation, employers are required to accommodate particular religious needs/expressions unless they impose “an undue hardship” on the place of business.	√		
108.	But the message is mixed, as found in the three sections concerning religious discrimination and reasonable		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	

	accommodation, stated in direct sequence on the EEOC website:			
109.	The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business	√		
110.	This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion.			√ (Entertain)
111.	Examples of some common religious accommodations include flexible scheduling, voluntary shift substitutions or swaps, job reassignments, and modifications to workplace policies or practices.	√		
112.	Unless it would be an undue hardship on the employer's operation of its business,		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
113.	an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices.			√ (Entertain)
114.	This applies not only to schedule changes or leave for religious observances,		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
115.	but also to such things as dress or grooming practices that an employee has for religious reasons.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
116.	These might include, for example, wearing particular head coverings or other religious dress (such as a Jewish yarmulke or a Muslim headscarf), or wearing certain hairstyles or facial hair (such as Rastafarian dreadlocks or Sikh uncut hair and beard).			√ (Entertain)

117.	It also includes an employee's observance of a religious prohibition against wearing certain garments (such as pants or miniskirts).	√		
118.	When an employee or applicant needs a dress or grooming accommodation for religious reasons, he should notify the employer that he needs such an accommodation for religious reasons.	√		
119.	If the employer reasonably needs more information, the employer and the employee should engage in an interactive process to discuss the request.	√		
120.	If it would not pose an undue hardship, the employer must grant the accommodation.			√ (Entertain)
121.	An employer does not have to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices if doing so would cause undue hardship to the employer.		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
122.	An accommodation may cause undue hardship if it is costly, compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights of other employees, or requires other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work.			√ (Entertain)
123.	The first two sections state clearly that employers must accommodate an employee's religious practices unless doing so would cause more than a "minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business."			√ (Entertain)

124.	The second and third sections then emphasize the escape clause of “an undue burden” that would allow employers to discriminate against those requiring religious accommodation.	√		
125.	There are many ways in which the escape clause of “decreasing workplace efficiency, infringing on the rights of other employees,” can be invoked by employers to not hire or fire a woman who wears the hijab (for example, placing someone in the stockroom, then deciding that such a placement is inefficient or imposes a burden on their colleagues or that such accommodations cause their colleagues discomfort by explicit religious expressions and considering such expressions a form of harassment, through some leap of logic).	√		
126.	Yet, as we have seen, various employers permit Muslim women to wear the hijab		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
127.	(that is to say, they are not explicitly harassed, fired, beaten, or stigmatized).		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
128.	Occasionally, they can be seen as the victims of discrimination.	√		
129.	And in still other instances, they are disciplined by being fired, jailed, or reprimanded—or physically beaten, without redress.	√		
130.	These outcomes suggest that, despite the absence of explicit regulations concerning the hijab, <i>there is nevertheless a form of disciplining that continually reinscribes the ideal of the good liberal female citizen in</i>			√ (Entertain)

	<i>contrast to the unruly, defiant, or difficult Muslim female subject.</i>			
131.	This inscription, based on the contingencies of the particular political moment, can accommodate certain kinds of visibly Muslim women—those who are acceptable—who are products of modernization to some degree, that is, who appear professional: they work in a labor force, have certain skills that warrant them, if not respect, at least freedom from harassment or tolerance.	√		
132.	These dress codes reinforce a certain expectation for professional women that appears to mark the norm of what a mildly liberated autonomous female subject looks like and, in turn, reinforces the assumption that the cooperative Muslim female citizen will be tolerated or accommodated if she can conform to certain key aesthetic principles of Western qua secular professional dress.	√		
133.	Thus, understood as the hallmark of the liberal feminist subject, such a Muslim woman might be someone who—despite wearing the hijab—exhibits certain key traits that confirm her liberal comportment.			√ (Entertain)
134.	These traits might include sociability (especially with a non-Muslim secular public), cooperativeness, education, professional status, and engagement in secular/civil society and market activities.			√ (Entertain)
135.	This accommodation requires a certain reconciliation with the ideal vision of the	√		



	liberal female subject and the violation of certain revered tenets such as transparency.			
136.	The norm of transparency also implies a liberal expectation of publicity, oversight, and accountability.	√		
137.	This norm is expressed through exchanges, contracts, and other forms of public communication, as these govern the relation between individuals.	√		
138.	That is to say, they make clear the expectations to be met by each party in any given transaction.	√		
139.	This version of transparency, in addition to that mode of transparency which is the conduit of relations between the state and the individual, suggests that this is the standard neutral liberal expectation of citizens in the liberal polity.			√ (Entertain)
140.	Both of these are exemplified in a Michigan small claims court judge's order that a Muslim woman remove her niqab or have her case dismissed.	√		
141.	She refused, explaining that she could only do so in front of a female judge, at which point her case <i>was</i> dismissed.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
142.	The judge's explanation for his actions were that he needed to see her face to verify whether she was telling the truth.	√		
143.	But, in fact, his position belied other frequent forms of communications that have no such transparency, such as audio recordings of phone conversations, which rely on intonations, pitch, and other features		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	

	of meaning but—until recently—not necessarily facial expressions.			
144.	As well, as the American Civil Liberties Union has commented in relation to this judge’s actions,			√ (Attribute – Acknowledge)
145.	there are multiple examples of visually disabled judges or juries who must rely on audio recordings, or disabled witnesses who are not able to communicate expressively with their faces.			√ (Entertain)
146.	The inconsistency of the judge’s position betrays a preference for a certain cultural comportment that ensures certain shared understandings, views, and attitudes—	√		
147.	revealing that communication is not a way to express uniqueness of standpoint,		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
148.	but rather “a shorthand by which to communicate variations of those ideas, norms, and procedures that are mostly shared”.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
149.	We can find similar expectations in the Georgia courts system, which prohibits the hijab in courtrooms and has gone so far as to arrest one woman who refused to remove her hijab except in front of a female judge.	√		
150.	From this, we might infer that the subject who wears the hijab/niqab/chador is concealing something and, thus, has violated the expectation of a common (cultural) appearance that is supposed to be shared by liberal female subjects.			√ (Entertain)
151.	But such violations can be mitigated in certain professional and cultural sub-		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	

	contexts by the woman who wears the hijab if that appearance reflects a particular version of openness and a certain stylized approachability that is expressed through the public exhibition of one's self.			
152.	In so doing, the Muslim woman challenges the cultural hegemony that undergirds the modern liberal environment enveloping the modern liberal woman/female professional.	√		
153.	Even though a refreshed politics of national security in the aftermath of 9/11 is partially responsible for a dominant wariness toward Muslim women, the political, social, and economic consequences of wearing the hijab appear to be different for Muslim women of different class backgrounds.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
154.	Certain female Muslim community leaders in the public eye wear the hijab while engaging in numerous contestations over Islam and the acceptability of exhibiting their faith and commitments publicly.	√		
155.	Yet, they also receive a certain acceptability from a significant part of the public by showing their similarities to secular women in certain visible ways.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
156.	Consider, for example, Linda Sarsour, a community organizer and director of the Arab American Association of New York, or the recently elected congresswoman from Minnesota, Rep. Ilhan Omar, both of whom are outspoken American Muslim women who wear the hijab even as they are publicly American and speak the language of	√		

	liberalism, that is, civil rights, constitution, and so on.			
157.	Evidence of this is marked by their sociability, education, and ability to engage in various civil society and market activities, whether as community organizers or professionals, or as people who interact with different kinds of governmental institutions—that is, already acting with the state symbolically and figuratively.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
158.	On January 6, 2019, the U.S. Congress voted to amend a nearly two-centuries-old Congressional ban on headgear to exempt religious headwear.	√		
159.	The repeal was passed successfully.	√		
160.	Both women have also received ample criticisms for their outspoken advocacy of many controversial issues.	√		
161.	Thus, while they are vilified by certain segments of the secular U.S. populace, they have received support from other segments, in part because of their being marked as appropriate liberal feminist subjects for being able to communicate and build bridges with non-Muslim, often secular, audiences.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
162.	Not all hijabis are seen as suitable female subjects in liberal societies.		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
163.	Hijabis who do not have the social clout that Omar and Sarsour hold—women who are prisoners and not seen as upstanding professional liberated female subjects—receive a very different treatment.	√		

164.	When Muslim women encounter corrections officers or face time in prison, they are then relegated to the category of the unruly, difficult, Muslim woman and much more likely to be dismissed, ruled against, or discriminated against.	√		
165.	The question of the right to religious expression is addressed dissimilarly in cases involving hijabis in prisons or as visitors in courtrooms than in professional/employment contexts.	√		
166.	The response of the courts has been to rule against Muslim women as prisoners on the grounds that there is a larger security concern that must be attended.			√ (Entertain)
167.	For example, as recently as 2018, the District Court of New Jersey ruled against prisoner Melany Chila's claim to religious discrimination for being forced to remove her headscarf in 2016.	√		
168.	The New Jersey District Court found multiple ways to rule against Chila on a range of claims.	√		
169.	The overall claim, that her constitutional rights were violated by the Camden County Correctional Facility, was dismissed by the Court on the grounds that the prison is not a person and, therefore, not liable to accommodate her objections.	√		
170.	There were also two specifically religious discrimination claims: Chila charged that her religious rights were violated because she was forced to remove her headscarf and also	√		

	because she was denied access to her Qur'an and from leaving the cell to worship.			
171.	The first claim occurred in 2007, and the second occurred in 2016.	√		
172.	The New Jersey District Court found that the 2007 claim was barred from being ruled upon due to the statute of limitations.	√		
173.	Regarding the 2016 claim, the Court found Chila's claim not substantial because her stay in the prison was brief (ten days);		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
174.	thus, while her rights may have been violated on some occasions, <i>these were too sporadic</i> to be supported.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
175.	In support of its judgment, the Court pointed to earlier cases whereby plaintiffs' similar claims were denied because the stay in prison was too short to affect one's religious beliefs.	√		
176.	The Court's language here is rather remarkable:	√		
177.	Plaintiff's claims with respect to her <i>hijab</i> , Quran access, and hair exposure during the period "Jan 5, 2016 - 1-15-16" <i>may have constituted</i> an intrusion upon Plaintiff's prayers and practices on some occasions during this brief ten-day period of 2016 incarceration,			√ (Entertain)
178.	<i>but these events were relatively short-term and therefore do not constitute a substantial interference.</i>		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
179.	The Court was not convinced that Chila's rights were violated because of the short duration of her prison stay.		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	

180.	Moreover, citing a 2007 case,			√ (Attribute – Distance)
181.	the Court further insists that because of the short duration, rather than the actual violation, the violation was a minimal rather than substantial burden on Chila’s actual religious beliefs.		√ (Proclaim – Pronounce)	
182.	Moreover, the refusal of CCCF to allow her to leave her cell to pray was due to concerns about security and orderliness and therefore outweighed her religious commitments.	√		
183.	Certainly, it is legitimate for the state to have concerns about state/institutional security and safety in correctional facilities.		√ (Proclaim – Concur – Affirm)	
184.	Those interests involve a set of concerns that must be addressed, involving the balance between the prisoner’s rights and the security/neutrality objectives of the government and alternative accommodations			√ (Entertain)
185.	But the link in this case appears tenuous at best.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
186.	As we can see from this recent case, the state had few concerns about religious discrimination with regard to Muslim women in prison and was not part of a larger trend to combat discrimination against Muslim women.	√		
187.	In other cases—again, mostly involving Muslim women as prisoners or as courtroom visitors—courts have dismissed charges brought by them on technical or jurisdictional grounds.	√		

188.	Often, the question of whether women have the right to wear the hijab wherever they go is evaded or sidelined in the interests of the question of principles: freedom or security, or they are preempted through settlements or other types of compromises.	√		
189.	These cases suggest that			√ (Entertain)
190.	there is not a single trajectory in the direction of greater accommodations to Muslims		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	
191.	but rather multiple expansions and contractions of acceptability.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
192.	Also, notably, these judgments are laid down in the absence of explicit anti-hijab legislations.	√		
193.	Furthermore, they are issued <i>even in the face of explicit religious accommodation concerns</i> .		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
194.	The contrary way in which courts rule against Muslim women in prison raises questions about the perspective that hijabis do not face discrimination in the United States.	√		
195.	The widespread and varied treatment of Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States should not be understood as a more open or accepting attitude toward them.	√		
196.	Judging by the way that the hijab becomes (or does not become) a focus of controversy in the American context, the state collaborates with markets and various local	√		



	public institutions (prisons, courts, school systems) to regulate the hijab and produce both the “good” and the “unruly” Muslim female subject.			
197.	It does so either by prohibiting the hijab or accommodating—on a micro level—women who wear the hijab; this appears to be the preferred method in the American liberal polity, rather than passing laws that prescribe how, when, and where the hijab shall be worn and by whom.	√		
198.	This method of disciplining is consistent with the long history of liberalism, which intersects with the market or engages in laissez-faire or hands-off libertarian practices in order to manage its subjects and in turn vilifies the defiant subject or produces/ rewards noteworthy liberal citizens.	√		
199.	At base, the question of the suitable liberal subject is formed and influenced through the prioritization of markets, employers, and profits in connection with state institutions.	√		
200.	That relationship is shaped through a discursive relationship between the institutions within the neoliberal (market-based, laissez-faire) paradigm in relation to the liberal precepts that form the American self-understanding.	√		
201.	There is also a dialectical relationship between the neoliberal polity and Muslim women, who are not mere bodies acted upon by the state,		√ (Disclaim – Deny)	

202.	but also engaged in decisions based on a set of contingencies, vulnerabilities, and ethical commitments, social influences, and personal obligations.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
203.	As such, the intersections where a Muslim woman is marked [...] will also be marked by institutional forces that may not be explicitly legislative		√ (Proclaim – Concur – Affair)	
204.	—certainly by race, gender, and class—			√ (Entertain)
205.	but also not limited to immediate family/community influences.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
206.	Thus, the negotiation may be done even in the aftermath of a victory to wear the hijab in her workplace—after which she may decide that her options are too strictly limited by wearing the hijab—			√ (Entertain)
207.	or, again, she may decide to return to the hijab in order to negotiate certain professional goals through the close cultural, patriarchal, or social strictures of one’s family.			√ (Entertain)
208.	This complex interaction and neoliberal collaboration can be understood as a reflection of the current official sentiments of the day,	√		
209.	but always with a view to the American polity’s elastic self-understanding as a liberal society.		√ (Disclaim – Counter)	
210.	The market, as both the mainstay of American liberalism and an important signifier of the ethically acceptable liberal subject, serves as the mechanism that	√		

	<p>interacts with a range of other institutions, including the judiciary and the police, in the service of the state's protection of its political and cultural boundaries, all the while accommodating or disciplining the Muslim female subject in a dialectical frame, depending upon the political vagaries of the moment.</p>			
211.	<p>Whether or not these cases are taken up, whether they are considered, how they are ruled—and taken up at higher echelons—circumscribes the state's ability to continually expand or contract the boundaries of liberalism in order to produce suitable Muslim women against the unmarked backdrop of the public secular aesthetic of the United States.</p>	√		

No	Words, Phrases, Clauses and Sentences	Graduation	
		Focus	Force
1.	I explore some of the elements by which Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States are managed		√ (Quantification – Number)
2.	a range of public and private institutions		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
3.	The particular infraction of women who wear the hijab is their conspicuously heterogeneous comportment—		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Lexicalisation)
4.	they conspicuously violate a dominant neutral cultural or political norm.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Lexicalisation)
5.	—so different that it is a matter of “deep translation”—		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
6.	On a global level, this is how much of North America, Europe, and Australia have responded to the events of September 11, 2001, namely, through a domestic and global politics of national security.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Space)
7.	an ever-increasing challenge to Muslims’ cultural and religious commitments,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
8.	As such, <i>to subscribe visibly to Islam is to always already be a problem.</i>		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
9.	There may be multiple historical and political rationales behind this hostility: at some level, there may be a widespread racial–sexual assumption that Muslim women, by the dictates of a (seemingly) monolithic Islam, are subservient, oppressed, and thereby unthreatening.		√ (Quantification – Number)  √ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Space)

10.	Certainly, we saw the expression of this belief in the rhetorical motivations expressed by First Lady Laura Bush soon after 9/11.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)
11.	Strings of address emerge that reach from persons to persons . . . from persons to things . . . from things to things (from spoon to oil, water, yolk), and from things to persons (from curdled mayonnaise to Lugones and onward to us).		√ (Intensification – Repetition – Quality)
12.	As such, the veil has multiple modalities, multiple relations to persons:		√ (Intensification – Repetition – Quality)
13.	As global attention to potential explosive activities construed as Islamic terrorism increases, this fear appears to increase correspondingly.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Space)
14.	In contemporary France, Muslim women have continued to face extensive, explicit, and continuous challenges to their visible public commitments to their faith and culture.		√ (Intensification – Repetition – Quality)
15.	The aesthetic norm of French public space—proudly presented as devoid of religious symbols—was imagined to be about liberal secularism.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation)
16.	Following Perina, we might argue that French public space is, again, the culturally unmarked default.	√ (Sharpen)	
17.	For the French, the veil is overdetermined as a racial affront,		√ (Intensification – Infusion – Process)
18.	as Fanon shows us all too vividly.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
19.	will it be the secular French looking to justify and redeem their colonial past or will it be the inferior and oppressive culture of Islam, against which the West has waged a centuries-long war?		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Time)

20.	the broad realm of Muslim men who have been detained or incarcerated without Constitutional due process over the last two decades,		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
21.	but in less explicit ways than their French or other European counterparts’ approach of outlawing conspicuous religious symbols.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
22.	For example, there is a long history of the American state’s defense of religious expression,		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Time)
23.	The protection of religious expression nevertheless has a robust narrative in the United States, effectively creating a familiar and accepted legal framework in which to challenge attempts to ban religious practices or symbols.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
24.	effective challenges to the hijab are better leveled by illustrating how it violates some other liberal principle,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
25.	Especially during times of crisis, it is selectively enforced.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
26.	The idea of managing subjects is perhaps best articulated by Michel Foucault’s discussion of governmentality,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
27.	it is to be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs		√ (Intensification – Repetition – Process)
28.	we might understand governmentality as operating at several levels.		√ (Quantification – Number)
29.	while selectively enforcing Constitutional law for some populations and not others.		√ (Quantification – Number)
30.	In the interest of national security, governmentality might reflect the strategic enforcement of constitutional protections for some individuals, combined with the		√ (Quantification – Number)

	strategic privation of the same protections for populations deemed threats to national security.		
31.	the United States prosecuted numerous individuals who were deemed to lend support to terrorist organizations,		√ (Quantification – Number)
32.	Borrowing further from Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics as the separation and production of certain populations,		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Space)
33.	we might understand this as part of a larger ontopolitical production of suitable or unacceptable Muslims,		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
34.	These are seen through the mechanisms of markets and judiciaries, along with the absence of explicit regulations or laws, at least typically.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Lexicalisation)
35.	The interplay of public and private institutions, sometimes with policing institutions,		√ (Intensification – Infusion – Modality)
36.	the American liberal state relies on judicial review, in which a contested claim is brought to the (higher) courts,		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
37.	The higher judiciary decides whether it will consider a claim of procedural or constitutional violation.		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
38.	The American legal system relies heavily on judicial review to gauge whether contested actions conform to constitutional precepts.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation NonFigurative)
39.	In so doing, the judiciary continually engages and revises doctrinal lawmaking		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation NonFigurative)
40.	Muslim women’s claims to religious expression—most often in the workplace,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)

41.	a much more negative manner		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
42.	rather than explicitly legalizing or banning the veil,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation)
43.	a subtle disciplining process that has less to do with outright legal policies that ban the hijab		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
44.	The multiple reiterations—through various U.S. courts that hear discrimination cases against hijabis—serve to continually reenact different iterations of the acceptable Muslim female subject.		√ (Quantification – Number)  √ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation NonFigurative)
45.	a range of market, police, judicial, and media receptions with reference to the liberal tenet that is being contested or reinscribed at various moments.		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
46.	Women who wear the hijab are routinely employed to work in (some of the same) businesses that require some social visibility,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation)
47.	By contrast, there have been multiple occasions (and a few legal cases) about Muslim women or teens who wear the hijab who were either not hired by or fired from clothing stores because they did not conform to in-house dress policies.		√ (Quantification – Number)
48.	In many cases		√ (Quantification – Number)
49.	other forms of daily harassment		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Time)



50.	a significant number of Muslim women appear to have begun wearing the hijab since 9/11 in response to any number of events;		√ (Quantification – Number)
51.	or in public more generally		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
52.	The spectrum of acceptable dress at work [...] for women in the United States is modulated less by some transcendent standard of glamour or suitability of the outfit than by a cultural aesthetic that reflects the convergence of a range of economic and sociopolitical forces.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
53.	she [...]leaves her body moderately concealed,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation NonFigurative)
54.	The quintessential model of “Western business attire” as described, with slight variants, on multiple blogs for Model United Nations, emphasizes professionalism.		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
55.	In this collaboration, the projection of how a good liberal female citizen comports is so ubiquitous		√ (Quantification – Number)
56.	Most media depictions of the generic acceptable Western/liberal female subject reflect a seemingly hegemonic dress code.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
57.	American and global television anchors dress similarly;		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Lexicalisation)
58.	these codes preclude outfits that are not expressly secular or American.		√

			(Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation)
59.	The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer’s business.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
60.	Examples of some common religious accommodations include [...]		√ (Quantification – Number)
61.	If the employer reasonably needs more information,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
62.	There are many ways		√ (Quantification – Number)
63.	some leap of logic		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
64.	they are not explicitly harassed, fired, beaten, or stigmatized		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation)
65.	Occasionally, they can be seen as the victims of discrimination.		√ (Intensification – Infusion – Process)
66.	<i>there is nevertheless a form of disciplining that continually reinscribes the ideal of the good liberal female citizen in contrast to the unruly, defiant, or difficult Muslim female subject.</i>		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation NonFigurative)
67.	what a mildly liberated autonomous female subject looks like		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
68.	a Michigan small claims court judge’s order		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)

69.	But, in fact, his position belied other frequent forms of communications that have no such transparency, such as audio recordings of phone conversations, which rely on intonations, pitch, and other features of meaning but—until recently—not necessarily facial expressions.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)
70.	there are multiple examples of visually disabled judges or juries who must rely on audio recordings,		√ (Quantification – Number)
71.	or disabled witnesses who are not able to communicate expressively with their faces.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation)
72.	“a shorthand by which to communicate variations of those ideas, norms, and procedures that are mostly shared”		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)
73.	Even though a refreshed politics of national security in the aftermath of 9/11 is partially responsible for a dominant wariness toward Muslim women,		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
74.	in numerous contestations over Islam and the acceptability of exhibiting their faith and commitments publicly.		√ (Quantification – Number)
75.	the recently elected congresswoman from Minnesota, Rep. Ilhan Omar,		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)
76.	a nearly two-centuries-old Congressional ban on headgear		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
77.	The repeal was passed successfully.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation)
78.	Both women have also received ample criticisms for their outspoken advocacy of many controversial issues.		√ (Quantification – Number)
79.	a very different treatment		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)

80.	they are then relegated to the category of the unruly, difficult, Muslim woman and much more likely to be dismissed, ruled against, or discriminated against.		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
81.	The question of the right to religious expression is addressed dissimilarly		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Lexicalisation)
82.	there is a larger security concern that must be attended		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
83.	For example, as recently as 2018, the District Court of New Jersey ruled against prisoner Melany Chila’s claim to religious discrimination for being forced to remove her headscarf in 2016.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)
84.	The New Jersey District Court found multiple ways to rule against Chila on a range of claims.		√ (Quantification – Number)
85.	The overall claim		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
86.	the Court found Chila’s claim not substantial because her stay in the prison was brief (ten days);		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Time)
87.	thus, while her rights may have been violated on some occasions, <i>these were too sporadic</i> to be supported.		√ (Quantification – Number) √ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
88.	The Court’s language here is rather remarkable:		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
89.	<i>but these events were relatively short-term</i>		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Process – Grammatical)

			√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Time)
90.	The Court was not convinced that Chila’s rights were violated because of the short duration of her prison stay.		√ (Quantification – Extent – Distribution – Time)
91.	Moreover, citing a 2007 case, the Court further insists that because of the short duration, rather than the actual violation, the violation was a minimal rather than substantial burden on Chila’s actual religious beliefs.		√ (Intensification – Infusion – Process)
92.	As we can see from this recent case,		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)
93.	part of a larger trend to combat discrimination against Muslim women		√ (Quantification – Mass/Presence)
94.	In other cases—again, mostly involving Muslim women as prisoners or as courtroom visitors—	√ (Sharpen)	
95.	Often, the question of whether women have the right to wear the hijab wherever they go is evaded or sidelined in the interests of the question of principles:		√ (Intensification – Infusion – Quality)
96.	multiple expansions and contractions of acceptability		√ (Quantification – Number)
97.	a more open or accepting attitude toward them		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)
98.	the long history of liberalism		√ (Quantification – Extent – Proximity – Time)
99.	her options are too strictly limited by wearing the hijab		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Grammatical)

100.	or, again, she may decide to return to the hijab in order to negotiate certain professional goals through the close cultural, patriarchal, or social strictures of one's family.	√ (Sharpen)	
101.	This complex interaction and neoliberal collaboration can be understood as a reflection of the current official sentiments of the day, but always with a view to the American polity's elastic self-understanding as a liberal society.		√ (Intensification – Maximisation)
102.	an important signifier of the ethically acceptable liberal subject		√ (Intensification – Isolation – Quality – Lexicalisation)

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